

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SURREY POWER STATION, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)

Lockout of Auto CO₂

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	0 3	8 5	8 5	0 0 5	0 0 0	0 5	0 2	8 5			0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)												
OPERATING MODE (9) N		20.402(b)			20.406(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 1 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(i)			50.38(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(e)	
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)			50.38(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				
		20.406(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME R. F. Saunders, Station Manager		TELEPHONE NUMBER 8 0 1 4 3 1 5 7 1 - 1 3 1 1 8 4	
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE:) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 3, 1985, at 1700 hours, with Unit 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 at Refueling Shutdown, an operator discovered, while clearing tags on various fire zones, that the automatic initiation of CO₂ for fire zone #7 had been locked out and no fire watch was present as required by Technical Specifications.

Operations personnel will verify that a fire watch has been posted in the area(s) affected prior to removing any fire protection system from service.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	8 5	— 0 0 5 —	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

1. Description of the Event:

On April 3, 1985, at approximately 0800 hours, construction personnel requested via a telephone conversation, that the automatic initiation of CO₂ for the Unit 1 cable vault area be locked out in order to facilitate construction activities. As a result of the conversation, operations personnel were under the impression that construction activities would be taking place in both fire zones #5 and #7 located in the unit 1 cable vault and subsequently locked out the CO₂ for both of these zones using the "Blue Tag" system.

However, construction personnel had intended that only zone #5 be tagged out and as a consequence, a fire watch was placed in fire zone #5 only and not in zone #7.

The event went unnoticed until 1700 hours that same day when another operator discovered, while clearing tags following completion of construction activities, that there was no fire watch posted for zone #7 as required by technical specification 3.21.A.5.

2. Safety Consequences and Implications:

The operability of the automatic CO₂ fire suppression system ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available upon demand. The fire warning system for the affected zone remained operable, the CO₂ system was capable of manual initiation, and all other fire warning and suppression systems were operable during this event; therefore, this event did not constitute an unreviewed safety question nor affect the health and safety of the public.

3. Cause:

The cause of the event was due to a misunderstanding that occurred during the telephone conversation between construction personnel and operations personnel as to which fire zones, in the unit 1 cable vault, were to be tagged out. There are two fire zones in the unit 1 cable vault labeled Hazard #5 Service Building Cable Vault and Hazard #7 Containment Cable Vault. Following the conversation, operations personnel were under the impression that construction activities were to take place in both fire zones and as a result tagged out both zones. However, construction personnel had intended zone #5 to be tagged out only and consequently a fire watch was placed in zone #5 and not in zone #7.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The CO₂ fire suppression system was restored to automatic operation.

5. Additional Corrective Action:

None.

6. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

In addition, operations personnel have been instructed to verify a fire watch has been posted in the area affected prior to removing any fire protection system

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

from service. The use of the "Red Tag" system has been incorporated when removing CO₂ systems from service. The "Red Tag" system will provide a more positive means of ensuring the proper system is removed or returned to service than the "Blue Tag" system. The "Red Tag" system requires independent verification by operations personnel and verification by the party requesting the tagout that the proper systems have been removed or returned to service.

7. Generic Implications:

None.



VIRGINIA POWER

May 2, 1985

Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
Surry, Virginia 23883

Serial No: 85-10

Docket No: 50-280

License No: DPR-32

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
016 Phillips Building
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Power hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER

85-005-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

R. F. Saunders

R. F. Saunders
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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