

NRC Form 306
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 6 1				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3	
TITLE (4) Inadvertent RCIC Isolation															
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES NA				DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0		
0 4	0 4	8 5	8 5	0 1 5	0 0	0 5	0 3	8 5					0 5 0 0 0		
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
1		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(c)(1)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)	
0 14 17		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(c)(2)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)															
NAME Ronald W. Byrd/Licensing Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 0 1 1 4 3 7 1 - 1 2 1 1 4 1 9					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)															
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 4, 1985, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was inadvertently isolated during a monthly functional test. A misunderstanding between the operator and technicians led the operator to return a switch to "normal" while test equipment remained connected to the circuit. The configuration of the test equipment was such that, with the switch in normal, the circuitry initiated an RCIC isolation. The RCIC isolation logic allows an isolation by a single channel trip signal.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 6	8 5	--	0 1 5	--	0 0	0 2 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description of Reportable Occurrence

At 2135 on April 4, 1985 the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system inadvertently isolated during a monthly functional test. The isolation is considered an ESF actuation since containment isolation signals were actuated to isolate the system.

Initial Conditions

The plant was operating at 47 percent power. The RCIC isolation bypass test switch was in "Bypass" for the test of the main steam line tunnel high temperature signal delay timer.

Status of Redundant or Backup Systems

All ECCS were operable.

Nature of Occurrence

As the technicians neared the completion of the test, they requested an operator to restore the bypass switch to normal. The operator arrived at the Upper Control Room panel and transferred the switch to normal. The technicians working behind the panel had not yet removed the test equipment however. The configuration of the test equipment was such that, with the switch in normal, the circuitry initiated an RCIC isolation. The RCIC isolation logic allows an isolation by a single channel trip signal.

Immediate Corrective Actions Taken

The RCIC system was returned to a standby operable status in approximately 20 minutes.

Apparent Cause

The cause of the isolation was a misunderstanding between the operator in the Control Room and the technicians working in the Upper Control Room. The technicians working behind the panel were not seen by the operator when he arrived and this was also a contributing factor.

Supplemental Corrective Action

The necessity of direct, face to face, clear communication during performance of these type surveillances has been emphasized to the personnel involved.

NRC Form 366A
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1) Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 6	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
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		8 5	— 0 1 5	— 0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Safety Assessment

The RCIC system was out of service for approximately 20 minutes. Technical Specification 3.7.3 allows for a 14 day out-of-service period provided the HPCS system is operable. HPCS and all other ECC systems were operable during the event.

DOCUMENT SCREENING RECORD SHEET

Document Screened: LER 85-015-0, AECM-85/0146

Condition Being Reviewed: Inadvertent RCIC Isolation

Conclusion:

- ☐ Deviation requiring evaluation (10CFR21)
- ☐ Deficiency requiring evaluation (10CFR50.55(e))
- ☒ No further evaluation required

Remarks: On April 4, 1985, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was inadvertently isolated during a monthly functional test. A misunderstanding between the operator and technicians led the operator to return a switch to "normal" while test equipment remained connected to the circuit. The configuration of the test equipment was such that, with the switch in "normal", the circuitry initiated a RCIC system isolation. The RCIC system was out of service for approximately 20 minutes. Technical Specification 3.7.3 allows for a 14 day out-of-service period provided the HPCS system is operable. The HPCS system and all other ECC systems were operable during the event. To prevent subsequent events of this type, memoranda have been generated to emphasize the necessity of direct, clear communication during performance of these type surveillances. The memoranda should reduce the probability of recurrence.

Screened by: CB Summers
Date: 5-1-85

Reviewed by: Sam A Hobbs
Date: 5-2-85



SCREENING FOR DEVIATIONS AND DEFICIENCIES
ATTACHMENT I to Procedure 1.7

REV. 0

DATE
Oct. 24, 1984

PAGE 1 of 1



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39215-1640

May 3, 1985

NUCLEAR LICENSING & SAFETY DEPARTMENT

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416
License No. NPF-29
File: 0260/L-835.0
Inadvertent RCIC Isolation
LER 85-015-0
AECM-85/0146

Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 85-015-0 which is a final report.

Yours truly,

L. F. Dale
Director

CBS/SHH:vog
Attachment

cc: Mr. J. B. Richard (w/a)
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Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/a)
Mr. N. S. Reynolds (w/a)
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