

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) LaSalle County Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050003741 OF 03

TITLE (4) Loss of Shutdown Cooling Due to Group 6 Division 2 Isolation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)										
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
0	3	8	8	5	013	00	0	4	2	2	8	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) 4

POWER LEVEL (10) 000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 6 (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.408(e)	20.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.38(a)(1)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(e)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.38(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Aras R. Lintakas, extension 576

TELEPHONE NUMBER 815 357-6761

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
D	JM	94	G080	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☐ NO ☒

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 28, 1985, while performing LES-PC-05 (Group V Isolation System Functional Test), a Group VI Division 2 isolation occurred. At the time, the unit had been shut down for 28 days and the B RHR loop was in the Shutdown Cooling Mode. This isolation closed the 2E12-F009, Shutdown Cooling Inboard Isolation Valve. This isolation occurred because a lead was lifted per LES-PC-05 which disconnected power to several other control circuits. One of these has a relay which caused the isolation of the 2E12-F009. LES-PC-05 is being revised to prevent this event from reoccurring.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) LaSalle County Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4 8 5 - 0 1 3 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 28, 1985, while performing LES-PC-05 (Group V Isolation System Functional Test), a Group VI Division 2 isolation occurred. At the time, the B Residual Heat Removal System (BO) was in the Shutdown Cooling Mode. This isolation closed the 2E12-F009, Shutdown Cooling Inboard Isolation Valve. With the 2E12-F009 closed, the B RHR pump tripped.

II. CAUSE

Step F.3.an. of LES-PC-05, Rev. 3, calls for the lead from terminal 5 of relay 2E31-K5B to be lifted to simulate a Reactor Water Cleanup (CE) loss of logic power. The terminal actually has two wires on it. One of these is the power while the other is the power feed for the remainder of the relays in the panel. When the lead is lifted, both leads should be lifted simultaneously and held together to maintain power to the rest of the relays in the panel. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to maintain positive contact between the two. If the two leads are separated, the rest of the relays in the panel, including the one that dictates an RHR Inboard Isolation, are deenergized. This deenergization caused the 2E12-F009 valve to close.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

The probable consequences of the event were minimal. The unit had been in Cold Shutdown for 28 days. As soon as the electrician saw that the RHR system had isolated, he immediately relanded the leads, restoring power to the other relays. The shutdown cooling loop was returned to service within 13 minutes of the isolation. A review of RHR heat exchanger inlet temperatures before and after the isolation indicate no significant change in reactor coolant temperature.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

As soon as the electrician saw that the RHR system had isolated, he immediately relanded the leads. This restored power to the other relays in the panel, allowing the isolation to be reset. The shutdown cooling loop was returned to service within 13 minutes of the isolation.

An AIR has been generated to revise LES-PC-05 to prevent recurrence. This will be accomplished by placing a jumper from power to one of the other relays in the circuit. This will supply power to the relays downstream of the K5B, should the two leads on terminal 5 of 2E31-K5B be separated again.

V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

None.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
LaSalle County Station Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4	8 5	— 0 1 3	— 0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

Aras R. Lintakas, 815/357-6761, extension 576.



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April 22, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #85-013-00, Docket #050-374 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

for R.D. Bishop
G. J. Diederich
Station Superintendent
LaSalle County Station

GJD/MLD/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director
INPO-Records Center
File/NRC

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11