



# Florida Power

CORPORATION

Crystal River Unit 3

Docket No. 90-302

April 26, 1996  
3F0496-30

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Special Report 96-02

Dear Sir:

Please find the attached Special Report 96-02 which is submitted in accordance with the Florida Power Corporation Nuclear Operations Fire Protection Plan, Revision 12, Table 6.5c.

Sincerely,

P. M. Beard, Jr.  
Senior Vice President  
Nuclear Operations

PMB/SCP:ff

Attachment

xc: Regional Administrator, Region II  
NRR Project Manager  
Senior Resident Inspector

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**SPECIAL REPORT 96-02**

**FIRE DETECTION ZONES REQUIRED BY THE FIRE PROTECTION PLAN  
OUT OF SERVICE FOR GREATER THAN FOURTEEN DAYS**

This Special Report provides information concerning the cause and corrective action for inoperability of Reactor Coolant Pump fire detection zones #23 and #24.

On March 13, 1996, Florida Power Corporation's (FPC) Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) was shutdown and defueled. At 1210, fire detection system zones #23 and #24 were removed from service. These zones consist of thermal detectors in the immediate vicinity of the four Reactor Coolant Pump Motors. This removed the capability for automatic fire detection within the 'D' rings. These zones were removed from service to facilitate removal and replacement of the 'A' RCP motor. At that time, Fire Protection Plan Actions 1A.1 and 1A.2 were entered. Action 1A.1 requires establishing an hourly roving fire watch patrol within one hour. Action 1A.2 requires equipment restoration to service within 14 days or the submission of a Special Report within the next 30 days. Following determination that the two fire detection zones were out of service, an hourly roving fire watch was established.

This report is being submitted because the affected fire detection zones remained out of service for greater than 14 days. The significance of this event was minimal. The affected zones were located in the immediate vicinity of the RCP motors, however the risk of fire was low at the time since the motors were shutdown. The cable tray Protect-O-Wire thermal detection system in the reactor building outside of the 'D' rings was not affected and continued to operate. The reactor building was manned almost continuously and the Class III standpipe suppression system was in service.

Fire detection zones #23 and #24 were returned to service on April 22, 1996.