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10CFR50.73



Nuclear
Operations

October 19, 1992
NRC-92-0106

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Fermi 2
NRC Docket No. 50-341
NRC License No. NPF-43

Subject: Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 92-008

Please find enclosed LER No. 92-008, dated October 19, 1992,
for a reportable event that occurred on September 19, 1992.
A copy of this LER is also being sent to the Regional
Administrator, USNRC Region III.

If you have any questions, please contact Joseph Pendergast,
Compliance Engineer, at (313) 586-1682.

Sincerely,

Enclosure: NRC Forms 366, 366A

cc: T. G. Colburn
A. B. Davis
M. P. Phillips
S. Stasek
P. L. Torpey

Wayne County Emergency
Management Division

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Fermi 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 OF 0 4										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4	
TITLE (4) 65F Bus De-energized During Surveillance 24.307.13																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
0 9	1 9	9 2	9 2	0 0 8	0 0	1 0	1 9	9 2				0 5 0 0 0									
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
5		20.402(i)				20.405(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)							
0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)							
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)											
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)											
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																					
NAME Joseph Pendergast, Compliance Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER 3 1 3 5 8 6 - 1 6 3 2											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										LECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
YES (If var. complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 words, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On September 19, 1992, operations personnel planned for the performance of surveillance 24.307.13, "Emergency Diesel Generator No. 14 - ECCS Start and Load Rejection Test". Operations requested the assistance of electrical maintenance personnel.

At 1901 hours, the electrician assigned to perform step 5.2.8.1 of the surveillance procedure did not perform that step. The electrician became confused when he was required to open a blade switch that was ganged to a second blade switch marked spare and he missed step 5.2.8.1. At 1903 hours, Bus 65F deenergized during performance of step 5.2.8.3. Shutdown Cooling isolated. The Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning, Control Center Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning, Standby Gas Treatment, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water, and Containment Isolation Valve systems responded as designed for the loss of Bus 65F. Bus 65F was restored at 1921 hours. Shutdown Cooling was restored at 1933 hours.

This event will be included in continuing training for operations and electrical maintenance. The procedure performed and the corresponding surveillance procedures for the other Emergency Diesel Generators were reviewed to identify any ganged switches. No additional ganged switches were found that should be noted in these surveillance procedures.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Fermi 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 1	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 385A's) (17)

Initial Plant Conditions:

Operational Condition: 5 (Refueling)
Reactor Power: 0 Percent
Reactor Pressure: 0 psig
Reactor Temperature: 82 Degrees Fahrenheit

Description of the Event:

On September 19, 1992, operations planned for the performance of surveillance 24.307.13, "Emergency Diesel Generator No. 14 - ECCS Start and Load Rejection Test". The Nuclear Supervising Operator (NSO) test leader assigned the task contacted the foreman for Electrical Maintenance and discussed the assistance which would be needed to set up a visicorder in the RHR complex and to manipulate blade switches in the switchgear room in accordance with the procedure.

At 1730 hours, a briefing was conducted by the NSO test leader. At 1750 hours, the NSO test leader took the electrician to the Division 2 Switchgear room for a detailed briefing, including procedure steps and the importance of self checking.

At 1815 hours, all personnel were in place and procedure 24.307.13 was started.

At 1901 hours, the electrician did not open the 65F bus trip cutoff switch as required by step 5.2.8.1 of the procedure. The electrician became confused when he was required to open switch F6 blade 1 [IS], that was ganged to blade 2 marked spare. At 1903 hours, the electrician initiated a bus trip per step 5.2.8.3 at which time the Division 2, 4160V Reactor Building Bus 65F [BU] deenergized. The electrician had been in constant communication with the test lead NSO and Control Room NSO.

Shutdown Cooling [(BO)(SDC)] isolated when valves E11-F008 and 9, "Division 1 and 2 SDC inboard and outboard containment isolation valves" closed. The Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning [(VA)(RBHVAC)], Control Center Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning [(VI)(CCHVAC)], Standby Gas Treatment [(BH)(SGT)], Emergency Equipment Cooling Water [(CC)(EECW)], and Containment Isolation Valve [JM] systems responded per design for the loss of Bus 65F by isolating/actuating.

Bus 65F was restored at 1921 hours. Shutdown Cooling was restored at 1933 hours.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (7)

Cause of the Event:

Both the NSO (utility licensed) who was stationed at the RHR complex and the Control Room NSO (utility licensed) believed that the electrician (utility non-licensed) had actually manipulated the switch as required by step 5.2.8.1. The electrician did not indicate that he had a problem with cutoff switch blade 1. Although surveillance procedure 24.307.13 may have been a contributing factor in that it did not state blade switches 1 and 2 were ganged together; the procedure was correct as written. Position F6, cutoff switch 1M294/86 clearly indicated that blade 2 was a "Spare". Therefore, the root cause of this event was personnel error on the part of the electrician.

Analysis of the Event:

The loss of shutdown cooling while in Condition 5 (Refueling) resulted in a six degree temperature rise until cooling was restored 30 minutes after the isolation. The Reactor Coolant temperature increased from 82 to 88 degrees Fahrenheit. The temperature limit for remaining in the Refueling condition is 140 degrees Fahrenheit.

The RBHVAC, CCHVAC, SGT, EECW, and Containment Isolation valve system responses were consistent with the design basis of these systems for loss of Bus 65F. Thus, this event did not decrease the ability of these systems to perform their intended design safety functions.

Corrective Actions:

Continuing training for operations and electrical maintenance will review this event. Included in the electrical maintenance training will be an emphasis on repeat backs and an emphasis to stop if there is a question during performance of a procedure. This training will be completed during the first Quarter of 1993.

Surveillance procedure 24.307.13, "Emergency Diesel Generator No. 14-ECCS Start and Load Rejection Test", has a temporary change notice issued. The TCN reflects the fact that blades 1 and 2 on F6 are ganged together.

The ganging on F6 blades 1 and 2 will be removed by November 15, 1992.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 600 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Procedures, "Emergency Diesel Generator 11, 12 and 13 - ECCS Start and Load Rejection Test", were reviewed for accuracy. These procedures were found to be accurate. No additional ganged switches were found that should be noted in the associated surveillance procedures.

Technical Engineering reviewed other procedures (i.e., 24.307.01 through .04, and 24.307.30 through .33) where gang switches could be a problem. No additional ganged switches were found that should be noted in the other procedures.

Previous Similar Events:

None.