

WOLF CREEK

NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

Bart D. Withers
President and
Chief Executive Officer

November 3, 1992

WM 92-0179

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D. C. 20555


Reference: Letter dated September 30, 1992 from A. B. Beach,
NRC, to B. D. Withers, WCNOC
Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Response to Exercise Weaknesses
482/9214-01

Gentlemen:

This letter provides Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's (WCNOC) response to Exercise Weakness 482/9214-01. Exercise Weakness 482/9214-01 involved delays in making initial notifications to the State and County and in activating the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (316) 364-8831, extension 4000 or K. J. Moles of my staff at extension 4565.

Very truly yours,



Bart D. Withers
President and
Chief Executive Officer

BDW/jad

Attachment

cc: A. T. Howell (NRC), w/a
J. L. Milhoan (NRC), w/a
G. A. Pick (NRC), w/a
W. D. Reckley (NRC), w/a
D. B. Spitzberg (NRC), w/a

090065

9211090304 5-1103
PDR ADOCK C3000482
G PDR

Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (316) 364-0831

An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/H/VET

JEEL 1/0

Exercise Weakness (482/9214-01): Delay in Making Initial Notifications to the State and County and Subsequent Delay in Activating Group Paging System to Activate the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center

Response: On September 1, 1992, the day of the Exercise, at approximately 1900 CDT, Electrical Maintenance personnel were completing the performance of Maintenance Procedure MPE BA-006, "5-Year Battery Capacity Test," on Battery CS-16, the battery back-up system for the hub Computerized Branch Exchange (CBX). Following completion of the test, Electrical Maintenance personnel reconnected the battery to the battery charger while the battery charger was loaded. It is believed that a spike was generated when Electrical Maintenance personnel were reconnecting the leads to the battery which caused a transient to the Central Processing Unit for the CBX. It is believed that this spike caused the corruption of some of the data files in the CBX database, specifically a portion of the long distance dialing files, which made it difficult to complete long distance calling through the CBX. The problem then became evident on September 1, 1992, at 2038 CDT, at the start of the Exercise when the Offsite Communicator could not complete the long distance notification call to the State of Kansas. The Offsite Communicator, who did not refer to Emergency Plan Procedure EPP 01-3.1, "Immediate Notifications," was not sure of the methods available for accessing an outside line following the failure of the CBX. In addition, at the start of the Exercise, the Offsite Communicator notified Security of the Alert and requested initiation of the call-out of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). When the Security Officer also failed at getting an outside line through the CBX, he tried the direct outside line in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). Because this line included a rotary phone, which precludes its use in activating the Automatic Dialing System, this method was also unsuccessful. The Offsite Communicator contacted the State of Kansas at approximately 2059 CDT when an outside telephone operator was reached who assisted in completing the call. Security personnel using the microwave link to Wichita activated the call-out via the Automatic Dialing System at approximately 2100 CDT. The CBX was restored at approximately 2115 CDT.

To prevent recurrence, procedure revisions have been issued instructing Electrical Maintenance personnel to contact Communications personnel before starting the test and before reconnecting the batteries. Incorporating steps into the Maintenance procedures to contact Communications personnel during their work on the CBX will allow Communications personnel to perform diagnostic tests to ensure the operability of the system. Revisions to Emergency Plan Procedures EPP 01-1.0, "Control Room Organization," EPP 01-3.1, "Immediate Notifications," and EPP 01-3.2, "Follow-up Notifications," will be made to incorporate a reference on the notification forms to refer to the "Phone Use Instructions," contained in Section 0 of the Radiological Emergency Telephone Directory when telephone system problems are encountered. This reference to alternate methods for accessing long distance lines to the Communicators will enhance their ability to notify offsite authorities. These procedure revisions will be issued by December 1, 1992, and required reading for Communicators will be completed within 60 days of Required Reading Notices issuance. The rotary phone in SAS was replaced with a touch-tone phone on September 2, 1992. A touch-tone phone in SAS as a direct outside line will enable Security personnel to activate the call-out system in case of a CBX failure.

Additionally, the activation checklists for the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) contain steps which require the completion of tasks by or require input from ERO positions which are not required to be staffed for facility activation. This caused additional delays in activating the facilities. The appropriate activation checklists for the TSC, OSC and EOF will be revised to restructure the assignment of responsibilities by December 18, 1992. Even though the majority of the TSC and OSC positions were staffed within 60 minutes of the Alert declaration, activation was delayed because of the checklist requirements. Revising these checklists as described above will result in the activation of the facilities in a more timely manner.

The actions taken and to be taken in response to this Exercise Weakness should preclude recurrence of the delays associated with the CBX system and activation of the facilities.