Northern States Power Company

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October 29, 1992

Report required by
10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

Automatic Transfer of High Pressure Coolant Injection Suction
From Condensate Storage Tanks to Suppression Pool
Caused by Inadvertent Jarring of Level Switch

The voluntary Licensee Event Report for this occurrence is attached. Please contact us if you require further information.

Thomas M Parker
Manager
Nuclear Support Services

c: Regional Administrator - III NRC
Sr Resident Inspector, NRC
NRR Project Manager, NRC
State of Minnesota,
Attn: Kris Sanda

Attachment

IE22

NRC FORM 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 3	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4) Automatic Transfer of High Pressure Coolant Injection Suction From Condensate Storage Tanks to Suppression Pool Cuased by Inadvertent Jarring of Level Switch

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
												0 5 0 0 0
1 0	0 3	9 2	9 2	—	0 1 4	—	0 0	1 0	2 9	9 2		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
N		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	XX 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Ray Dennis , Shift Supervisor	6 1 2 2 9 5 - 1 1 1 4 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	XX NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While investigating the cause of a small fluctuation in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system suction pressure, an operator inadvertently dropped his hard hat on a Condensate Storage Tank level switch. The switch activated a Condensate Storage Tank low level alarm and a transfer of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and High Pressure Coolant Injection suctions from the Condensate Storage Tanks to the Suppression Pool. The cause of this event was an inadvertently dropped hard hat on sensitive instrumentation. A contributing cause was the location of the instrumentation. The alarm immediately cleared and the systems were returned to the normal standby line-up. The operations staff has been cautioned concerning work around sensitive instrumentation and the area of the level switches has been posted alerting workers that sensitive instrumentation is located in the area.

DESCRIPTION

At 0230 hours, on October 3, 1992, with the plant operating at 100% of rated thermal power the High Pressure Coolant Injection (EIIS System: BJ) system and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (EIIS System: BN) system suction valves from the Suppression Pool opened and the suction valves from the Condensate Storage Tanks (EIIS System: KA) closed.

While investigating a small fluctuation in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system suction pressure observed during surveillance testing, an operator inadvertently dropped his hard hat on a Condensate Storage Tank level switch (EIIS Component: LS). The level switch actuated a Condensate Storage Tank "Low Level Alarm" in the Control Room (EIIS System: NA) and initiated a transfer of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and High Pressure Coolant Injection suctions from the Condensate Storage Tank to the Suppression Pool. MO-2100, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Inboard Torus Suction, MO-2101, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Outboard Torus Suction, MO-2061, High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Suction (Inner) Isolation, and MO-2062, High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Suction (Outer) Isolation, valves (EIIS Components: 20) opened. MO-2102, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Condensate Storage Suction, and MO-2061, High Pressure Coolant Injection Suction From Condensate Storage, valves closed.

The control room alarm cleared immediately and the systems were returned to normal standby line-up.

The High Pressure Coolant Injection system is an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) and actuation is reportable under 10 CFR Part 50 Section 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

CAUSE

The cause of this event was an inadvertent dropping of a hard hat onto a level switch. The unusual location of the Condensate Storage Tank level gauge, which is about two feet off the floor, was a direct contributing factor. The operator needed to bend down to view the reading on the gauge. This caused his hard hat to fall from his head and strike the level switch which is located at floor level.

ANALYSIS

Realignment of the High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling systems suction to the Suppression Pool does not affect system operability.

Based on the ability of both systems to perform their function there were no consequences to the health and safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling systems were returned to normal line up with suction from the Condensate Storage Tanks.

2. A visual inspection of the Condensate Storage Tank level switch was conducted.

3. The operations staff has been cautioned about the sensitivity of instrumentation and the care which must be taken when viewing these devices.

4. A sign has been posted at the location of the level switch alerting individuals that sensitive instrumentation is located in the area.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Failed Component Identification:

None

Previous Similar Event:

There are four identified similar events. Licensee Event Reports 87-004, 87-009, 89-038, and 90-017. These events are all similar in that they all involve inadvertent jarring of sensitive instrumentation. The corrective actions for these events included revision of procedures, labeling of plant instrumentation, and instruction to plant personnel when working near sensitive instrumentation. These corrective actions did not prevent this event because the Condensate Storage Tank level switches had not been identified as sensitive instrumentation.