

NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 F L C R P 3 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 d - 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 37 CAT 38

CON'T
01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 0 2 7 0 2 2 2 8 3 8 0 4 2 4 8 5 9
7 8 60 61 66 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
02 At 1400 while performing Surveillance SP-349, Emergency Feedwater Pump Opera-
03 bility, Auxiliary Steam Valve ASV-5 failed to open, causing Emergency Feed-
04 water Pump EFP-2 to be inoperable. This event is reportable under T.S. 3.7.1.
05 2.(b). Redundancy was provided by the motor-driven emergency feedwater pump
06 (EFP-1). There was no effect on public health or safety. Maintenance was
07 initiated and operability restored at 2045. This is the first occurrence for
08 ASV-5 and the 19th event reported under T.S. 3.7.1.2.
7 8 9

09 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
C H 11 B 12 C 13 V A L V O P 14 B 15 Z 16

17 LER NO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
7 8 9 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
8 3 0 0 9 0 3 X 1

ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPSR-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
A 18 Z 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 A 25 L 2 0 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10 Emergency Feedwater Pump EFP-2 was declared inoperable due to failure of ASV-5,
11 The motor operator for ASV-5 burned up due to a sticking contactor. The motor
12 torque switch were replaced. The valve was functionally tested satisfactorily.
13
14

15 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
E 28 0 9 7 29 NA B 31 Operator Observation

16 RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
Z 33 Z 34 NA NA

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES PERSONNEL INJURIES LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA
0 0 0 40 NA
Z 42 NA

18 PUBLICITY
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
N 44 NA

2 NAME OF PREPARER D.G. Green PHONE (904) 795-3802
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

8505030729 850424
PDR ADCK 05000302
S PDR

IE22 1/1

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO: 50-302/83-009/03X-1
FACILITY: Crystal River Unit #3
REPORT DATE: April 24, 1985
OCCURRENCE DATE: February 22, 1983

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Emergency Feedwater Pump EFP-2 failed to start when ASV-5 did not open. Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 requires initiation of the Action Statement with one Emergency Feedwater Pump inoperable.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 (97% Full Power).

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1400 on February 22, 1983, while performing surveillance procedure SP-349, Emergency Feedwater System Operability Demonstration, the Emergency Feedwater Pump EFP-2 did not start. The pump did not start because Auxiliary Steam Valve ASV-5 was failed closed.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

An engineering investigation revealed that the motor operator failure for ASV-5 was probably not caused by a faulty torque switch as previously thought, but was caused rather by a sticky substance (perhaps cable pulling lubricant) being present on the contacts, thus resulting in the periodic sticking of the contacts.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:


Emergency Feedwater Pump, EFP-1, was operable and available to provide Emergency Feedwater, if necessary. There was no effect on public health or safety.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The valve operator and torque switch were replaced. The valve was functionally tested satisfactorily. The above referenced engineering investigation concluded that the contactor sticking problem on ASV-5 is an isolated occurrence, hence, no further corrective action is considered necessary.

FAILURE DATA:

This is the first failure of ASV-5 and the nineteenth event reported under Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.



**Florida
Power**
CORPORATION

April 24, 1985
3F0485-13

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3
Docket No. 50-302
Operating License No. DPR-72
Licensee Event Report No. 83-009, Revision 1

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report No. 83-009 and the attached supplementary information sheet.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

G. R. Westafer
Manager, Nuclear Operations
Licensing and Fuel Management

DGG/feb

Enclosures

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace
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Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30323

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