

Commonwealth Edison Company  
LaSalle Generating Station  
2601 North 21st Road  
Marseilles, IL 61341-9757  
Tel 815-357-6761


**ComEd**

May 10, 1996

**United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission**  
**Attention: Document Control Desk**  
**Washington, D.C. 20555**

Licensee Event Report #96-004-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Respectfully,



D. J. Ray

Station Manager  
LaSalle County Station

Enclosure

cc: H. J. Miller, NRC Region III Administrator  
P. G. Brochman, NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle  
C. Mathews, IDNS Resident Inspector - LaSalle  
F. Niziolek, IDNS Senior Reactor Analyst  
INPO - Records Center  
D. L. Farrar, Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

LaSalle County Station Unit One

DOCKET NUMBER(2)

05000373

PAGE(3)

1 of 3

TITLE (4)

Unit 1 "B" RPS MG SET EPMA Breaker Inadvertently Tripped due to Personnel Error.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)				
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER			
04	12	96	96	004	00	05	12	96	Unit Two	05000374			
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER			
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)													
OPERATING MODE (9)		2											
POWER LEVEL (10)		0											
		<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2201(b)			<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(3)(i)			<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.7
		<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(1)			<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2003(a)(3)(ii)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(c)
		<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(2)(i)			<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2003(a)(4)			<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER
		<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(c)(1)			<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)		
		<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(c)(2)			<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract below	
		<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)			<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
		<input type="checkbox"/>	20.2003(a)(2)(v)			<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)			<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(x)		
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)													
NAME Roger Patterson, Facilities Maintenance Supervisor									TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (815) 357-6761 Extension 2515				
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)													
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS			
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)													
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines (16))

At 1132 hours on April 12, 1996, a contractor was painting near the Unit 1 "B" Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) Set and inadvertently tripped the Electrical Power Monitoring Assembly (EPMA) breaker. This resulted in the loss of power to the 1"B" RPS MG Set, a reactor half scram, and isolations for Groups 1-7, and 10.

Unit 1 responded as designed with a reactor half scram and all Primary Containment Isolation (PC) inboard and outboard valves reacting into their designed positions for Groups 1-7 and 10. At 1133 hours, "1B" RPS was taken to its alternate power supply, the Group 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) was bypassed and a 1 hour timeclock was entered. At 1209 hours, the "1B" RPS MG Set was properly lined up and placed back into operation. At 1215 hours, Unit 1 established reactor building ventilation and at 1225 hours, the timeclock was exited. The Division 2 isolation signal for a Group 1 MSIV isolation was defeated at 1133 hours to prevent a MSIV isolation on Unit 2 and a 1 hour timeclock was started. At 1200 hours, LGA-02 was entered on above maximum normal temperature (reached 149 degrees Fahrenheit in the Main Steam Line Pipe Tunnel). At 1215 hours, Unit 2 established reactor building ventilation and at 1228 hours, temperatures stabilized to allow exiting of the timeclock.

The RPS and PCIS actuations occurred as expected upon loss of RPS power. The safety consequences of this event were minimal due to the prompt actions of the operators to bypass or jumper the isolation circuits to prevent the loss of ventilation.

The cause of the event was the painters inattention to detail and a less than fully effective station program for control of painting activities.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
LaSalle County Station Unit One		05000373	96	004	00	2 of 3

(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

**PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION**

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

**A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT**

Unit(s): 1                      Event Date: 04/12/96              Event Time: 1132 Hours  
Reactor Mode(s): 2              Mode(s) Name: Startup              Power Level(s): 0%

**B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT**

At 1132 hours on April 12, 1996, with LaSalle Unit 1 in Startup and LaSalle Unit 2 in Run at 99.5% power, the "1B" Reactor Protection System (RPS, RP) [EF] Motor Generator (MG) Set Electrical Power Monitoring Assembly (EPMA) tripped causing a loss of power to the 1 "B" RPS MG Set. Unit 1 responded as designed with a reactor half scram and all Primary Containment Isolation (PC) [NH] inboard and outboard valves reacting into their designed positions for Groups 1-7 and 10. At 1133 hours, "1B" RPS was taken to its alternate power supply, the Group 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV, MS) [SB] was bypassed and a 1 hour timeclock was entered. The area temperatures were monitored for abnormal temperature increases and no abnormalities were identified. At 1209 hours, the "1B" RPS MG Set was properly lined up and placed back into operation. At 1215 hours, Unit 1 established reactor building ventilation and at 1225 hours, temperatures stabilized to allow exiting of the timeclock.

The loss of the "1B" MG Set also affected Unit 2 by closing the Reactor Building Ventilation (VR) [VA] dampers and starting the Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) train. The Main Steam Line tunnel temperatures were monitored to ensure no steam leak was creating the increasing steam tunnel temperatures. The Division 2 isolation signal for a Group 1 MSIV isolation was defeated at 1133 hours to prevent a MSIV isolation on Unit 2 and a 1 hour timeclock was started. At 1200 hours, LGA-02 was entered on above maximum normal temperature (reached 149 degrees Fahrenheit in the Main Steam Line Pipe Tunnel). At 1215 hours, Unit 2 established reactor building ventilation and at 1228 hours, temperatures stabilized to allow exiting of the timeclock.

At the time of the event, contract painters had been assigned to paint the walls in the Auxiliary Building near the "1B" RPS MG set and had inadvertently tripped the EPMA breaker for the "1B" MG Set. Upon discovery of the tripped breaker the painter notified his foreman who notified shift.

This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) due to an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).

**C. CAUSE OF EVENT**

The cause of the event was the painters inattention to detail and a less than fully effective station program for control of painting activities. The painters had all been briefed during their initial arrival onsite on the significance of work in the plant and in highly sensitive areas along with daily communications on plant/personnel safety.

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LaSalle County Station Unit One	05000373	96	004	00	3 of 3

(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

**D. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES**

The RPS system has a fail safe design. The RPS and PCIS actuations occurred as expected upon loss of RPS power. The loss of cooling to the main steam tunnel could be a problem (i.e. high steam tunnel temperature and/or high differential temperature causing inadvertent Group 1 leak detection isolation (Main Steam Isolation Valves and Main Steam Line Drain Isolation Valves) and subsequent scram) if the VR isolation was to remain in place for an extended period of time during power operation. The VR isolation effects both Units 1 and 2. The safety consequences of this event were minimal due to the prompt actions of the operators to bypass the Group I leak detection isolation circuits to prevent the Group I isolation and subsequent scram.

**E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

All onsite painting was immediately stopped and this event was explained to all painters. Following daily safety communication meetings on April 15-19, painters were allowed to perform plant painting in non-trip sensitive areas. These meetings stressed the importance of sensitivity of plant equipment, work precautions, safety, and reporting of any incidents, even if questionable. The painting contractor management were also involved in these meetings.

A program is being developed to address work activities in "Trip Sensitive" areas to include the Stop Think Act Review (STAR) program for contract painters along with marking or flagging sensitive equipment. This program has proven to be successful at another utility and includes walkdowns with Operating or Engineering, flagging of trip sensitive equipment, roping off vital sensitive equipment, and when necessary, establishing an area monitor to provide additional oversight of painting activities.

**F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES**

LER NUMBER	TITLE
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None.

**G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA**

Since no component failure occurred, this section is not applicable.