

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4)																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 3	2 8	8 5	8 5	0 0 4	0 0	0 4	2 5	8 5	NORTH ANNA, UNIT 2				0 5 0 0 0 3 3 9			
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																
OPERATING MODE (9)		1		20.402(b)		20.408(e)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)						
POWER LEVEL (10)		1 1 0 1 0		20.408(a)(1)(i)		50.38(e)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(e)						
				20.408(a)(1)(ii)		50.38(e)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)		X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)						
				20.408(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)								
				20.408(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)								
				20.408(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)								
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME E. Wayne Harrell										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
										AREA CODE						
										7 0 3 8 9 4 - 5 1 5 1						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 28, 1985, with both units at 100 percent power, a review of survey results disclosed a deficiency involving the Service Water System supply and return piping between the Service Water Pump house and the Safeguards area. For a length of approximately fifty linear feet, the depth of compacted backfill over the piping was less than the six feet required for tornado missile protection. The minimum depth of backfill over the piping was two and one half feet. Corrective actions were immediately developed and initiated in order to re-establish a backfill coverage over the affected piping equivalent to the original design. This was completed by March 29, 1985. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vi).

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 5	— 0 0 4	— 0 0 0	2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 28, 1985, with both units at 100 percent power, a review of survey results disclosed a deficiency involving the Service Water System (EIS System Code BI) supply and return piping between the Service Water Pump house and the Safeguards area. For a length of approximately fifty linear feet, the depth of compacted backfill over the piping was less than the six feet required for tornado missile protection. The minimum depth of backfill over the piping was two and one half feet.

The Service Water System is a common system and is designed for removal of heat resulting from the simultaneous operation of various systems and components of both North Anna units. The Service Water lines affected by this deficiency were the redundant 36 inch main supply and return headers used to distribute Service Water from the Service Water Reservoir (EIS Component Identifier RVR) to both units. The rupture of either a supply or return line in the affected area would not be isolable and therefore would render that header inoperable. Since the design basis function of the Service Water System can be achieved with only one operable header, any missile projected by tornado or otherwise would have to rupture either the supply or return line of both headers in order to render the Service Water System inoperable.

An engineering evaluation concluded that the probability of a missile strike rendering both Service Water headers inoperable was extremely low and therefore the operability of the Service Water System was not significantly reduced as a result of the deficiency.

Corrective actions were developed immediately following discovery and subsequently initiated the same day. A backfill coverage equivalent to the original design was re-established over the affected piping by March 29, 1985. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vi).

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION  
P.O. BOX 402  
MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117



April 25, 1985

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
016 Phillips Building  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No. N-85-010  
NO/JRR: nih  
Docket No. 50-338  
50-339

License No. NPF-4  
NPF-7


Dear Sirs:

The Virginia Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Units 1 and 2.

Report No. LER 85-004-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to Safety Evaluation and Control for their review.

Very Truly Yours,



E. Wayne Darrell  
Station Manager

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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