

Commonwealth Edison Company
Braidwood Generating Station
Route #1, Box 84
Braceville, IL 60407-9619
Tel 815-458-2801

ComEd

June 4, 1996
BW/96-0061

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Braidwood Generating Station is being transmitted in accordance with the requirement of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), which requires a 30-day report.

This report is number 96-005-00, Docket No. 50-457.

Yours truly,



T. J. Tulon
Station Manager
Braidwood Nuclear Station

TJT//BJM/vak
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Encl: Licensee Event Report
No. 457-96-005-00

cc: NRC Region III Administrator
NRC Resident Inspector
INPO Record Center
ComEd Distribution Center
I.D.N.S.
I.D.N.S. Resident Inspector

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PDR ADOCK 05000457
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EXPIRES 04/30/98

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Braidwood Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000457

PAGE (3)

1 OF 4

TITLE (4)

Inadvertent Start of the 2A Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Due to Personnel Error.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
05	06	96	96	-- 005 --	00	06	06	96	None	
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	Mode	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	5	20.2201(b)					
	000	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)			
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)			
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		20.2203(a)(4)			
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)	
				50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71	
				50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER	
				50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
				50.73(a)(2)(vi)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

B. Claveau

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(815) 458-2801 x3213

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS
NA									

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 5/6/96 Braidwood Unit 2 was in a refueling outage with multiple activities in progress to support Mode 4 entry. The 2A and 2B auxiliary feed pumps were in pull-to-lock to prevent auto starting from LO-2 steam generator level and due to not being required in Mode 5. All outage activities were scheduled by work control and operating outage management and were listed on the shiftily update list provided to the oncoming crew. During performance of 2BwOS PL-R1, the 2A auxiliary feed water pump was placed in local at the remote shutdown panel and automatically started due to the 2B steam generator level being below the LO-2 setpoint. The nuclear station operator manipulating the switch immediately recognized the auto start condition and returned the switch to remote. This action stopped the 2A auxiliary feed water pump and the surveillance was immediately stopped. The cause of the event was personnel error. Two contributing causes were a procedural deficiency and a perceived pressure to complete Mode 4 surveillance requirements. Corrective actions included revising the procedure for the remote shutdown panel control power checks and counseling personnel involved. This event had no affect on plant or public safety as the unit was in Mode 5 (cold shutdown).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Braidwood Unit 2	05000457	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 4
		96	--005--	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

UNIT: Braidwood Unit 2 EVENT DATE: 05/06/96
EVENT TIME: 0526
MODE: 5 RX POWER: 0%
RCS [AB] TEMPERATURE/PRESSURE: 150 degrees F/ 365 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

There were no systems or components inoperable at the beginning of this event that contributed to the severity of the event.

On 5/6/96 Braidwood Unit 2 was in a refueling outage with multiple activities in progress to support Mode 4 entry. These activities included 2BwOS 3.2.1-970 (B Train Auto Valve Actuation Slave Relay Surveillance), nitrogen sparge of the 2B steam generator, draining of the 2A and 2B steam generators to 40% wide range level to support chemistry, 2BwVS 6.2.2.b-1 (Containment Cooling Fan Auto Actuation Test), 2BwOS 4.3.3-1 (Pressurizer Heaters 18 Month Surveillance), 2 BwOS 4.6.2.1.d-1 (Reactor Coolant System Leakrate), and 2BwOS PL-R1 (Remote Shutdown Panel Control Power Checks 18 Month Surveillance). The 2A and 2B auxiliary feed pumps were in pull-to-lock to prevent auto starting from LO-2 steam generator level and due to not being required in Mode 5. All of the activities were scheduled by work control and operating outage management and were listed on the shiftly update list provided to the oncoming crew.

During performance of 2BwOS PL-R1, the 2A auxiliary feed water pump was placed in local at the remote shutdown panel and automatically started due to the 2B steam generator level being below the LO-2 setpoint. The nuclear station operator (NSO, Licensed Reactor Operator) manipulating the switch immediately recognized the auto start condition and returned the switch to remote. This action stopped the 2A auxiliary feed water pump. The surveillance was immediately stopped. The 2A auxiliary feed water pump had been previously lined up, ran and was isolated from the steam generators from the Main Control Board. Both auxiliary feed water pumps do not have a pull-to-lock position at the remote shutdown panel and will receive all auto

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Braidwood Unit 2	05000457	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (continued)

start signals through their control logics when placed in local. Fuses in the control power circuit would have to be pulled to prevent the occurrence. Control power is needed to successfully pass the surveillance and satisfy the acceptance criteria. Thus any auto start signal present conflicts with BWOS PL-R1 performance.

At 0617, a 4 hour Non-emergency Report was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) for an event that resulted in the automatic actuation of an engineered safety feature.

This report is being submitted as required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature, including the reactor protection system.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The cause of the event was personnel error. There was a failure to recognize the contradictory evolutions in progress by all personnel involved from planning to operational execution. There was a failure to tie together the auto start signal created by draining the steam generators and taking local control of an auxiliary feed water pump capable of passing that control logic signal.

There were two contributing causes for this event. Inadequate precautionary information addressed in the procedure for a surveillance performed on an infrequent frequency. Perceived pressures to complete Mode 4 surveillance requirements and complete the outage created conflicting activities.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

This event had no affect on plant or public safety as the unit was in Mode 5 (cold shutdown). The auxiliary feed water pumps are not required during Mode 5. All systems operated as designed. There are no reasonable and credible alternative conditions that would have been more severe.

EXPIRES 04/30/98

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Braidwood Unit 2		05000457	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	4 OF 4
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Procedures 1/2 BwOS PL-R1 will be revised to reflect this event. A precaution stating an auto start signal present (LO-2 steam generator level, reactor coolant pump bus undervoltage, ATWS mitigation system, undervoltage condition on bus 141 following the start of the 1A diesel generator and its sequencer, safety injection) will auto start the appropriate auxiliary feed water pump when placed in local at the remote shutdown panel even with its remote control switch in pull-to-lock. This will be tracked to completion by NTS item #457-180-96-00501 and will be completed by 7/31/96.

The personnel involved with this event were counselled and held accountable under Braidwood Policy #103.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

A review of ComEd databases revealed one previous event (LER 457-180-94-002) involving an inadvertent start of the 2A auxiliary feed water pump. The cause of the event was a procedural deficiency. A review of the corrective actions revealed that they would not have prevented this event from occurring.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>MODEL</u>	<u>MFG PART NO.</u>
NA	NA	NA	NA