

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit #1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2	
TITLE (4) Diesel Generator Start when backfeeding Powerboard 102 from Powerboard 16																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)						
0 6	0 1	8 4	8 4	0 1 2	0 1	1 0	1 9	8 4							0 5 0 0 0						
OPERATING MODE (9) N			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																		
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0			20.402(b)				20.406(e)				X 90.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)						
			20.406(a)(1)(i)				90.36(a)(1)								73.71(e)						
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)				90.36(a)(2)								OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)						
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)				90.73(a)(2)(i)														
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)				90.73(a)(2)(ii)														
			20.406(a)(1)(v)				90.73(a)(2)(iii)														
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																					
NAME Robert Randall, Supervisor, Technical Services										TELEPHONE NUMBER											
										AREA CODE 3 1 5 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)				MONTH	DAY	YEAR					
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

On June 1, 1984, during a refueling outage, work was to be done on breaker R1012, which supplies 4160 Volt Powerboard 102. This made it necessary to backfeed Powerboard 102 through 600 Volt Powerboard 16. Breaker R1012 was opened in preparation for this maintenance. Immediately thereafter, new protective relays sensed undervoltage on 4160 Volt Powerboard 102. As a result, tie breaker R1042 tripped, and Diesel Generator 102 started at approximately 1000 hrs.

Immediate corrective action taken included returning to the normal 115k Volt supply on Powerboard 102. Operating procedures are being reviewed to determine if any procedural changes are required which will prevent this type of event from occurring in the future.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Nine Mile Point Unit #1	05000220	84	012	01	02	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TEXT

On June 1, 1984, during a refueling outage, maintenance work was to be done on breaker R1012, which supplies 4160 Volt Powerboard 102. This made it necessary to backfeed Powerboard 102 through 600 Volt Powerboard 16. The interlock between sections A and B on Powerboard 16 was defeated to allow tie breaker R1042 to be closed, which completed the backfeed to 4160 Volt Powerboard 102. At that point, breaker R1012 was opened in preparation for maintenance. Immediately after this breaker was opened, new protective relays sensed an undervoltage condition on 4160 Volt Powerboard 102. As a result, tie breaker R1042 was tripped and Diesel Generator 102 started at approximately 1000 hrs.

The following factors contributed to the incident:

1. The new undervoltage relays monitored phase-to-ground voltage rather than phase-to-phase as did the old relays.
2. An ungrounded condition existed as the result of backfeeding.
3. An unbalanced condition was sensed by the new undervoltage relays, which then operated as designed.

ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There are no potential safety consequences arising out of this event because: 1) the reactor was in cold shutdown and subcritical; 2) all control rods were fully inserted at the time of the event; 3) there were no loads on the 4160V Powerboard 102 at the time of the event; and 4) all engineered safety features involved in this event operated as designed; therefore there was no possibility of damage to the plant or danger to plant personnel arising out of this event. The effect of this event on the plant and its personnel, had the plant been at any other power level, would still be negligible, because all of the engineered safety features involved in this event operated as designed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate corrective action taken included returning to the normal 115Kv supply on Powerboard 102. Operating procedures are being reviewed to determine if any procedural changes are required which will prevent this type of event from occurring in the future.

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

March 18, 1985

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555RE: Docket No. 50-220
LER 84-12-01


Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following
Licensee Event Report:

LER 84-12	Which is being submitted in accordance with
Rev. 01	10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)."

A 10 CFR 50.72 report was made at 1015 hrs on June 1, 1984. This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, dated September 1983. This revision corrects a misleading statement made in the original report. The setpoints of the undervoltage relays were not changed, but voltages were monitored phase-to-ground rather than phase-to-phase.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges
Vice President - Nuclear Generation

attachments

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional AdministratorLE22
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