

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 and 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 1				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) SPURIOUS TOXIC GAS ISOLATION SYSTEM (TGIS) ACTUATION																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 1	1 0	8 5	8 5	0 1 0 3	0 1 0	0 2	0 7	8 5	SONGS UNIT 3				0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 2			
OPERATING MODE (9) N			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 0			20.402(b)				20.405(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
			20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)	
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
			20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER										TELEPHONE NUMBER 7 1 1 4 4 9 2 1 - 7 7 0 1 0						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- Turer	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- Turer	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				
Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																
<p>On 1/10/85 at 2319, with Unit 2 defueled and Unit 3 at 100%, and on 2/2/85 at 1928 with Unit 2 in Mode 6 and Unit 3 in Mode 5, spurious Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) Train 'B' actuations occurred. The Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) actuated as required. The actuation was verified to be spurious by confirming that the meter indications on the TGIS panel were less than their respective setpoints, and TGIS was reset. See also LERs 84-006, 012, 021, 026, 032, 037, 042, 052, 055, and 065 (Docket No. 50-361).</p> <p>Spurious TGIS actuations have been a recurring event, and have been the result of one or more of the following conditions: overly conservative alarm setpoints; electrical noise; rapid temperature and pressure changes; radio transmissions; vibration; and dust and dirt accumulation. Implementation of corrective actions has reduced the number of spurious TGIS actuations from an average of thirty per quarter to eight in the last quarter of 1984. A Technical Specification amendment has been issued to allow more appropriate setpoints to be implemented. This should further reduce the number of spurious actuations.</p> <p>There are no reasonable or credible circumstances which could have increased the severity of this event. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected.</p>																
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER		
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3	05000361	85	-003	-00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)


On 1/10/85 at 2319, with Unit 2 defueled and Unit 3 at 100%, and on 2/2/85 at 1928 with Unit 2 in Mode 6 and Unit 3 in Mode 5, spurious Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) Train 'B' (EIIS System Identifier JF) actuations occurred. The Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) (EIIS System Identifier VI) actuated as required. The actuations were verified to be spurious by confirming that the meter indications on the TGIS panel were less than their respective setpoints, and TGIS was reset at 2339 on 1/10/85 and at 1934 on 2/2/85.

Spurious TGIS actuations have been a recurring event, and have been the result of one or more of the following conditions: overly conservative alarm setpoints; electrical noise levels; rapid temperature and pressure changes; radio transmissions; vibration; and dust and dirt accumulation. See also LERs 84-006, 012, 021, 026, 032, 037, 042, 052, 055 and 065 (Docket No. 50-361).

Several corrective actions were implemented in 1983 that were effective in reducing, but not eliminating, the spurious TGIS actuations. These actions include: sealing the door in the corridor housing the TGIS, which has reduced rapid temperature and pressure changes and dust accumulation; banning radios in the area; and reducing calibration and surveillance intervals on the TGIS analyzers. In September 1984, the time delay for the ammonia and carbon dioxide analyzers was increased, which has been effective in reducing the number of spurious actuations from an average of thirty per quarter to eight in the last quarter of 1984. A Technical Specification amendment was issued on 1/9/85 to allow more appropriate TGIS setpoints to be implemented. This should further reduce the number of spurious actuations.

There are no reasonable or credible circumstances which could have increased the severity of these events. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected.

*Southern California Edison Company*



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STATION MANAGER

February 7, 1985

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361  
30-Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 85-003  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for actuations of the Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS). Since these events involved shared systems between Units 2 and 3, these events have been combined into a single report in accordance with NUREG-1022. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected by these events.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

*JG Haynes/sem*

Enclosure: LER No. 85-003

cc: F. R. Huey (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)  
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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