

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Palo Verde Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 8 1 OF 0 2				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2									
TITLE (4) Improper Fire Patrols																							
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)													
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	3	2	3	8	5	0	1	6	0	0	0	4	1	9	8	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9) 5		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)									
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)									
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)									
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)													
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)													
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)													
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																							
NAME W. F. Quinn (Extension 4087)										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 6 0 2 9 4 3 - 7 2 0 0													
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																							
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS													
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR									
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input type="checkbox"/> NO		0	5	3	1	8	5						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 23, 1985 three fire watch roving patrols did not properly conduct their hourly rounds. This occurred twice in a twenty-four hour period, with three hourly rounds not being made on each occasion. The basic causes of this event were: A lack of appreciation by the individuals involved for the consequences of not completing their assigned rounds; and the lack of a clear reporting chain to the Operations Staff to alert them that required rounds were not being made. The situation that precipitated this event was a problem with the station security computer which had caused the individual's key cards to become ineffective and thereby prevent access through plant card reader doors.

Corrective action consisted of: Re-emphasizing to the fire watch roving patrols that hourly rounds must be completed or proper timely notification be made; and modifying the reporting chain to require that the Plant Fire Protection Staff be notified of fire watch problems.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Palo Verde Unit 1	0500052885	85	016	00	02	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

On March 23, 1985, while in Mode 5 three fire watch roving patrols did not properly conduct their hourly rounds.

Three roving fire watch patrols had been stationed for several weeks due to the extensive number of design changes that were being installed. These patrols had been established initially as compensation for those design changes that were being made to bring the plant into more complete compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. As a consequence of the presence of these patrols, additional work that involved fire penetration seals and other barriers was able to be conducted without establishing separate compensatory measures. Some of this work affected areas covered under 3.7.12 of the Technical Specifications. Three continuous fire watches were stationed in areas where the roving patrols were not sufficient.

On March 23, 1985, a number of problems were experienced with the security computer. The problems continued throughout most of the day. For two periods of time, due to trouble-shooting and corrective action on the computer, individual key cards became inactive and automatic passage through card reader equipped doors was impossible. Compensatory means such as posting of guards on certain doors, use of hard keys, and escorting by individuals with effective key cards were instituted in various combinations. The fire watches, as members of the constructor's organization, were confused by this situation. The operating staff was more familiar with the required measures and continued to function, albeit with some difficulty.

Unable to make their rounds in a normal manner, the roving patrols were escorted out of the vital areas. The three continuous fire watches were not affected. The roving patrols notified their Foremen, who in turn contacted the security force. In the morning occurrence (7 AM to 9 AM), the Operations Shift Supervisor was not notified and he was thereby effectively prevented from taking appropriate action. In the evening occurrence (6 PM to 8 PM), even with the notification of the Shift Supervisor, the roving patrols demonstrated their lack of appreciation for the importance of their duties. After regaining access, they ate dinner and relieved the continuous watches for the same purpose before they returned to their patrol responsibilities. The individuals in the report path did not appreciate the significance of the roving patrol responsibilities. Problems were not adequately addressed nor corrected in a timely fashion.

A review of the actual status of work in progress at the time of this incident revealed that twenty-eight fire penetration seals were open. Of these, eight were in barriers affecting equipment required to be operable. Normal fire detection and suppression systems were operable throughout this event, with the exception of areas where the continuous fire watches were stationed for that purpose.

The personnel assigned to roving patrols have had their responsibilities re-emphasized. All reports of problems in carrying out their duties must now be made to the Fire Protection Staff, who will assure that proper notifications are made and that adequate compensatory actions are taken. The Security Force and Operations staff are now aware of the possibility of the unique problem with the Security computer and are better able to recognize and respond to it, both in a general sense and in the particular case of roving fire watch patrols.



Arizona Nuclear Power Project

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ANPP-32458-EEVB/WFQ

April 19, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1
Docket No. STN 50-528, License No. NPF-34
Licensee Event Report
File: 85-056-026; G.1.01.10

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 85-016-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. By copy of this letter we are also forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.

If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

EE Van Brunt / DBK

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
Project Director

EEVB/GEC/das
Attachment

cc: J.B. Martin
R.P. Zimmerman
A.L. Hon
E.A. Licitra
A.C. Gehr
INPO Records Center

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