

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
Robert E. Ginna Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0

PAGE (3)

1 OF 0 1

TITLE (4)  
Inadvertent Start of the "A" Diesel Generator

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	8	17	84	009	010	9	14	84		0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)	20.402(b)	20.405(a)	20.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
N			X	
POWER LEVEL (10)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.38(a)(1)	20.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(a)
1 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.38(a)(2)	20.73(a)(2)(vi)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.73(a)(2)(i)	20.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.73(a)(2)(ii)	20.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.73(a)(2)(iii)	20.73(a)(2)(viii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME  
E. Clair Edgar, I&C Supervisor

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

3 1 5 5 2 4 - 4 4 4 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
B	E D D	B L K M	4 8 2	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 17, 1984, during the monthly testing of the undervoltage protection system on safeguard bus 18 switches S5 and S6 were placed in the test position in accordance with the applicable steps in procedure PT-9.1. Upon placing these switches in the test position the "A" Diesel Generator automatically started. The cause of the event was initially attributed to an intermittent contact in switch S5. Subsequent investigation identified an intermittent 12 volt power source for the control logic board which was traced to a loose wire lug on TBD1-1 states deck. The intermittent voltage only occurred when the cabinet was vibrated by operating test switches or bumping. The failure was in the safe direction and at no time was the diesel generator or safeguard bus inoperable.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES: 8/31/86

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (3)

PAGE (3)

Robert E. Ginna Unit 1

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

At 1445 hours on August 17, 1984, during the monthly testing of the undervoltage protection system on safeguard Bus 18 switches S5 and S6 were placed in the test position in accordance with the applicable steps in procedure PT-9.1. Switch S5, when placed in the test position, latches the control circuitry so that it will not respond to any undervoltage conditions. Switch S6, when placed in the test position removes the actual Bus voltage signal and applies a variable test signal. Upon placing the switches in the test position the "A" Diesel Generator automatically started. The plant was operating at 100 percent power before and during the event. In addition, bus 18 was energized from its normal power supply before and during the event.

The cause of the event was initially attributed to an intermittent contact in switch S5. When the switch is placed into the enable position a 12 volt logic signal is applied to the control logic board to latch the control circuit. Subsequent investigation identified an intermittent 12 volt power source for the control logic board. This condition was traced to a loose wire lug on TBD1-1 states deck. The nut was screwed down tightly on the stud, but due to insufficient thread length did not squeeze the wire lug. The 12 volt power source became intermittent when the control cabinet vibrated by test switch operation or bumping. This allowed the control circuit to become unlatched during test allowing a one out of two logic in one train to be established. This one out of two logic in either train is sufficient to cause the diesel generator to start. A one out of two logic in both trains is required in order to energize the bus from the diesel generator. Thus, this loose connection resulted in a safe condition and at no time made the diesel generator or safeguard bus inoperable.

The condition was corrected using a flat washer between wire lug and nut. All remaining connections were inspected and found to be acceptable. The problem was identified on a non conformance report and the vendor of the undervoltage protection system was notified of the finding. Three successful tests of the undervoltage protection system have been completed since repairs were made.



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AREA CODE 716 546-2700



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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555


Subject: LER 84-009-01, Automatic Actuation of any Engineered  
Safety Feature

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1  
Docket No. 50-244

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is revision one of the above LER which was originally  
transmitted to you on September 13, 1984.

Very truly yours,

  
Roger W. Kober

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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