

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2																		
TITLE (4) Primary Containment Isolation System Initiation																																						
EVENT DATE (5)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																				
MONTH			DAY			YEAR			YEAR			SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER			MONTH			DAY			YEAR			FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)					
																											Browns Ferry - Unit 2						0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0					
0 4			1 1			8 5			8 5			0 1			1 1			0 0			0 5			8 5			Browns Ferry - Unit 3						0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6					
OPERATING MODE (9) N						THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																																
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0						20.402(b)						20.405(c)						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)						73.71(b)														
						20.405(a)(1)(i)						50.38(c)(1)						50.73(a)(2)(v)						73.71(c)														
						20.405(a)(1)(ii)						50.38(c)(2)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)						OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 386A)														
						20.405(a)(1)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(i)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)																				
						20.405(a)(1)(iv)						50.73(a)(2)(ii)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																				
20.405(a)(1)(v)						50.73(a)(2)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(ix)																										
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																						
NAME R. C. Steele																TELEPHONE NUMBER 2 0 5 7 2 9 - 3 5 8 3																						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																						
CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NPDOS																				
AR		J M R		L Y		G 0 8 0		Yes																														
AY		J M F		U		M 1 7 5		No																														
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH		DAY		YEAR																
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

The coil in relay 16AK72 failed causing the control circuit fuse to blow. The failure caused a partial initiation of primary containment isolation system. The reactor zone isolation system, refueling zone isolation system, and standby gas treatment system were affected by the isolation.

The failed coil was replaced, and a new fuse was installed. The system was returned to normal.

This is considered to be a random failure and no further recurrence control is required.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Browns Ferry - Units 1, 2, and 3	0500025985	-0	11	-0	0	2	OF 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Unit 1 was in cold shutdown, unit 2 was in a refueling outage, and unit 3 was in cold shutdown.

On April 11, 1985, electrical coil (CL) in relay (RLY) 16AK72 (GE type CR120A) failed resulting in a control circuit fuse (FU) to blow. The event initiated a control room annunciation when unit 2 reactor building ventilation isolation occurred. The licensed operator immediately verified that no signal was present before trying to clear the annunciation. The attempt to reset the isolation signal failed.

The coil failure resulted in hydrogen oxygen analyzer B to isolate, drywell detection outboard valves FCV-90-255 and FCV-90-257A to close, and control room emergency ventilation (VI) system to initiate.

The blown fuse resulted in partial initiation of secondary containment isolation division II, i.e. initiation of reactor zone isolation (VA), refueling zone isolation (VA) and standby gas treatment (BH) system initiation. The safety systems performed as designed.

The failed relay coil was replaced and a new fuse installed. The circuit was returned to normal and the annunciation alarm was reset.

There are approximately 1300 CR120A relays installed at Browns Ferry and less than 0.4 percent per year fail. Since the failure rate is so low, these failures are considered random and no recurrence control is required. This event is not considered to be Part 21 reportable.

There was no danger to the health or safety of the public, plant employees, or equipment at any time during the event.

Responsible Plant Section - N/A

Previous Events - BFRO-50-259/8034, /8163, /8248, /8257, / 8423
BFRO-50-260/7918, /8117, /8225
BFRO-50-296/8009

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

May 10, 1985

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 -
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-259/85011

The enclosed report provides details concerning primary containment
isolation system initiation. This report is submitted in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

G. T. Jones

6- G. T. Jones
Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

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