

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 F L C R P 3 00 - 000000 - 0003
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CON'T
01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 1 0 - 1 0 3 d 2 7 0 9 2 9 8 2 8 0 4 2 4 8 5 9
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On 9-29-82, water in the instrument air (IA) system caused a fan damper
03 operator on the industrial cooler to fail reducing the amount of cooling
04 air available to the reactor building (RB). Thus at 0048, while taking daily
05 surveillance data, it was discovered that the RB average air temperature
06 exceeded 130°F limit of T.S. 3.6.1.5 By 0051 temperature was reduced below
07 130°F using another cooler. There was no effect on public health or safety.
08 This is the eighth occurrence under T.S.3.6.1.5.

09 SYSTEM CODE S B 11 CAUSE CODE A 12 CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14 COMP SUBCODE C 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
17 LER NO REPORT NUMBER 8 2 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 This event was caused by personnel failing to close the valve (FSV-250) that
11 connects fire service (FS)water and IA,causing water from FS to back up into
12 IA. Although water was drained from the IA system,enough remained to cause
13 operator to fail. Dampers were disconnected from their operator and wired open
14 until the system was returned to operability. In order to preclude a future
occurrence of this nature, a check valve has been installed in the line con-
necting the fire service system tank to the instrument air system.

15 FACILITY STATUS E 28 10 9 7 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

NAME OF PREPARER D.G. Green

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO: 50-302/82-061/03X-1

FACILITY: Crystal River Unit 3

REPORT DATE: April 24, 1985

OCCURRENCE DATE: September 29, 1982

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactor Building average air temperature exceeded the 130°F limit of Technical Specification 3.6.1.5.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 (97% Rated Thermal Power).

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On September 29, 1982, water in the instrument air system caused a fan damper operator on the industrial cooler to fail. This failure caused a reduction in the amount of cooling air available for the Reactor Building, thus causing the Reactor Building temperature to exceed the 130°F limit. Additional cooling was initiated so that by 0051 the Reactor Building temperature was reduced below the 130°F limit.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

This event was caused by personnel error. On September 21, 1982, personnel were using an inappropriate document (flow diagram) to determine the correct position of FSV-250 rather than the approved procedure (OP-207). FSV-250 is the valve isolating fire service water from the instrument air system. Leaving FSV-250 open allowed water from fire service to back up into instrument air. Although water was drained from the instrument air system and the valve closed, enough water apparently remained in the instrument air system to cause the damper operator to fail.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:


There was no effect on public health or safety. Containment temperature was reduced to within the limit within the time frame required by the Action Statement of Specification 3.6.1.5.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Personnel were instructed on the importance of using approved documents and procedures. The dampers were wired open until the system was returned to operability late September 29, 1982. A check valve has been installed in the line connecting the fire service system tank to the instrument air system to preclude such an occurrence in the future.

FAILURE DATA:

This is the eighth time the Reactor Building temperature has exceeded the 130°F limit of Technical Specification 3.6.1.5.



**Florida
Power**
CORPORATION

April 24, 1985
3F0485-15

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3
Docket No. 50-302
Operating License No. DPR-72
Licensee Event Report No. 82-061, Revision 1

Dear Sir:

Enclosed please find Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report No. 82-061 and the attached supplementary information sheet.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

G. R. Westafer
Manager, Nuclear Operations
Licensing and Fuel Management

DDG/feb

Enclosure

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace
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Office of Inspection and Enforcement
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30323

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