

Commonwealth Edison Company
Byron Generating Station
4450 North German Church Road
Byron, IL 61010-9794
Tel 815-234-5441



August 12, 1996

LTR: BYRON 96-0216
FILE: 3.03.0800 (1.10.0101)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The Enclosed Licensee Event Report from Byron Generating Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

This report is number 96-012; Docket No. 50-454.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "K. L. Kofron", is written over a faint, larger signature.

K. L. Kofron
Station Manager
Byron Nuclear Power Station

KLK/WD/js

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report No. 96-012

cc: H. J. Miller, NRC Region III Administrator
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
INPO Record Center
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NRC FORM 366 (4-95)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)					
FACILITY NAME (1) BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATION				DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000454	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
TITLE (4) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION STATEMENT NOT ENTERED FOR TORNADO WATCH					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER
07	17	96	96	012	00
					MONTH DAY YEAR
					08 12 96
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
FACILITY NAME			DOCKET NUMBER		
			05000		
FACILITY NAME			DOCKET NUMBER		
			05000		
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)			
1		20.2201(b) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii) <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71 <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v) <input type="checkbox"/> Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii) <input type="checkbox"/>			
POWER LEVEL (10)					
92.5%					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)					
NAME David Peterson				TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 815-234-5441 X4131	
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)					EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).					MONTH DAY YEAR
X NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

The National Weather Service issued a tornado watch on 7/17/96, at 1542 hrs. Station personnel were not aware of the issuance of the tornado watch. The Technical Specification (TS) Action Statement addressing tornado watches, TS 3.7.5, action h states in part.... "within 1 hour verify that both deep well pumps are operable with both ultimate heat sink cooling tower basin levels greater than or equal to 82%". The actions required by TS 3.7.5 action h were not initiated or completed by the Station Personnel.

The tornado watch was canceled at 2100 hrs., 7/17/96. The deep well pumps were operable and the SX basin levels were maintained greater than 82% throughout the tornado watch event.

Although conditions did exist for a potential tornado touchdown, there were no observed occurrences in the Byron Site area.

This is a condition prohibited by Byron's Technical Specifications and therefore, is a reportable event per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION					
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATION	05000454	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		96	-- 012	-- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Event Date/Time 07-17-96 / 1542

Unit 1 Mode 1 - PWR OPS Rx Power 92.5% RCS [AB] Temperature/Pressure NOT/NOP

Unit 2 Mode 1 - PWR OPS Rx Power 98% RCS [AB] Temperature/Pressure NOT/NOP

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

The National Weather Service (NWS) issued a tornado watch on 7/17/96, at 1542 hrs. Normally, the Operating Department is informed of a tornado watch through the use of a weather radio. The weather radio alarms when activated by the NWS. The weather radio is located in the Shift Engineer's office adjacent to the main control room.

The weather radio at Byron Station does not lock automatically onto the alarm tone from the NWS. When the alarm tone is cleared by the NWS, the radio stops alarming. This condition could result in plant personnel missing the alarm, even though they are gone for only a short period of time.

The weather radio had been alarming throughout the day as a result of heavy thunder showers and high winds. However, the alarming conditions were acknowledged as required.

There is no back-up to the Shift Engineer's weather radio. Subsequently, the operation of the radio was checked out after this event and was found to be satisfactory.

The weather radio does not have any standing procedures that require testing the weather radio. However, the NWS tests the weather radio weekly. No documentation exists that shows the radio is the official mechanism to receive tornado watches or warnings.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The Shift Engineer (SE) was in the control room performing other duties at the time of the alarm. As a consequence, no one was in the SE office to hear and respond to the NWS tornado warning alarm.

The Shift Engineer was unaware of the tornado watch alarm since no personnel were in the SE office at the time of the alarm.

The root cause of the event was attributed to frequent job or task shuffling (Supervisory Methods).

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

There were no safety consequences impacting plant or public safety as a result of this event. The missed actions required by TS were to verify both deep well pumps were operable and to verify both SX cooling tower basin levels were $\geq 82\%$. Both deep well pumps were operable and the SX basin levels were $\geq 82\%$, which is their normal level throughout this event.

Therefore, the ultimate heat sink and its make-up sources were available to perform their intended functions and to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATION	05000454	96	-- 012	-- 00	3 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Tailgate sessions were conducted to address this event with the Shift Management.

NTS item 454-180-96-0012-01 will track installation of a weather radio in the control room.

To ensure the weather radio is operating, a weekly check will be performed. NTS 454-180-96-0012-02 will track this action.

F. RECURRING EVENTS SEARCH AND ANALYSIS:

A search was performed of the Station's Problem Identification Database. No previous events involving missed Technical Specification actions due to a tornado watch were found.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

No components failed in association with this event.