

Attachment B

Amended Technical Specification Pages

1.0 DEFINITIONS (Cont)

- Q. Core Alteration - Core Alteration shall be the movement of any fuel sources, or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel, with the vessel head removed, and fuel in the vessel. The following exceptions are not considered to be Core Alterations:
- Movement of source range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing incore probes, or special movable detectors (including undervessel replacement); and
 - Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell.
- Suspension of Core Alterations shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.
- R. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Unless otherwise indicated, reactor vessel pressures listed in the Technical Specifications are those measured by the reactor vessel steam space detectors.
- S. Thermal Parameters
- Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) - the value of critical power ratio associated with the most limiting assembly in the reactor core. Critical Power Ratio (CPR) is the ratio of that power in a fuel assembly, which is calculated to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, to the actual assembly operating power.
 - Transition Boiling - Transition boiling means the boiling regime between nucleate and film boiling. Transition boiling is the regime in which both nucleate and film boiling occur intermittently with neither type being completely stable.
 - Total Peaking Factor - The ratio of the fuel rod surface heat flux to the heat flux of an average rod in an identical geometry fuel assembly operating at the core average bundle power.
- T. Instrumentation
- Instrument Calibration - An instrument calibration means the adjustment of an instrument signal output so that it corresponds, within acceptable range, and accuracy, to a known value(s) of the parameter which the instrument monitors. Calibration shall encompass the entire instrument including actuation, alarm or trip.
 - Instrument Channel - An instrument channel means an arrangement of a sensor and auxiliary equipment required to generate and transmit to a trip system a single trip signal related to the plant parameter monitored by that instrument channel.
 - Instrument Functional Test - An instrument functional test means the injection of a simulated signal into the instrument primary sensor to verify the proper instrument channel response, alarm and/or initiating action.
 - Instrument Check - An instrument check is a qualitative determination of acceptable operability by observation of instrument behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the instrument with other independent instruments measuring the same variable.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

Shutdown Transformer is required to be operable and capable of supplying power to the emergency bus.

-Fuel movement will not occur until the reactor vessel is flood up to elevation 114'.
-The train of CRHEAF without its safety related bus or without its emergency diesel generator will have power supplied from a normal offsite source via a non safety related bus. The normal offsite source consists of either the Startup Transformer or Unit Auxiliary Transformer (Backfeed Mode)

C. Secondary Containment

1. Secondary containment shall be OPERABLE when in the Run, Startup and Hot Shutdown MODES, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and during movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).
2. a. With Secondary Containment inoperable when in the Run, Startup and Hot Shutdown MODES, restore Secondary Containment to OPERABLE status within 4 hours.

b. Required Action and Completion Time of 2.a not met, be in Hot Shutdown in 12 hours AND Cold Shutdown within 36 hours.
- c. With Secondary Containment inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and during movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, and during OPDRVs, immediately
 1. Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.
AND
 2. Suspend movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool.
AND
 3. Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.
AND
 4. Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

C. Secondary Containment

1. Each refueling outage prior to refueling, secondary containment capability shall be demonstrated to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm wind (5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 4000 cfm.

BASES:

3/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

C. Secondary Containment

The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor building provides secondary containment during reactor operation, when the drywell is sealed and in service; the reactor building provides primary containment when the reactor is shutdown and the drywell is open, as during refueling. Because the secondary containment is an integral part of the complete containment system, secondary containment is required at all times that primary containment is required as well as during refueling.

There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for secondary containment operability. These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a fuel handling accident inside [secondary] containment. The secondary containment performs no active function in response to each of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

An operable secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered operable, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.

If secondary containment is inoperable (when required to be operable), it must be restored to operable status within 4 hours. The 4 hour completion time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during Run, Startup, and Hot Shutdown modes. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment operability) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.

If secondary containment cannot be restored to operable status within the required completion time, the plant must be brought to a mode in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least Hot Shutdown within 12 hours and to Cold Shutdown within 36 hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool, core alterations, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. Core alterations, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4 inch of water negative pressure within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the operation of the reactor building isolation valves, leak tightness of the reactor building and performance of the standby gas treatment system. Functionally testing the initiating sensors and associated trip channels demonstrates the capability for automatic actuation. Performing these tests prior to refueling will demonstrate secondary containment capability prior to the time the primary containment is opened for refueling. Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system performance capability.

Attachment C

Marked-up Technical Specification Pages

1.0 DEFINITIONS (Cont)

- Q. Alteration of the Reactor Core - The act of moving any component in the region above the core support plate, below the upper grid and within the shroud. Normal control rod movement with the control rod drive hydraulic system is not defined as a core alteration. Normal movement of in-core instrumentation is not defined as a core alteration.
- R. Reactor Vessel Pressure - Unless otherwise indicated, reactor vessel pressures listed in the Technical Specifications are those measured by the reactor vessel steam space detectors.
- S. Thermal Parameters
1. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) - the value of critical power ratio associated with the most limiting assembly in the reactor core. Critical Power Ratio (CPR) is the ratio of that power in a fuel assembly, which is calculated to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, to the actual assembly operating power.
 2. Transition Boiling - Transition boiling means the boiling regime between nucleate and film boiling. Transition boiling is the regime in which both nucleate and film boiling occur intermittently with neither type being completely stable.
 3. Total Peaking Factor - The ratio of the fuel rod surface heat flux to the heat flux of an average rod in an identical geometry fuel assembly operating at the core average bundle power.
- T. Instrumentation
1. Instrument Calibration - An instrument calibration means the adjustment of an instrument signal output so that it corresponds, within acceptable range, and accuracy, to a known value(s) of the parameter which the instrument monitors. Calibration shall encompass the entire instrument including activation, alarm or trip.
 2. Instrument Channel - An instrument channel means an arrangement of a sensor and auxiliary equipment required to generate and transmit to a trip system a single trip signal related to the plant parameter monitored by that instrument channel.
 3. Instrument Functional Test - An instrument functional test means the injection of a simulated signal into the instrument primary sensor to verify the proper instrument channel response, alarm and/or initiating action.
 4. Instrument Check - An instrument check is a qualitative determination of acceptable operability by observation of instrument behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the instrument with other independent instruments measuring the same variable.

CORE ALTERATION

CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel, with the vessel head removed, and fuel in the vessel. The following exceptions are not considered to be CORE ALTERATIONS:

- a. Movement of source range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing incore probes, or special movable detectors (including undervessel replacement); and
- b. Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell.

Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

Shutdown Transformer is required to be operable and capable of supply power to the emergency bus.

- Fuel movement will not occur until the reactor vessel is flood up to elevation 114'.
- The train of CRHEAF without its safety related bus or without its emergency diesel generator will have power supplied from a normal offsite source via a non safety-related bus. The normal offsite source consists of either the Startup Transformer or Unit Auxiliary Transformer (Backfeed Mode).

C. Secondary Containment

1. Secondary containment integrity shall be maintained during all modes of plant operation except when all of the following conditions are met.
 - a. The reactor is subcritical and Specification 3.3.A is met.
 - b. The reactor water temperature is below 212°F and the reactor coolant system is vented.
 - c. No activity is being performed which can reduce the shutdown margin below that specified in Specification 3.3.A.
 - d. The fuel cask or irradiated fuel is not being moved in the reactor building.
2. If Specification 3.7.C.1 cannot be met, procedures shall be initiated to establish conditions listed in Specification 3.7.C.1.a through d.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

see attached

Replace with

C. Secondary Containment

1. Secondary containment surveillance shall be performed as indicated below:

A preoperational secondary containment capability test shall be conducted after isolating the reactor building and placing either standby gas treatment system filter train in operation. Such tests shall demonstrate the capability to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm wind (<5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 4000 cfm.

- b. Additional tests shall be performed during the first operating cycle under an adequate number of different environmental wind conditions to enable valid extrapolation of the test results.

① Secondary containment capability to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

- 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
C. Secondary Containment (Cont)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
C. Secondary Containment (Cont)

② ←
calm wind (5 mph.) conditions
with a filter train flow
rate of not more than 4000
cfm, shall be demonstrated.

① →
at each refueling outage
prior to refueling.

New
3.7.C.1 ←

1. Secondary containment shall be OPERABLE when in the Run, Startup and Hot Shutdown MODES, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and during movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).
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BASES:

3/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

C. Secondary Containment

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