

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 1					PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2	
TITLE (4) INCORRECT WIRING ON 1T41-F011A																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
									Edwin I. Hatch, Unit 2					0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6		
0 3	2 1	8 5	8 5	0 1 5	0 0	0 4	1 9	8 5						0 5 0 0 0		
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
4		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
0 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				X 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(a)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
Steven B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance										9 1 1 2 3 6 1 7 1 7 8 1 5 1						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										NO		0	7	1 9 8 5		

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 03/21/85 at approximately 1530 with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, contract personnel in the process of performing a functional test discovered that the isolation logic for the reactor building supply fan discharge inboard isolation damper (T41-F011A) was wired incorrectly.

Plant engineering personnel determined that wires had been improperly connected both at the damper and at the panel which prevented the damper from closing automatically upon receipt of an isolation signal.

Plant personnel corrected the wiring deficiencies associated with T41-F011A, successfully functionally tested the damper and returned it to service on 03/21/85 at approximately 2030 CST.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1	8 5	- 0 1 5	- 0 0 0	2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On 3/21/85 at approximately 1430 CST, with the Unit I reactor mode switch in the shutdown position and Unit II at 2430 MWt (approximately 100% power), contract personnel were performing a functional test of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). During the performance of this test, they determined that the isolation logic circuitry for the reactor building supply fan discharge inboard isolation damper (T41-F011A) was not wired according to the print.

Plant engineering personnel investigated the problem and determined that wires had been improperly connected both at the damper and at panel H11-P657. This wiring configuration would have prevented the damper from closing automatically upon receipt of an isolation signal (i.e., the wiring configuration was such that the wire from the isolation logic went to the open indicating light instead of to the damper operating solenoid, and the wire from the open position limit switch went to the damper operating solenoid instead of the open indicating light). If an isolation signal was received, the open indicating light would have extinguished, but the damper operating solenoid would not have de-energized as required and the closed light would not have energized. This wiring configuration rendered the damper inoperable and, by definition, compromised the secondary containment integrity of Unit I. Thus, Unit I has been operating contrary to the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.7.C.2 and Unit II has been operating contrary to Tech. Specs. section 3.6.5.1 and 3.9.5.1 (i.e., Unit I secondary containment integrity was not maintained).

No actual or potential safety consequences resulted from this event since the reactor building supply fan discharge outboard isolation damper (T41-F011B), which is just downstream of T41-F011A, was operable. The health and safety of the public were not affected.

The cause of the improper wiring configuration is unknown. Further investigation will be performed to determine the cause. An update report will be issued to report the results of the investigation.

Plant personnel corrected the wiring deficiencies associated with T41-F011A. They then successfully functionally tested the damper by simulating an isolation signal and observing the correct operation of both damper position and position indicating lights. The damper was returned to service on 3/21/85 at approximately 2030 CST .

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
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

April 19, 1985
GM-85-357

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1985-15. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i).


H. C. Nix
General Manager

SBT
HCN/STB/vlz

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