NRC Form 366 (9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4) Automatic Actuation of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)

EVENT DATE (5) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	LER NUMBER (6) YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	REPORT DATE (7) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	2 6	8 5	8 5	— 0 0 4 —	0 0	0 4	2 6	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)	N				
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0				
		[ ] 20.402(b)	[ ] 20.405(c)	[XX] 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	[ ] 73.71(b)
		[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(i)	[ ] 50.36(c)(1)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(v)	[ ] 73.71(c)
		[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	[ ] 50.36(c)(2)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	[ ] OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(i)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(v)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE	
G. F. Larizza, Operations Manager	3 1 5	5 2 4 - 4 4 4 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
D	E D	- B K R	W 1 2 0	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
[ ] YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	[X] NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 26, 1985 at 1021 hours while the reactor was in cold shutdown, a safety injection (SI) actuation signal was generated when a high containment vessel (C.V.) pressure bistable was tripped as a result of a momentary loss of instrument Bus 1C. While work on Protection Channel #3 was in progress, personnel were closing vital Bus tie 14 to 16 in preparation for electrical work on Bus 14 Undervoltage Relays. Since one protection channel was in the trip mode, momentary loss of power tripped the second protection channel thus completing the 2/3 logic for high containment vessel pressure signal.

On the same day at 1125 hours, with the reactor in cold shutdown, a second safety injection actuation signal was generated from pressurizer pressure signal greater than 2000 psig and low steam line pressure less than 514 psig. Calibration of Delta T SP1 (Over Temperature Setpoint) in protection channel #3 (Pressurizer Pressure Channel Defeated) was in progress while 1A Diesel Generator supplying Bus 14 and 18 was being removed from service and normal supply being restored. During this transfer momentary loss of power tripped another S.I. unblock relay which completed a 2/3 logic unblock of S.I. plus low steam line pressure < 514 psig, causing S.I.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 26, 1985 at 1021 hours while the reactor was in cold shutdown, a safety injection (SI) actuation signal was generated when a high containment vessel (C.V.) pressure bistable was tripped as a result of a momentary loss of instrument Bus 1C. Containment pressure channel P-947 bistable had been placed in the tripped mode per procedure to permit the relocation of its conduit so that a new seismic support could be installed. While the bistable was in the tripped mode Class 1E 480 volt Safeguard Bus #14 was being divorced from its normal feed and was being connected to Safeguard Bus #16 via Bus tie breaker 14 to 16 in preparation for maintenance work on Bus #14 Undervoltage Protection System. The procedure being used for the transfer neglected to instruct personnel to position a key switch at the tie breaker resulting in a loss of voltage to Bus #14 when normal supply breaker was open. Since one protection channel was already in the trip mode, momentary loss of power tripped the second protection channel thus completing 2/3 logic for high containment vessel pressure signal.

The "A" D/G was started by placing its start switch back to normal and resetting the start relays. All the S.I. equipment that was not in pull-stop started as required. "A" D/G tied into Bus 14 and 18, and Containment Isolation and Containment Ventilation Isolation occurred.

Operations personnel referred to Emergency Procedure E-1.1 "Immediate Action and Diagnostics for Spurious Actuation of SI, LOCA, Loss of Secondary Coolant, and Steam Generator Tube Rupture," and diagnosed the situation was a spurious SI. There was no actual SI flow into reactor vessel since SI pumps were in pull-stop.

On the same day at 1125 hours, with the reactor in cold shutdown, a second Safety Injection Actuation signal was generated from pressurizer pressure signal greater than 2000 psig and low steam line pressure less than 514 psig. Work on protection channel #3 (Pressurizer Pressure Channel defeated) was still in progress and 1A Diesel Generator supplying Bus 14 and 18 was being removed from service and normal supply being restored. While holding normal supply breaker to Bus 14 closed, and opening the D/G supply to Bus 14 a momentary loss of power tripped another SI unblock relays which completed a 2/3 logic unblock of SI plus low steam line pressure < 514 psig, causing SI.

All the SI equipment that was not required to be in pull-stop started. Containment Isolation and Containment Ventilation Isolation occurred. The "A" D/G remained tied to Bus 14 and 18.

NRC Form 366A
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Operations personnel referred to Emergency Procedure E-1.1 "Immediate Action and Diagnostics for Spurious Actuation of SI, LOCA, Loss of Secondary Coolant, and Steam Generator Tube Rupture," and diagnosed the situation was a spurious SI. There was no actual SI flow into Reactor Vessel since SI pumps were in pull-stop.

The cause for the first SI actuation was a deficiency in maintenance procedure M-48.14 "Isolation of Bus 14 Undervoltage System for Maintenance Repair or If Applicable Modification," in that the key-switch at the breaker was not activated during the bus transfer and that SI was not adequately blocked to prevent inadvertent SI during Bus transfer. M-48.14 and M-48.13 (Isolation of Bus 16) were modified to include switching steps for interlock key system for Bus tie breakers and also steps to address defeating the "A" and "B" safeguard logic trains during bus power transfers, these procedure changes will preclude similar recurrence.

The cause of the second SI was the momentary loss of power during removal from service of 1A Diesel Generator and normal power supply being restored to Bus 14, concurrent with calibration activities on Protection Channel #3. Changes made to M-48.14 and M-48.13 prevents Reactor Protection Channels being in the tripped mode for calibration concurrent with this other maintenance procedure activity.

At no time during these events was the station operated in an unanalyzed condition.

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001

ROGER W. KOBER
VICE PRESIDENT
ELECTRIC & STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 716 546-2700

April 26, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: LER 85-004, Automatic Actuation of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv) which requests a report of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)," the attached Licensee Event Report LER 85-004 is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours,

Roger W. Kober

Roger W. Kober

RWK/eeg

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

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