NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO INBOARD MSIV's DRIFTING CLOSED

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 1	1 9	8 5	8 5	—	0 0 1	—		0 2	1 8	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
												0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
1	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 7 5	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
T. L. Elton, Acting Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance	AREA CODE 9 1 2 3 6 7 - 7 8 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 01/19/85 during performance of the "MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE TRIP TEST" procedure (HNP-2-3111), the "A" inboard MSIV (2B21-F022A) failed to operate within the time limits of Tech. Specs. sections 4.4.7, 4.6.3.3, and item A.1 of Tech. Specs. Table 3.6.3-1. Plant personnel then cycled the "A" MSIV repeatedly to see its time would change such that it would meet the Tech. Specs. requirement. At approximately 0848 CST, during this cycling, the inboard MSIV's drifted to less than 90% open, resulting in an unplanned Reactor Scram.

Plant personnel performed an investigation, and determined that the continuous cyclings of the "A" inboard MSIV resulted in a high rate of charging flow (i.e., greater than or equal to 30 SCFM) to the MSIV's accumulator which caused isolation of the drywell pneumatic system supply valves (2P70-F004 and F005) -- these valves isolate when the supply flow rate is greater than or equal 30 SCFM for (2) two minutes. When the drywell pneumatic system supply valves isolated, the MSIV's started drifting closed (due to their accumulators not being charged up and being isolated from their supply).

Plant personnel reviewed HNP-2-3111, and determined that personnel could use it to cycle all of the inboard MSIV's in sequential order or to cycle an inboard MSIV more than once. Thus, by using the procedure, plant personnel could place a greater than or equal to 30 SCFM drain on the drywell pneumatic system supply for two minutes. Thus, this event was the result of procedure inadequacy. This does not affect the outboard MSIVs because they are not fed by the drywell pneumatic system.

HNP-2-3111 is being revised to add a "Note" to allow a two (2) minute wait between operating MSIV's sequentially or cycling MSIV's to prevent a high flow isolation of the drywell pneumatic system.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6	8 5	— 0 0 1	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This 30 day report is required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) since this unplanned scram was an unplanned actuation of an ESF.

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Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444

Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

February 18, 1985
GM-85-152

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1985-001. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

H. C. Nix
General Manager

HCN/TLE/vlz

xc: R. J. Kelly
R. E. Conway
J. T. Beckham, Jr.
P. D. Rice
K. M. Gillespie
Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance
R. D. Baker
Control Room
Document Control

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