

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): LaSalle County Station Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4										PAGE 19 1 OF 2	
TITLE (4): Group VI Isolation																					
EVENT DATE (5): MONTH DAY YEAR 0 4 1 3 8 5			LER NUMBER (6): YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 8 5 - 0 1 7 - 0 0 0 5 0 2 8 5			REPORT DATE (7): MONTH DAY YEAR 0 4 1 3 8 5			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8): FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 0												
OPERATING MODE (9): 4			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11):																		
POWER LEVEL (10): 0.010			20.402(a)			20.406(a)			X 80.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)									
			20.406(a)(1)(i)			80.36(a)(1)			80.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)									
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)			80.36(a)(2)			80.73(a)(2)(vi)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)									
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)			80.73(a)(2)(i)			80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)												
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)			80.73(a)(2)(ii)			80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)												
			20.406(a)(1)(v)			80.73(a)(2)(iii)			80.73(a)(2)(viii)												
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):																					
NAME Michael J. Martinovich										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 3 5 7 6 7 6 1											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13):																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC												
B	JM	PS	S 3 8 2	N																	
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15):		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE):										X NO											
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16):																					
<p>While clearing the out of service on reactor pressure switches (PS) 2B33-N018A, B (RR), a Group 6 isolation occurred. This isolation closed the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling Suction Inboard (2E12-F009) and Outboard (2E12-F008) isolation valves along with the Shutdown Cooling Injection Valve (2E12-F053A).</p> <p>Isolation logic had been bypassed using a jumper to prevent isolations during installation of Environmentally Qualified switches. During removal of the jumper, the logic was dropped out (de-energize to activate) and the isolation occurred as designed.</p> <p>Technical Staff and the electrical contractor traced wiring diagrams against the field installation until they found the cause of the isolation. One set of contacts from a pressure switch had been incorrectly wired to an open terminal. This discrepancy was immediately corrected and the system returned to service.</p>																					
8505160418 850502 PDR ADOCK 05000374 S PDR																					

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/91

FACILITY NAME (1): LaSalle County Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2): 05000374	LER NUMBER (5):			PAGE (3):	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		85	017	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A (1/77))

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On April 13, 1985, while clearing the out of service on the 135 psig reactor pressure switches (PS), 2B33-NO18A, B (AD, RR), a Group 6 isolation (JM) occurred. This isolation closed the Residual Heat Removal (BO, RHR) Shutdown Cooling Suction Inboard (2E12-FO09) and Outboard (2E12-FO08) isolation valves along with the Shutdown Cooling Injection Valve (2E12-FO53A). Jumpers were installed to clear the isolation so that post installation calibrations could be performed on these switches.

II. CAUSE

Environmental Qualification Modifications had replaced pressure switches (PS) 2B33-NO18A, B and (PS) 2E31-NO12A, B with qualified Static-O-Ring (SOR) switches. Isolation logic had been bypassed using a jumper in the logic trains to prevent isolations during installation of these switches. Some new wiring was required on these switches. When the Outboard Residual Heat Removal Isolation Logic was being returned to service, the live circuit was broken because one set of contacts had been inadvertently wired to an open terminal due to an installation error. This open circuit de-energized the logic controlling relay (K74) to cause an isolation.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the isolation LaSalle Unit 2 was in Operational Condition 4, Cold Shutdown. These switches have contacts in series to initiate the appropriate logic. When the logic dropped out (de-energize to activate), the affected valves isolated as designed. The system was walked down for leaks and restarted with the installation of jumpers bypassing the isolation. Safe plant operation was maintained at all times.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Technical Staff and the electrical contractor traced the wiring diagrams against the field installation until they found the cause of the isolation. The wiring discrepancy was immediately corrected and the system returned to service.

V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

No previous occurrences have been reported.

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

Michael J. Martinovich, 815/357-6761, extension 469.



Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
Rural Route #1, Box 220
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

May 2, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #85-017-00, Docket #050-374 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

G. J. Diederich
G. J. Diederich
Station Superintendent
LaSalle County Station

GJD/DRR/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director
INPO-Records Center
File/NRC

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