



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

May 22, 1996

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of )  
Tennessee Valley Authority )

Docket No. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE  
DPR-79 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 96-03

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the removal of the biological shield blocks and the opening of the Unit 2 containment vessel equipment hatch and the breaching of (1) both Unit 2 reactor building personnel air locks, (2) an auxiliary building door, and (3) multiple sleeve penetrations. These preplanned fire breaches are for the support of Unit 2 Cycle 7 refueling outage activities. The fire barriers are being breached for a period of time greater than the TS allowable timeframe.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone J. Bajraszewski at (423) 843-7749.

Sincerely,

*R. H. Shell*

R. H. Shell  
Manager  
SQN Site Licensing

Enclosure  
cc: See page 2

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## ENCLOSURE

### SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 96-03

#### I. Unit 2 Reactor Building Biological Shield Blocks and Containment Vessel Equipment Hatch

##### Description of Condition

On April 20, 1996, with Unit 2 entering a refueling outage, the Unit 2 reactor building biological shield blocks located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 734 were removed, and the equipment hatch was opened.

The fire barrier penetration has been breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

##### Cause of Condition

The shield blocks were removed, and the equipment hatch was opened to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel between the auxiliary building and the Unit 2 reactor building. The shield blocks will be removed from position (i.e., maintained in a storage position) for the duration of the Unit 2 Cycle 7 (U2C7) refueling outage (RFO).

##### Corrective Action

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. At the completion of the outage, before entering Mode 4, the equipment hatch will be closed, and the shield blocks will be reinstalled, reestablishing the fire barrier.

#### II. Unit 2 Reactor Building Personnel Air Locks

##### Description of Condition

On April 21, 1996, the upper Unit 2 reactor building personnel air lock door, located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 734, was breached open. On April 22, 1996, the lower Unit 2 reactor building personnel air lock door, located on auxiliary building Floor Elevation 690, was breached open.

The fire barrier penetrations have been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

#### Cause of Condition

The doors for both personnel airlocks were breached open to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel between the auxiliary building and the Unit 2 reactor building. The doors will be breached for the duration of the U2C7 RFO.

#### Corrective Action

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished before entering Mode 4.

### III. Auxiliary Building Door

#### Description of Condition

On April 21, 1996, auxiliary building Door A-75, located on Floor Elevation 690, was breached. The door provides access to the Unit 2 penetration room from the general auxiliary building area.

The fire barrier penetration has been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

#### Cause of Condition

The door is breached to facilitate U2C7 RFO activities, including the movement of personnel and equipment through the area and the routing of electrical cables (communications and video). The fire breach will remain open for the duration of the U2C7 RFO.

#### Corrective Action

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished. The fire barrier will be reestablished upon the completion of the outage activities.

#### IV. Sleeve Penetrations

##### Description of Condition

During April 21 through 23, 1996, the following five sleeve penetrations located in either the auxiliary building or the Unit 2 reactor building were breached.

<u>Sleeve Number</u>	<u>Building</u>	<u>Elevation</u>
Mk-72	Auxiliary	717
Mk-100	Auxiliary	700
Mk-101	Auxiliary	698
X-108	Reactor	688
X-109	Reactor	688

These fire barrier penetrations have been breached in excess of the TS allowable timeframe of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

##### Cause of Condition

The sleeve penetrations are breached in support of U2C7 RFO activities, including the routing of electrical cables (communication and video) and the installation of ice blowing piping. The auxiliary building fire breaches will remain open for the duration of the U2C7 RFO.

##### Corrective Action

In accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was immediately established, and the fire detectors on one side of the breach were verified operable. The roving fire watch will be maintained until the fire barriers are reestablished. The auxiliary building fire breaches will remain open for the duration of the U2C7 RFO. The reactor building fire breach will be reestablished before entering Mode 4.