FORM 366 (5-92) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1	05000334	1 OF 2

Generic Letter 96-01 Incorrect Test Frequency of Safety Related Logic

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	25	96	96	004	00	04	24	96	N/A	
									FACILITY NAME: N/A	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in abstract below and in Text NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)
T. P. Noonan, Vice-President Nuclear Operations/Plant Manager	(412) 393-7622

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
A	BE	XXX	XXXX	N						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		NO		5	24	96

ABSTRACT (Limited to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

As a result of reviews being performed in response to Generic Letter 96-01, "Incorrect Test Frequency of Safety Related Logic", the following condition(s) has (have) been discovered and determined to be reportable:

1. On March 25, 1996, with Unit 1 in Mode 5, it was found that relays LRLL-QS100C and 100D were being tested once per 18 months. The proper test frequency has been determined to be monthly as part of the Channel Functional Test required by TS Table 4.3.2 item 1.1.d. The function of these relays is described in the text section of page 2 of this report. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On March 25, 1996 with Unit 1 in Mode 5 cooling down for the eleventh refueling outage, it was determined that relays LRLL-100C & 100D were not being tested at the appropriate frequency. This was discovered as a result of reviews being performed in response to Generic Letter 96-1. These relays de-energize and close the Quench Spray Pump Flow Cutback Control valves when the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) reaches a level of 8'6" during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). These flow control valves are normally open and permit full flow following a LOCA until the Containment is sub atmospheric. When the RWST reaches a level of 8'6" the flow control valves will close and the Quench Spray flow will be throttled to approximately 1,000 gpm. These relays are currently being tested on an eighteen month frequency per an operations surveillance test. It has been determined that they should be tested as part of the monthly Channel Function Test per Technical Specification Table 4.3.2 Item 1.1.d, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation.

CAUSE OF EVENT

These relays were not considered to be part of the instrument channel and therefore not required to be tested as part of the monthly Channel Functional Test.

REPORTABILITY

This condition is being reported as a condition prohibited by the Plant Technical Specifications in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to relays LRLL-100C & 100D not being tested at the proper frequency.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The Flow Cutback Control valves provide reduced flow for sub atmospheric peak pressure control. A failure of the relays would result in these valves remaining open and full flow going through the Quench Spray system. The Emergency Operating Procedures contain a continuous action step to verify these valves close when a low level alarm is received. If the valves do not automatically close the operator is instructed to manually close them. If they still do not close the operator is instructed to shut off all but one pump. A review of recent operational surveillance tests showed no problems or failures associated with these relays. Therefore, there are no safety implications as a result of not testing these relays at the proper frequency.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Maintenance and Operations procedures will be changed to include the performance of relay testing for LRLL-QS100C and D as part of the monthly Channel Functional Test.

2. These relays will be tested prior to entering Mode 4 during the heat-up of Unit 1.

3. A review of Unit 2 revealed that there is no similar relay arrangement for this application.

4. The review of safety related logic will continue in compliance with Generic Letter 96-01. Should additional reportable conditions be discovered, an LER revision will be submitted.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

No recent previous similar events were found.