



Northeast
Utilities System

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Northeast Utilities Service Company
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August 8, 1996

Docket No. 50-423
B15823

Re: 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 96-024-00, documenting a condition that was determined at Millstone Unit No. 3 on July 12, 1996. This LER is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY



M. H. Brothers
Unit Director, Millstone Unit No. 3

Attachment: LER 96-024-00

cc: H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator
A. C. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3
V. L. Rooney, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS
LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED
BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN
ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-
6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC
20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000423

PAGE (3)

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TITLE (4)

Missed Inservice Testing of a Stop Check Valve in the Steam Supply to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed
Water Pump due to Programmatic Weakness

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
07	12	96	96	024	00	08	08	96	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING MODE (9)		5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		000	20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(2)(v)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
			20.2203(a)(1)			20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Richard T. Laudenat, Nuclear Licensing Supervisor

TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)

(860)437-5248

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)☐ YES
(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).☒ NO**EXPECTED
SUBMISSION**

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On July 12, 1996 with the unit in mode 5 cold shutdown, it was discovered that a motor operated stop check valve had not been inspected in accordance with the Inservice Test (IST) Program. The IST program required that one of three motor operated stop check valves in the main steam supply to the turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump be disassembled and visually inspected each refuel outage (RFO). One of these valves (3MSS*MOV17D) was scheduled for inspection during RFO5 in May 1995. This inspection was to be performed concurrent with other maintenance activities scheduled to be performed on this valve. When the maintenance work on this valve was canceled, the visual inspection was not completed. This missed inspection resulted in the IST requirements not being performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as required by 10 CFR 50, section 50.55a(g) and the unit Technical Specifications. Therefore, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

The cause of this event was a programmatic deficiency which resulted in the inadequate scheduling and completion of an IST check valve surveillance. This condition was discovered while the unit was in an extended cold shutdown and as a result no immediate operator action was required. Completion of the missed inspection was performed. Programmatic enhancements to the check valve program will be incorporated to prevent recurrence.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. Description of Event

On July 12, 1996 with the unit in mode 5 cold shutdown, it was discovered during a review of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) that a motor operated stop check valve (3MSS*MOV17D) was not inspected as required by the Inservice Test (IST) Program. Technical Specification 4.0.5 requires that Inservice testing of ASME Class 1, 2, 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10CFR50, Section 50.55a(g). Therefore, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

There are three lines supplying steam to the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump. Each line has a motor operated stop check valve. One function of the valves is to close in the event of a main steam line break upstream of the valve, to prevent steam diversion. A relief request was approved to inspect one of the three valves each refueling outage (RFO). Thus a requirement exists within the IST Program to perform a disassembly and inspection of one main steam supply motor operated stop check valve during each refueling outage. The inspection of the check valves is in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 89-04 "Guidance on Developing Acceptable In-Service Inspection Programs", positions 2 and 3. Position 2 allows grouping similar valves together as long as a different valve in the group is inspected during each refuel outage. This test method was added to the IST program in January 1992 in response to an NRC letter dated September 1991. 3MSS*MOV17A was previously inspected in September 1993, during RFO4.

Since the unit was in cold shutdown at the time of the event, there were no operator actions required as a result of this condition.

II. Cause of Event

The cause of this event was inadequate program controls to ensure successful completion of all required Technical Specification check valve inspections in order to meet the IST program requirements. In addition, personnel error was a contributing factor in that the check valve program failed to identify that the turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump steam line motor operated stop check valve inspections are required to be performed under the IST Program. Adequate administrative review of the check valve program did not occur, thereby resulting in an incomplete program.

This component was not identified as an IST program check valve in the inspection schedule. A computer generated spreadsheet was utilized to schedule all check valve inspections. The turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump steam line motor operated stop check valves were not identified as requiring IST inspections within this matrix. The matrix was not reviewed by the IST engineer prior to the outage. A valve inspection was planned during RFO5. The accomplishment of this work was tied to scheduled repairs to the valve actuator. A specific work order was not generated for the disassembly and inspection required by the IST program. The valve actuator work was subsequently canceled. The review of completed IST program inspections did not identify that the required inspection had not been performed.

A review of the check valve program performed as part of a comprehensive configuration management plan identified a weakness with the scheduling of check valve inspections, in that no formal control existed for check valve inspections which are required to be performed by the unit's Technical Specifications.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

III. Analysis of Event

This condition is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) which identifies any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 4.0.5 requires that Inservice testing of ASME Class 1, 2, 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10CFR50, Section 50.55a(g).

The motor operated stop check valve was inspected during the current shutdown. Minor damage to the valve seating surface was identified. However, the function of the check valve to close against back pressure and prevent diversion of main steam flow was not effected.

IV. Corrective Action

This condition was discovered while the unit was in an extended cold shutdown. As a result, no immediate operator action was required. The inspection of motor operated stop check valve (3MSS*MOV17D) was completed. A review of the IST check valves required to be disassembled indicated that all of the other required inspections have been completed.

The results from the configuration management process review will be incorporated into the check valve program to ensure that all required inspections are correctly documented and scheduled for inspection prior to unit restart.

V. Additional Information

None

Similar Events

Other events involving missed surveillances required by the IST program due to programmatic errors were reported in previous LERs.

96-021-00 Components Not Included in the In-service Test Program as a Result of Programmatic Deficiencies.

Inservice Test (IST) Program deficiencies were identified consisting of incomplete implementation of several commitments, the omission of several valves from the program, testing inadequacies for valves already in the program, inconsistent or missing documentation in the Inservice Test Manual and IST surveillance procedures, and lack of adequate process control procedures which would ensure effective maintenance of the program. The cause of this condition was a programmatic deficiency resulting from inadequate resources available to assess the quality of the existing program, evaluate the interpretations employed during development of the program and implement more effective process controls. Correction of individual discrepancies and programmatic enhancements

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

to prevent recurrence are being incorporated into the IST manual and applicable surveillance procedures.

96-023-00 Failure to Include Fuel Transfer Tube Bellows within Containment Penetration Test Program.

An independent assessment of the containment system identified that the fuel transfer tube bellows, containment penetration no. 88, had not been included in the 10CFR50 Appendix J Test Program. This containment penetration had not been identified in the Appendix J program as requiring leak testing since the initial unit startup. The cause of this event was a programmatic deficiency resulting from an incomplete test procedure. This penetration leak path was added to the Appendix J program and a local leak rate test was performed. An independent assessment of the containment system penetrations was performed and concluded all other type B and type C penetrations are currently included in surveillance procedures and are tested in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J.

Manufacturer Data

EIS System: Main Steam - SB

EIS Component: Check Valve - V