



Entergy

Entergy Operations, Inc.  
River Bend Station  
5485 U. S. Highway 61  
P.O. Box 220  
St. Francisville, LA 70775  
Tel 504 336 6225  
Fax 504 635 5068

Rick J. King  
Director  
Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
M/S P1-37  
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: River Bend Station - Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-458  
Clarifications for the Temporary Addendum to River Bend Station (RBS) Physical Security Plan - Revision 17

Reference: Temporary Addendum to River Bend Station Physical Security Plan - Revision 17, per RBG-42819, dated May 3, 1996

File No.: G9.5, G12.23.4.1

RBG-42947  
RBF1-96-0223

Gentlemen:

Enclosed are clarifications and additional detail concerning the temporary addendum to Revision 17 of the River Bend Station (RBS) Physical Security Plan [docketed submittal of May 3rd, 1996, per RBG-42819]. These clarifications and details are being provided per the request of Mr. Tom Dexter, NRC Region IV, and do not constitute licensee commitments by RBS. No safeguards information is identified in the enclosure to this letter. As noted in the addendum submittal, the temporary variances will be necessary during the timeframe of the switchover from the current RBS security system/computer to the new system.

If you have any questions or require additional information regarding these clarifications, please contact Howard Hutchens at (504) 336-6245.

Sincerely,

WJF/km  
enclosure

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Clarifications for the Temporary Addendum  
to Rev. 17 of the RBS Security Plan  
June 6, 1996  
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cc: Mr. L. J. Callan, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region IV  
611 Ryan Drive, Suite 400  
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Senior Resident Inspector  
P. O. Box 1050  
St. Francisville, LA 70775

Mr. David L. Wigginton  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
M/S OWFN 13-H-15  
Washington, DC 20555

### **Multiplexer/System Switch Over**

Prior to switch over, items that will have already been installed are Versa Modular European (VME) buses, network equipment, fiber cabling, the Temporary Alarm Station (TAS), and the Access Control Station (ACS) console. The network will have been established on an unloaded database and multiplexers zones will have been reconfigured.

It will take approximately 2 to 3 hours to perform the switch over and testing per multiplexer. The switch over is anticipated to take place around August 15 which leads into a three day weekend for the plant. This time frame was chosen to minimize the number of personnel on site. A Temporary Security Position Instruction will be used to ensure security personnel are aware of the sequence of events and their role in the transition. The Central Alarm Station (CAS), Secondary Alarm Station (SAS), TAS, and ACS console will be manned during this transition period.

The first action to take place will be to manually log personnel in the plant into the new system. It is anticipated this will be approximately 40 to 60 people. As personnel enter and leave the protected area, the new system will be updated until the card readers for Multiplexer (MUX) 1 are switched, become operational, and are tested.

Multiplexers will be switched over in the following order:

Mux 1 which contains the north perimeter and the Primary Access Point. (\*7 compensatory personnel)

Mux 6 which contains the south perimeter and the Normal Switch Gear Building. (\*4 compensatory personnel)

Mux 3 which contains the Fuel Building, a portion of the Reactor Building, and Standby Service Water Cooling Tower including G-Tunnel. (\* 7 compensatory personnel)

Mux 2 which contains the Auxiliary Building and a portion of the Reactor Building. (\*7 compensatory personnel)

Mux 5 which contains the Control Building. (\*6 compensatory personnel)

Mux 4 which contains the Diesel Generator Building. (\*3 compensatory personnel)

\*These positions are as prescribed in PSP-4-307, "Operations (Security Systems Compensation)".

The following sequence of events will be performed to switch over each multiplexer:

1. Position compensatory personnel.
2. Unplug Sygnatron supervised line communication cabling and plug it into the new communications chassis. It is anticipated this should take five minutes. (Note: Supervised Line Boards (SLB) will remain powered during this transition. Unplugging the cabling will only affect the ability of the multiplexer to transmit data received from the SLBs.)

3. Unplug Sygnatron card reader interface board communication cabling and plug into new communications chassis. It is anticipated this should take five minutes.
4. Reset VME bus. This redirects the database and makes it active to the new system. It is anticipated this should take five minutes.
5. Testing of alarm points will now occur to verify operability. One tamper switch at each zone point will be tested in the secure mode, access mode, and while in card reader access mode. The balanced magnetic switch (BMS) and latch position switch (LPS) will be tested in the secure mode and each microwave/e-field/fiber optic zone will be tested in the secure mode for operability, as applicable. This is anticipated to take one to two hours depending on the number of alarm points associated with the multiplexer being tested. (Note: Power will not be removed from the zone points nor will the alarm circuit (SLB) be powered down. Only the ability to communicate between the SLB and multiplexer was disabled therefore preserving sensitivity settings.)
6. Test of each card reader by using a valid and invalid test card. These tests are performed at the same time as item 5 above.
7. Compensatory personnel will be secured as zone points are tested.

To ensure personnel are not delayed in the plant as the transition between the existing and new system occurs, the following steps are being taken:

1. Security will run an individual's key card through a temporary card reader in the ACS that is tied to the old system prior to issuing to the individual. This action logs the key card into the protected area.
2. The individual is then issued their key card. Use of the key card at the entry turnstile, will automatically log the key card into the protected area on the new system.
3. Upon exiting the protected area, the individual will card out at the exit turnstile which logs them out of the protected area on the new system. They will then turn in their key card.
4. Security will then run their key card through the phantom reader and through a temporary reader which will log them out of the protected area on the old system.

When the last multiplexer is switched over and the system is tested, the old system's database will be backed up on tape and shutdown. CAS and SAS personnel will then be relieved as TAS and ACS will now be in control of the system. As stated in the "Temporary Addendum to River Bend Station Physical Security Plan - Revision 17", RBG-42819, the transition back to the CAS and the SAS will be approximately 75 days later.