

AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

DOCKET NO. 50-346
 UNIT Davis-Besse Unit 1
 DATE March 8, 1985
 COMPLETED BY Bilal Sarsour
 TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000
 Ext. 384

MONTH February 1985

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)	DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
1	<u>802</u>	17	<u>819</u>
2	<u>818</u>	18	<u>819</u>
3	<u>818</u>	19	<u>695</u>
4	<u>819</u>	20	<u>691</u>
5	<u>819</u>	21	<u>814</u>
6	<u>799</u>	22	<u>822</u>
7	<u>820</u>	23	<u>805</u>
8	<u>817</u>	24	<u>820</u>
9	<u>817</u>	25	<u>827</u>
10	<u>818</u>	26	<u>826</u>
11	<u>818</u>	27	<u>826</u>
12	<u>817</u>	28	<u>825</u>
13	<u>816</u>	29	<u> </u>
14	<u>818</u>	30	<u> </u>
15	<u>821</u>	31	<u> </u>
16	<u>818</u>		

INSTRUCTIONS

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

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OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-346
 DATE March 8, 1985
 COMPLETED BY Bilal Sarsour
 TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000,
 Ext. 384

OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name: Davis-Besse Unit 1
2. Reporting Period: February 1985
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 2772
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 915
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 918
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 874

Notes

8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons:

9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe): _____
10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any: _____

	This Month	Yr.-to-Date	Cumulative
11. Hours In Reporting Period	672	1,416.0	57,721.0
12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical	672	1,066.1	34,097.6
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours	0.0	0.0	4,014.1
14. Hours Generator On-Line	672	976.0	32,617.3
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	0.0	0.0	1,732.5
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	1,712,431	2,196,755	77,182,177
17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	573,184	726,155	25,572,499
18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	543,374	672,269	23,962,525
19. Unit Service Factor	100	68.9	56.5
20. Unit Availability Factor	100	68.9	59.5
21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net)	92.5	54.3	47.5
22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)	89.2	52.4	45.8
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate	0.0	0.0	16.9
24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):			

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup: _____
26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):

	Forecast	Achieved
INITIAL CRITICALITY	_____	_____
INITIAL ELECTRICITY	_____	_____
COMMERCIAL OPERATION	_____	_____

REPORT MONTH February 1985

TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, Ext. 384

No unit shutdowns or significant power reductions

5 Exhibit 1 - Same Source

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
February, 1985

2/1/85 - 2/6/85

Reactor power was maintained at approximately 93% (reactor power was limited to 93% due to an inoperable main steam safety valve) until 0300 hours on February 6, 1985, when power was reduced to approximately 90% to stop Condensate Pump #1 for maintenance inspection and to repair its upper bearing oil cooler lines. After the completion of Condensate Pump #1 inspection, reactor power was slowly increased to approximately 93% which was reached at 1800 hours on February 6, 1985.

2/7/85 - 2/20/85

Reactor power was maintained at approximately 93% until 1400 hours on February 19, 1985, when a manual power reduction to approximately 88% was initiated to perform control rod drive exercising testing.

At approximately 1506 hours on February 19, 1985, while the unit was at approximately 88%, Control Rod 2-3 dropped due to an improper connection of a wire cable connector to the transfer switch. The unit ran back to 52%. The rod was pulled, and reactor power was slowly increased at a steady rate.

At 2057 hours on February 19, 1985, while the unit was at approximately 62%, Control Rod 7-12 dropped. The cause is suspected to be a bad transfer switch. Control Rod 7-12 was realigned with Control Rod Group 7.

Power escalation continued until 1200 hours on February 20, 1985, when 93% of full power was achieved. Reactor power level was maintained at 93% until 1316 hours on February 20, 1985, when the unit ran back to approximately 53% power due to a dropped Control Rod 1-3, which was caused by an improper connection of a wire cable connector to the transfer switch. Control Rod 1-3 was pulled and power escalation continued until 2300 hours on February 20, 1985, when 93% of full power was achieved. These rod drops will be further investigated during the next outage of sufficient length. The cause for the loose connectors was attributed to the extensive cleanup conducted in the cabinets during the recent refueling outage. Efforts were made to tighten connections but accessibility is a problem with the cabinets energized.

2/21/85 - 2/28/85

Reactor power was maintained at approximately 93% until 1300 hours on February 23, 1985, when power was reduced to approximately 72% due to an unplanned runback of Group 7 caused by a defective command module in the auxiliary power supply which was controlling Group 7.

Reactor power was slowly increased to approximately 94% which was reached at 2400 hours on February 24, 1985, and maintained at this power level for the remainder of the month.

REFUELING INFORMATION

DATE: February, 1985

1. Name of facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: Spring, 1986
3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: Summer, 1986
4. Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specification change or other license amendment? If answer is yes, what in general will these be? If answer is no, has the reload fuel design and core configuration been reviewed by your Plant Safety Review Committee to determine whether any unreviewed safety questions are associated with the core reload (Ref. 10 CFR Section 50.59)?

Ans: Expect the Reload Report to require standard reload fuel design Technical Specification changes (3/4.1 Reactivity Control Systems and 3/4.2 Power Distribution Limits).

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting information: Winter, 1985
6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures.

Ans: None identified to date.

7. The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core and (b) in the spent fuel storage pool.

(a) 177 (b) 204 - Spent Fuel Assemblies

8. The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies.

Present: 735 Increase size by: 0 (zero)

9. The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity.

Date: 1992 - assuming ability to unload the entire core into the spent fuel pool is maintained.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 79-430

SYSTEM: Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)

COMPONENT: Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Detector

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR installed a nuclear safety related qualified auxiliary feedwater flow detector which met the requirements set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.89 and which is powered from an emergency power source. Work was completed August 4, 1982.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The original auxiliary feedwater flow detector was not qualified nuclear grade. The addition of the nuclear safety qualified detector was required to comply with NRC Requirements Task #18 of Lessons Learned dated October 1, 1979.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This change provided additional information to the reactor operator during abnormal reactor operation when auxiliary feedwater flow is required to remove decay heat.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 81-164

SYSTEM: Clean Liquid Radioactive Waste

COMPONENT: Clean Waste Monitor Tank Transfer Pump

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 81-164 was implemented to replace the Clean Waste Monitor Tank Transfer Pump, which was a Crane Chem-pump, with two Gould type pumps. This FCR includes the piping, electrical, and other modifications required to install the pumps to the system. Work involved with this FCR was completed April 4, 1984.

REASON FOR CHANGE: This change was needed in that the original Clean Waste Monitor Tank Transfer Pump was of the Crane Chem-pump type and unsuitable for the intended function of the pump, which pumps water from the Clean Waste Monitor Tank to either the Primary Water Storage Tank, the waste system for further processing, or into Lake Erie. If the water is sent on for further processing in the waste system, the water will have suspended solids present in it. The Crane Chem-pumps are excellent for clear water service, but are susceptible to excessive wear and plugging when pumping suspended solid mixtures. Also, in the past, the Crane Chem-pumps have had to be returned to the manufacturer for maintenance which has shown to take at least one year to perform. This duration for repair is unacceptable.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The purpose of the Clean Waste Monitor Tank Pump is to pump water from the Clean Waste Monitor Tank to either the Primary Water Storage Tank, the waste system for further processing, or into Lake Erie. Since this function is not decreased by the change made, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 82-019

SYSTEM: Fire Detection System

COMPONENT: Fire Door 427A

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR modified door 427A, a 3-hour fire rated door, by installing an electromagnetic hold/release device to hold the door in the normally open position. This modification is temporary until a permanent battery heating system can be installed in Battery Room #2. Work was completed January 19, 1984.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The recommended battery room temperature is approximately 60°F at all times. In the past, this room has become very cold in the winter months. The door hold/release device was installed to hold the door open during the winter months. This is to continue until a heating system can be installed in Battery Room #2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Because this door is a 3-hour fire rated door, it has been tied into the Fire Detection System and will automatically release in the event of an alarm. Because of this connection into the Fire Detection System, the intended safety function of door 427A is not decreased. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 84-0046

SYSTEM: Various

COMPONENT: N/A

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR revised the Safety Analysis Report to incorporate pressure and temperature data for the following systems:

- 1) Auxiliary Feedwater System
- 2) Reactor Coolant Letdown System
- 3) Reactor Coolant Makeup System
- 4) Reactor Coolant Seal Water Supply System
- 5) Containment Spray System
- 6) Low Pressure Injection/Decay Heat Removal System
- 7) High Pressure Injection System
- 8) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System
- 9) Radiological Monitoring System

FCR 84-0046 was implemented January 22, 1984.

REASON FOR CHANGE: This FCR resolved inconsistencies present in drawing 12501-M-602 and the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR).

SAFETY EVALUATION: It is concluded that these changes to drawing 12501-M-602 and the USAR will not result in an unreviewed safety question as defined by 10CFR50.59 or in undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 84-047

SYSTEM: Various

COMPONENT: Drawing 12501-M-602

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 84-047 revised drawing 12501-M-602, piping class summary sheets, which corrected certain system pressures and temperatures. The affected systems are:

- 1) Makeup and Purification System
- 2) Component Cooling Water System
- 3) Service Water System
- 4) Screen Wash System
- 5) Gaseous Radioactive Waste System
- 6) Miscellaneous Liquid Radioactive Waste System
- 7) Station Fire Protection System
- 8) Clean Liquid Radioactive Waste System

This FCR was completed February 8, 1985.

REASON FOR CHANGE: This FCR was transmitted to provide resolution to inconsistencies between drawing 12501-M-602 and the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

SAFETY EVALUATION: It is concluded that these changes to drawing 12501-M-602 will not result in an unreviewed safety question as defined by 10CFR50.59 or result in undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 84-129

SYSTEM: Fire Protection

COMPONENT: Jockey Fire Pump, P-6

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR revised drawing 7749-C-395 to represent the correct "as-built" condition of the Jockey Fire Pump, P-6. This revision involved updating the concrete pad and anchor bolts for the Jockey Fire Pump. FCR 84-129 was implemented December 19, 1984.

REASON FOR CHANGE: This FCR was the result of work that was performed when the bolts installed to hold the Jockey Fire Pump were found broken off per Non-Conformance Report 84-0015. Therefore, changes to drawing 7749-C-395 were required to represent the correct "as-built" condition of the plant.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Since this change does not decrease the safety function of the Fire Protection System, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.



March 8, 1985

Log No. K85-488
File: RR 2 (P-6-85-02)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. Norman Haller, Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Haller:

Monthly Operating Report, February 1985
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1

Enclosed are ten copies of the Monthly Operating Report for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 for the month of February, 1985.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Bilal Sarsour at (419) 259-5000, Extension 384.

Yours truly,

Stephen M. Quenneville
Plant Manager
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/BMS/ljk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler, w/1
Regional Administrator, Region III

Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director, w/2
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mr. Walt Rogers, w/1
NRC Resident Inspector

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