

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4	PAGE 1 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)

Automatic Actuation of the Reactor Protection System

EVENT DATE (6)			LER NUMBER (8)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (9)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
0 4	0 5	8 5	8 5	0 0 5	0 0	0 5	0 3	8 5		0 5 0 0 0	
										0 5 0 0 0	

OPERATING MODE (10) N		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 1 0	20.402(b)	20.408(a)	X	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)						
	20.408(a)(1)(i)	80.38(a)(1)		80.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(a)						
	20.408(a)(1)(ii)	80.38(a)(2)		80.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 388A)						
	20.408(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(i)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
	20.408(a)(1)(iv)	80.73(a)(2)(ii)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)							
	20.408(a)(1)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(ix)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME G.F. Larizza, Operations Manager	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 1 5 5 2 4 1 4 4 4 6
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs
B	I M	- I - T I W	1 2 1 0	N					
A	J C	- I - T E R	3 7 1 0	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 5, 1985, while the Reactor Protection Channel 3 overtemperature Delta T trip bistable and overpower Delta T trip bistable were in the tripped mode, in accordance with the applicable steps of a calibration procedure, the leads of a resistance temperature detector in Reactor Protection Channel 4 were opened. This resulted in overpower Delta T and overtemperature Delta T reactor trip signals being generated. The cause of the event has been attributed to utility personnel performing resistance temperature detector failure response testing without procedural guidance. This event occurred while the reactor was in the hot shutdown mode with all control rods fully inserted and the primary boron concentration greater than 2000 ppm. The reactor trip breakers opened on actuation of the reactor trip signal.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4	8 5	- 0 0 5	- 0 0 0	2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

At 0954 hours on April 5, 1985, while the Reactor Protection Channel 3 overtemperature Delta T trip bistable and overpower Delta T trip bistable were in the tripped mode in accordance with the applicable steps in procedure CP-403 (Calibration and/or Maintenance of T Average Channel 403), the leads of a resistance temperature detector (RTD) in Channel 4 were opened. This resulted in a reactor trip signal being generated. This event occurred while the reactor was in the Hot Shutdown mode with all control rods fully inserted and primary system boron concentration greater than 2000 ppm. The reactor trip breakers were in the closed position prior to the event and subsequently opened on initiation of the reactor trip signal.

The cause of the event has been attributed to utility personnel performing RTD failure response verification without procedural guidance. Instrument and Control technicians were performing a calibration of the primary system average temperature indicators, and had placed the Reactor Protection Channel 3 bistables in the tripped position as per their calibration procedure. The technicians were inside the Main Control Board reinstalling an average temperature indicator which had mechanically failed during the calibration. The utility personnel received permission to perform the RTD failure response testing and, unaware of the calibration in Reactor Protection Channel 3 which was being performed inside the Main Control Board, opened the leads from a RTD in the Reactor Protection Channel 4 rack. The opening of the leads of the B loop hot leg RTD caused the RTD to be seen as failing to a high temperature, which in turn caused the indicated differential temperature for channel 4 to increase. The differential temperature signal exceeded the reactor trip setpoints for overtemperature Delta T and overpower Delta T in channel 4, which with channel 3 in the tripped mode completed a two out of four logic for a reactor trip signal. Since the reactor was in the hot shutdown condition and all the control rods were inserted at the time of the event the only actuation was the automatic opening of the reactor trip breakers.

Those personnel involved were aware that the plant was in the hot shutdown mode and felt that no adverse affects would result from their testing. This event is an isolated occurrence and those personnel involved are aware of the consequences of performing testing in the protection racks without using the proper administrative controls and procedural guidance.



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
May 3, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: LER 85-005, Automatic Actuation of the Reactor
Protection System (RPS)
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv) which requests a report of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)," the attached Licensee Event Report LER 85-005 is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours,


Roger W. Kober

RWK/eeg

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
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