

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3										
TITLE (4) Reactor Trip																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
0	1	1	4	8	5	8	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	3	8	5	0	5	0	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
1		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				XX 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)										
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)										
0 3 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)										
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)														
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)														
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)														
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME H. R. Rogers, Compliance Section Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER														
										AREA CODE 6 1 5 8 7 0 - 6 1 4 6														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS														
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR								
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												XX NO												

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 14, 1985, unit 2 experienced a reactor trip from 30 percent power due to a personnel error by Instrument Maintenance personnel. All systems actuated as expected, and there was no effect upon public health and safety.

IE 22
1/18502140006 850213
PDR ADOCK 05000328
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Sequoyah, Unit 2	0500032885	—	0101	—	010	02	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 14, 1985 with the unit holding at 30% reactor power, Instrument Maintenance personnel received permission from the unit operator to perform a calibration on nuclear instrumentation system power range channel N-41. This was the normal channel calibration following the recent refueling outage and was being performed using approved procedure SI-80, "Power Range Neutron Flux Channel Calibration and Functional Test (Quarterly)." When an instrument mechanic went to pull the instrument power fuses for the N-41 channel, he mistakenly pulled the instrument power fuses to the N-42 channel. Immediately realizing his error, the mechanic reinserted the N-42 fuses and pulled the correct fuses for N-41 channel. Since the mechanic did not reset the rate signal for the N-42 channel before the fuses for N-41 were pulled, the reactor tripped on power range negative rate trip which has a 2 out of 4 logic scheme. Upon the reactor trip, which occurred at 0704C on January 14, 1985, the unit operator verified that all reactor protection and engineered safeguard systems worked properly and no abnormal conditions were noted. The unit was stabilized in mode 3 with Tavg at 547 degrees F.

The surveillance instruction, SI-80, requires that the calibration be performed as specified by procedure IMI-92-PRM-CAL, "NIS Power Range." This procedure states that tests may be performed on only one of the four power range channels at a time. During removal of the power range channel from service, step 5.2.1.6 requires that the channel drawer be deenergized by removing the instrument power fuses. This action removes the high voltage supply to the power range detector causing its output to go to zero and results in the negative rate flux trip bistable of the respective channel to be picked up. This makes up one-half of the reactor trip logic for the negative rate flux trip. The negative rate flux trip bistable must be manually reset when bistable has been actuated to return the channel to operable status. Removal of a second power range channel instrument power fuse without resetting the first channel will result in a reactor trip from the negative rate flux trip protection.

The instrument mechanic is experienced in the use of this calibration procedure and immediately recognized the mistake when he pulled the fuses for the N-42 channel. In an interview with the mechanic, he stated that he was so "shook" when he realized that he had pulled the wrong fuses that he did not think about resetting the rate function on N-42 before pulling the N-41 fuses. Management has counselled the individual involved and instructed him to ensure himself of the proper equipment to be worked on before proceeding to correct the error. To emphasize the importance of following procedures and the consequences when personnel errors are made, disciplinary action has been taken against the individual.

A review was made of the procedure involved, and IMI-92-PRM-CAL will be revised to help eliminate similar errors in the future. The procedure will be revised to require orange stickers to be placed on the power range drawer near the fuses to be pulled. This is to be done at the same time stickers are being placed on the main control board status windows, which is a process already in the procedure. A statement will also be added to have the mechanic verify that alarm lights on other power range drawers are not lit before pulling any fuses.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 9/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Sequoyah, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8	8 5	0 0 1	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Operations personnel performed a systematic evaluation of the trip, and it was determined that the unit was safe for restart. At 1440 CST on January 14, 1985, the unit went critical and subsequently proceeded up in power. All systems operated as expected during and following the trip, and there was no effect upon public health and safety. This was the second reactor trip for unit 2 in 1985.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

February 13, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO.
50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT
SQRO-50-328/85001

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning a reactor trip which occurred on January 14, 1985. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.iv.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah

IE22
1/1