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June 3, 1996

LCV-0822

Docket No. 50-424
50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Ladies and Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-96-5
UNQUALIFIED CABLING USED IN
CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTERS

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby submits the enclosed report associated with the discovery of a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

Sincerely,

C.K.M. McCoy
C. K. McCoy

CKM/TEW

Enclosure: LER 1-96-5

cc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. L. L. Wheeler, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. C. R. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 50.0 HRS. REQUIRED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 50004241				PAGE (3) 1 OF 4		
TITLE (4) UNQUALIFIED CABLING USED IN CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTERS																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME VEGP - Unit 2				DOCKET NUMBER(S) 05000425			
05	15	96	96	005	00	06	03	96	FACILITY NAME				050000			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more) (11)														
POWER LEVEL (10)		X														
100		50.73(a)(2)(i)														
		50.73(a)(2)(ii)														
		50.73(a)(2)(iii)														
		50.73(a)(2)(iv)														
		50.73(a)(2)(v)														
		50.73(a)(2)(vi)														
		50.73(a)(2)(vii)														
		50.73(a)(2)(viii)														
		50.73(a)(2)(ix)														
		73.71														
		OTHER														
		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A														
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Mehdi Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance										TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)						
										AREA CODE 706826-3209						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately 15 single-space typewritten lines) (16)

As a result of an inspection being performed following maintenance, both Unit 1 containment sump level transmitters were found to be wired with cabling that was not environmentally qualified as required by design specifications because the outside jacketing had been removed. A work order search also found that a section of unqualified cabling had previously been in service in Unit 2. The use of the improper cabling meant that the transmitters may not have been capable of performing their post-accident intended safety function. As a result, the units operated in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS), because TS 3.3.3.6 requires these transmitters to be operable when the unit is in Modes 1, 2, or 3.

The causes of this condition were: the improper installation of the cabling by removing the outside jacketing in Unit 1, and, placing an unjacketed cable splice into a junction box that was not environmentally qualified in Unit 2. The cabling for these transmitters was replaced or repaired with qualified materials.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 365A)(17)

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the units operated in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS) when containment sump level transmitters were in service with unqualified cabling.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of the discovery of this condition, Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent of rated thermal power. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment that contributed to the occurrence of this condition.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On May 15, 1996, Unit 1 containment north sump level transmitter 1LV-7789 was out of service due to transmitter failure. During transmitter replacement, a quality control (QC) inspector noticed that cabling running to the transmitter had an unjacketed splice. An investigation determined that the cable on one side of this splice was not environmentally qualified as required by design specifications because the outside jacketing had been removed. On May 16, 1996, an inspection of cabling associated with Unit 1 containment south sump level transmitter 1LV-7777 found the same condition. The cabling for both transmitters was replaced with qualified materials. 1LV-7789 was returned to service on May 17, 1996, and 1LV-7777 was returned to service on May 18, 1996.

A search of previous work orders for these Unit 1 transmitters determined that this condition had existed since original construction. The corresponding Unit 2 transmitters were inspected and no unqualified cabling was found. However, a search of Unit 2 work orders found that 2LV-7789 had been replaced in 1993 and an unjacketed cable splice was left in a junction box that was not environmentally qualified. This splice was later corrected by a repair performed in 1995. Therefore, a similar condition of the use of unjacketed and unqualified cabling existed from 1993 to 1995.

The use of the unqualified cabling meant that the transmitters may not have been operable as accident monitoring instrumentation. As a result, the units operated in a condition prohibited by the TS, because TS 3.3.3.6 requires these transmitters to be operable when the unit is in Modes 1, 2, or 3.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event was the use of cabling that was not environmentally qualified because the outside jacketing had been removed. The Unit 1 cabling was installed as a part of the original construction. The Unit 2 event occurred when an unjacketed splice was located in a junction box that was not environmentally qualified. The reason for this action is not documented and due to the length of time since this occurred in 1993, a root cause could not be determined.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The transmitters continued to perform their normal reactor coolant system leakage detection function. However, in the event of a LOCA, the unqualified cabling may have failed, rendering the transmitters non-functional. Nonetheless, these transmitters do not perform an active function in mitigating the consequences of an accident and other instruments are available to determine the containment water level. Furthermore, no event has occurred that would require these transmitters to function in the post accident mode. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse affect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this condition.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTION

- 1) The cabling for both Unit 1 transmitters was replaced with qualified materials.
- 2) The corresponding Unit 2 transmitters were inspected and no unqualified cabling was found. The unqualified cable splice was previously repaired in 1995.
- 3) Appropriate personnel will review this LER in continuing training with emphasis on environmental qualifications. This training will be completed by September 13, 1996.
- 4) A broadness review will be completed by June 23, 1996, to determine if other level transmitters require inspections.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- 1) Failed Components:
None
- 2) Previous Similar Events:
None
- 3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:
Containment Building Drain System - BD
Reactor Coolant System - AB