



Tennessee Valley Authority Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

J. L. Wilson
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

October 9, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket Nos. 50-327
50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - SPECIAL REPORT 92-08

The enclosed special report provides details concerning ceilings in the control building being breached for a period greater than the technical specification (TS) allowable time period. It also provides details concerning the inoperability of fire protection detectors in Fire Zone 277 in the essential raw cooling water building. Both conditions resulted from preplanned activities; compensatory actions were taken in accordance with TS requirements. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS Action Statements 3.3.3.8.b and 3.7.12.a.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone Russell R. Thompson at (615) 843-7470.

J. L. Wilson
J. L. Wilson

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

9210140281 921009
PDR ADOCK 05000327
S PDR

JE22

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Page 2

October 9, 1992

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint, North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20854

NRC Resident Inspector
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
2600 Igou Ferry Road
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) SPECIAL REPORT 92-08

I. CEILINGS IN THE CONTROL BUILDING

Description of Condition

On September 8, 1992, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1 at full power, the control building ceilings in Rooms C10 and C11 on Elevation 732 were breached. The breached condition existed for a period in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days.

Cause of Condition

The ceilings in control building Rooms C10 and C11 were breached to facilitate a remodeling modification of the area adjacent to the main control room area.

Corrective Action

In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), hourly, roving fire watches were established and were maintained until the passive fire barriers were returned to service on September 28, 1992.

II. FIRE DETECTORS LOCATED IN THE ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER (ERCW) BUILDING ABOVE THE ERCW PUMPS

Description of Condition

On September 1, 1992, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1 at full power, two thermal fire protection detectors in Fire Zone 277 were removed to facilitate the removal and repair of ERCW Pump K-A. The maintenance activity exceeded the TS allowable timeframe of 14 days for fire detection devices to be out of service.

Cause of Condition

The maintenance activities required the two detectors to be removed to facilitate the removal of the pump motor to pull the pump.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (a), an hourly fire watch was established and maintained for the duration of the maintenance activity. LCO 3.3.3.8 was entered on September 1, 1992, and exited on September 20, 1992, when the thermal detectors were returned to operable status.