



GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

IVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 320 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775
AREA CODE 504 835-6094 346-8851

November 6, 1992
RBG- 37687
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 92-022 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell
for W. H. Odell
Manager - Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

LAE PDG SAR DCH
LAE/PDG/FRC/DCH/CEB/kvm

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cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

Mr. C.R. Oberg
Public Utility Commission of Texas
7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North
Austin, TX 78757

Department of Environmental Quality
Radiation Protection Division
P.O. Box 82135
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2135
ATTN: Administrator

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) RIVER BEND STATION DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000 458 PAGE (3) 1 OF 3

TITLE (4) ENTRY INTO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 DUE TO FAILED CHARCOAL ANALYSIS FOR DIVISION I CONTROL BUILDING FILTER TRAIN

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | REPORT NUMBER (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | |
|----------------|-----|------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----|------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAME | DOCKET NUMBER |
| 10 | 07 | 92 | 92 | 022 | 00 | 11 | 06 | 92 | | 05000 |
| | | | | | | | | | FACILITY NAME | DOCKET NUMBER |
| | | | | | | | | | | 05000 |

| OPERATING MODE (9) | 1 | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11) | | | |
|--------------------|----|---|------------------|---------------------|--|
| POWER LEVEL (10) | 79 | 20.402(b) | 20.405(c) | 50.73(a)(2)(iv) | 73.71(b) |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(i) | 50.36(c)(1) | 50.73(a)(2)(v) | 73.71(c) |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(ii) | 50.36(c)(2) | 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | OTHER |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(iii) | X 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A) | (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(iv) | 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B) | |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(v) | 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | 50.73(a)(2)(x) | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME L.A. ENGLAND, DIRECTOR - NUCLEAR LICENSING TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (504) 381-4145

| COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) | | | | |
|--|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|
| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NRRDS |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 10/7/92 at 1421 hours, with the reactor at 79 percent power (Operational Condition 1), the radiological engineering Supervisor informed the Control Operating Foreman that the Division I main control room filter train (1HVC*FLT3A) had failed the charcoal analysis required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.2.d. Therefore, the Division I train was declared inoperable. The Division II main control room air conditioning system had previously been removed from service to perform preplanned maintenance. Since both Divisions of the main control room air conditioning system were inoperable, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 1421. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.

The root cause of this event was the failure of the charcoal to meet the acceptance criteria of the analysis concurrent with preplanned maintenance in progress on the Division II main control room air conditioning system.

REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS
FOR EACH BLOCK

| BLOCK NUMBER | NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS | TITLE |
|--------------|--|------------------------------|
| 1 | UP TO 46 | FACILITY NAME |
| 2 | 8 TOTAL 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 | DOCKET NUMBER |
| 3 | VARIES | PAGE NUMBER |
| 4 | UP TO 76 | TITLE |
| 5 | 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK | EVENT DATE |
| 6 | 7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER | LER NUMBER |
| 7 | 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK | REPORT DATE |
| 8 | UP TO 18 - FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL - DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED |
| 9 | 1 | OPERATING MODE |
| 10 | 3 | POWER LEVEL |
| 11 | 1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES | REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR |
| 12 | UP TO 50 FOR NAME 14 FOR TELEPHONE | LICENSEE CONTACT |
| 13 | CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 4 FOR COMPONENT 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRM VARIES | EACH COMPONENT FAILURE |
| 14 | 1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES | SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED |
| 15 | 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK | EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE |

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (4) | | | PAGE (3) |
|--------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|
| RIVER BEND STATION | 05000 458 | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | 2 OF 3 |
| | | 92 | - 022 | - 00 | |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 365A). (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

On 10/7/92 at 1421 hours, with the reactor at 79 percent power (Operational Condition 1), the radiological engineering Supervisor informed the Control Operating Foreman that the Division I main control room filter train (1HVC*FLT3A) had failed the charcoal analysis required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.2.d. Therefore, the Division I train was declared inoperable. The Division II main control room air conditioning system had previously been removed from service to perform preplanned maintenance. Since both Divisions of the main control room air conditioning system were inoperable, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 1421. In accordance with TS 3.0.3, power descension was initiated at 1507. On 10/7/92 at 1548, the scheduled maintenance on the Division II main control room air conditioning system was completed and the Limiting Condition for Operation was cleared. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at this time. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.

INVESTIGATION

Technical Specification 3.7.2 requires that the main control room air conditioning system, with two independent air handling unit/filter train subsystems, shall be operable in all operational conditions. Technical Specification 4.7.2.d, requires that a charcoal sample be obtained and analyzed following 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation. On 9/24/92 at 1343, surveillance test procedure (STP)-402-8604 (Main Control Room Air Conditioning Carbon Filter Analysis), was initiated to obtain a charcoal sample from the Division I main control room filter train, 1HVC*FLT3A.

On 10/6/92 at 0514, the Division II main control room air conditioning system was removed from service for preplanned heater and breaker maintenance. Pursuant to TS 3.7.2, a 7 day Limiting Condition for Operation was entered. On 10/7/92 at 1421, during routine operations at 79 percent reactor power, the Radiation Engineering Supervisor informed the Control Operating Foreman that the Division I main control room filter train (1HVC*FLT3A) had failed the charcoal analysis. With both Division I and II of the main control room air conditioning systems inoperable, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 1421 hours on 10/7/92.

In accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.3, power descension was initiated at 1507 on 10/7/92. At 1548, the preplanned maintenance on the Division II main control room air conditioning system was completed and the Limiting Condition for Operation was cleared. Reactor power descension was terminated at 78 percent power. At 1558, reactor power ascension was initiated to return to 79 percent power.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) |
|--------------------|-------------------|----------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------|
| RIVER BEND STATION | 05000 458 | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | 3 OF 3 |
| | | 92 | -- 022 -- | 00 | |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 365A). (17)

ROOT CAUSE

The root cause of this event was the failure of the charcoal to meet the acceptance criteria of the analysis concurrent with preplanned maintenance in progress on the Division II main control room air conditioning system. This situation rendered both trains of the control room ventilation system inoperable. Note that charcoal samples are shipped offsite for analysis. This results in a delay between the time that the sample is taken and the results are returned. In this event, the delay time was 13 days, and the results were received after corrective maintenance was begun on the Division II train. TS 4.7.2.d allows 31 days from the time that the sample is taken to the time that the results are to be obtained.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The corrective action was to expedite completion of the preplanned maintenance on the Division II, main control room air conditioning system. The actual work had already been completed at the time of discovery and only the closure of the associated paperwork was outstanding. The paperwork was reviewed, signed as completed, and the Limiting Condition for Operation was closed. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at this time. The charcoal in the Division I train was replaced and satisfactorily tested.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

Experience has shown that failures of charcoal to meet acceptance criteria are unusual. Thus, to have such a failure coincide with maintenance on the other Division is very unlikely. In addition, TS 4.7.2.d allows 31 days to obtain the result of the analysis. The results were obtained within 13 days in this case, in compliance with this TS requirement.

GSU has reviewed the design basis accidents (DBAs) to aid in the determination of the safety significance of reduced iodine removal efficiency. Any reduction in the iodine removal efficiency would tend to increase the control room thyroid dose, if an accident occurred. However, the thyroid dose in the control room as calculated in the DBAs comes from both unfiltered iodine (which enters the ventilation system prior to actuation of filters) and filtered iodine which enters the ventilation system after actuation of the filters. The most limiting control room thyroid dose in the DBAs is from a main steam line failure outside containment and is calculated to be 16 REM compared to a regulatory limit of 30 REM. The calculation assumes a charcoal efficiency of 99.0 percent and that the filters actuate automatically on a low water level (level 2) signal. As long as the automatic actuation of the control room filters was not effected, the control room thyroid dose with the inoperable filter would be less than the 16 REM calculated, since the actual filter efficiency was greater than 99.0 percent. Therefore, the situation as described has low safety significance.