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May 14, 1996

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318
Special Report Concerning Fire Hose Stations
Technical Specification 3.7.11.4, Action Statement a

In accordance with our Technical Specification 3.7.11.4, Action Statement a, please find attached a Special Report concerning inoperable fire hose stations. Specifically, the fire hose stations in the Unit 1 Containment were inoperable during the Unit 1 refueling outage for greater than 14 days to support work activities associated with local leak rate testing of the Fire Main Containment Penetration and fire main check valve repairs. The Technical Specification required compensatory actions were in place until the affected fire hose stations were restored to an operable status on May 7, 1996.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Peter E. Katz", is written over a horizontal line.

PEK/CDS/bjd

Attachment

cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire
J. E. Silberg, Esquire
Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRC
A. W. Dromerick, NRC
T. T. Martin, NRC
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ATTACHMENT (1)

FIRE HOSE STATIONS SPECIAL REPORT

CAUSE OF INOPERABILITY

On April 4, 1996, the Fire Hose Stations inside the Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Containment were disabled to permit work activities. These activities included conduct of local leak rate tests of the containment isolation valves for the Fire Main Containment Penetration and repairs to one of these isolation valves (a fire system check valve during the Unit 1 Refueling Outage). The Unit 1 Containment contains a total of six hose stations with two each on the 10 foot, 45 foot, and 69 foot elevations. The hose stations inside Containment are supplied from a common system header that penetrates the Containment Structure.

The fire hose stations in this area are listed in Technical Specification Table 3.7-6 and the compensatory measures required when they become inoperable are addressed by Technical Specification 3.7.11.4, Action Statement a. As specified by Technical Specification 3.7.11.4, Action Statement a, if the fire hose station is not restored to an operable status within 14 days, a Special Report must be submitted within 30 days detailing the cause of the inoperability, the action taken and the plans and schedule for restoring it to an operable status. The affected Fire Hose Stations were inoperable for more than 14 days as of April 18, 1996.

ACTION TAKEN

As specified by Technical Specification 3.7.11.4, Action Statement a, an additional equivalent capacity fire hose was routed to the unprotected areas (Containment) from an operable hose station. A temporary fire hose was routed from an outside fire hydrant to inside containment and connected to the containment header while the portion of the Fire Main at the containment penetration was isolated and inoperable. This temporary fire hose was in place until the Fire Main was restored to an operable status on May 7, 1996.

PLANS AND SCHEDULES

Work on the fire system check valve and its containment penetration has been completed and the hose stations inside containment were restored to an operable status on May 7, 1996.