ATTACHMENT 1

UNIT 1 REVISED

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

AND BASES PAGES

CHANGE NO. 1

3/4 4-7

B3/4 4-2

CHANGE NO. 2

3/4 4-32

3/4 4-33

3/4 4-34

B3/4 4-10

NOTE: In the INSERTs, wording which is a change from the current Technical Specifications is underlined.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3 Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be **OPERABLE**.

APPLICABILITY: **MODES** 1, 2, and 3. (*)

ACTION:

Replace with INSERT A

~~a. With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to **OPERABLE** status or close the associated block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least **HOT STANDBY** within the next 6 hours and in **COLD SHUTDOWN** within the following 30 hours.~~

~~b. With one or more block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour either restore the block valve(s) to **OPERABLE** status or close the block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least **HOT STANDBY** within the next 6 hours and in **COLD SHUTDOWN** within the following 30 hours.~~

~~c.~~ ~~With one or more block valve(s) closed and power removed from the block valve(s) to satisfy a. or b. above,~~ the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated **OPERABLE**:

a. At least once per 31 days by performance of a **CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST**, in accordance with Table 4.3-1, Item 4.

b. At least once per 18 months by performance of a **CHANNEL CALIBRATION**.

4.4.3.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated **OPERABLE** at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel ~~This demonstration is not required if a PORV block valve is closed and power removed~~ (unless the) to meet Specification 3.4.3 ~~a. or b.~~

the Requirements of Action a., b, or c. in

Add INSERT B

INSERT A (for Technical Specification 3.4.3 Actions)

a. If one or both POPV(s) has excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour close the associated block valve(s) and maintain power to the block valve(s).

b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive PORV seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 5 days or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 355°F within the following 24 hours.

c. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive PORV seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore one PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore one PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 355°F within the following 24 hours.

d. With one or both block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV(s) in override closed. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next 72 hours if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within the following 5 days; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 355°F within the following 24 hours.

INSERT B (for Technical Specification 3/4.4.3)

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* Above 355°F. At or below 355°F, Specification 3/4.4.9.3 applies.

shutdown cooling loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be **OPERABLE** to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to limit the Reactor Coolant System pressure to within its Safety Limit of 2750 psia following a complete loss of turbine generator load while operating at **RATED THERMAL POWER** and assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint (Pressurizer Pressure-High) is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of turbine) and also assuming no operation of the pressurizer power-operated relief valve or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES

The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) operate to relieve RCS pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves. These relief valves have remotely operated block valves to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable. The electrical power for both the relief valves and the block valves is capable of being supplied from an emergency power source to ensure the ability to seal this possible RCS leakage path. However, the PORVs and their circuitry do not perform a safety related function and, therefore, do not need emergency power as part of their operability requirements

Add INSERT C

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

A steam bubble in the pressurizer with the level as programmed ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and is capable of accommodating pressure surges during operation. The operating band for pressurizer level bounds the programmed level and ensures that RCS pressure remains within the bounds of an analyzed condition during the excessive charging event as well as during the limiting depressurization event, Excess Load. The operating band also protects the pressurizer code safety valves and power-operated relief valve against water relief. The power- operated relief valves function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients. Operation of the power-operated relief valve in conjunction with a reactor trip on a Pressurizer-Pressure-High signal, minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves.

The requirement that 150 kw of pressurizer heaters and their associated controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency

INSERT C (for BASES 3/4.4.3)

The block valves are exempt from the surveillance requirements to cycle the valves when they have been closed to comply with the ACTION requirements. This precludes the need to cycle the valves with full system differential pressure or when maintenance is being performed to restore an inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status.

Power is maintained to the block valve when it is closed to control excessive PORV seat leakage. This allows the PORV and block valve to remain operable should the PORV be needed to control reactor pressure and facilitate decay heat removal during certain accident conditions. The removal of power from a closed block valve for a PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive PORV seat leakage provides additional assurance that the block valve will not be inadvertently opened when the condition of the PORV is uncertain.

RCS temperature, as used in the applicability statement, is determined as follows: (1) with the RCPs running, the RCS cold leg temperature (Tc) is the appropriate indication, (2) with the Shutdown Cooling System in operation, the shutdown cooling temperature indication is appropriate, (3) if neither the RCPs or shutdown cooling is in operation, the core exit thermocouples are the appropriate indicators of RCS temperature.

The testing for transferring motive and control power for the PORVs and block valves from the normal to emergency power bus is done under Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.d.3.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

Overpressure Protection Systems

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 The following overpressure protection requirements shall be met:

a. One of the following three Overpressure Protection Systems shall be in place:

1. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with a trip setpoint ≤ 429 psia or (with their associated block valves open),

2. A single PORV with a trip setpoint of ≤ 429 psia (with its associated block valve open) and a Reactor Coolant System vent of ≥ 1.3 square inches, or

3. A Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vent ≥ 2.6 square inches.

b. Two high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps# shall be disabled by either removing (racking out) their motor circuit breakers from the electrical power supply circuit, or by locking shut their discharge valves.

c. The HPSI loop motor operated valves (MOVs)# shall be prevented from automatically aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS by placing their hand switches in pull-to-override.

d. No more than one **OPERABLE** high pressure safety injection pump with suction aligned to the Refueling Water Tank may be used to inject flow into the RCS and when used, it must be under manual control and one of the following restrictions shall apply:

1. The total high pressure safety injection flow shall be limited to ≤ 200 gpm OR

2. A Reactor Coolant System vent of ≥ 2.6 square inches shall exist.

e. When not in use, the above **OPERABLE** high pressure safety injection pump shall have its handswitch in pull-to-lock.

APPLICABILITY: When the RCS temperature is ≤ 355°F and the RCS is vented to < 8 square inches.

EXCEPT when required for testing.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION: In MODE 3 with the RCS temperature ≤ 355°F or in MODE 4

a. With one PORV inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV to **OPERABLE** status within 5 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a ≥ 1.3 square inch vent(s) within the next 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to **OPERABLE** status.

Add INSERT D

b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a ≥ 2.6 square inch vent(s) within 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until either one **OPERABLE PORV** and a vent of ≥ 1.3 square inches has been established or both PORVs have been restored to **OPERABLE** status.

c. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

d. With less than two HPSI pumps# disabled, place at least two HPSI pump handswitches in pull-to-lock within fifteen minutes and disable two HPSI pumps within the next four hours.

e. With one or more HPSI loop MOVs# not prevented from automatically aligning a HPSI pump to the RCS, immediately place the MOV handswitch in pull-to-override, or shut and disable the affected MOV or isolate the affected HPSI header flowpath within four hours, and implement the **ACTION** requirements of Specifications 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3, and 3.5.3, as applicable.

f. With HPSI flow exceeding 200 gpm while suction is aligned to the RWT and an RCS vent of < 2.6 square inches exists,

1. Immediately take action to reduce flow to less than or equal to 200 gpm.

2. Verify the excessive flow condition did not raise pressure above the maximum allowable pressure for the given RCS temperature on Figure 3.4.9-1 or Figure 3.4.9-2.

EXCEPT when required for testing.

INSERT D (new Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 Action b)

b. With one PORV inoperable in Modes 5 or 6, either restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, or depressurize and vent the RCS through a $\geq$ 1.3 square inch vent(s) within the next 48 hours, and maintain the RCS in this vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

3. If a pressure limit was exceeded, take action in accordance with Specification 3.4.9.1.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated **OPERABLE** by:

a. Performance of a **CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST** on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required **OPERABLE** and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required **OPERABLE**.

b. Performance of a **CHANNEL CALIBRATION** on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.

c. Verifying the PORV ~~isolation~~ block valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

d. Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent(s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours* when the vent(s) is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9.3.3 All high pressure safety injection pumps, except the above **OPERABLE** pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits or by verifying their discharge valves are locked shut. The automatic opening feature of the high pressure safety injection loop MOVs shall be verified disabled at least once per 12 hours. The above **OPERABLE** pump shall be verified to have its handswitch in pull-to-lock at least once per 12 hours.

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* Except when the vent pathway is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these vent pathways open at least once per 31 days.

A pressurizer steam volume and a single PORV will provide satisfactory control of all mass addition transients with the exception of a spurious actuation of full flow from a HPSI pump. Overpressurization due to this transient will be precluded for temperatures 355°F and less by disabling two HPSI pumps, placing the third in pull-to-lock, and by throttling the third pump to less than or equal to 200 gpm flow when it is used to add mass to the RCS.

Note that only the design bases events are discussed in detail since the less severe transients are bounded by the RCP start and inadvertent HPSI actuation analysis.

RCS temperature, as used in the applicability statement, is determined as follows: (1) with the RCPs running, the RCS cold leg temperature is the appropriate indication, (2) with the Shutdown Cooling System in operation, the shutdown cooling temperature indication is appropriate, (3) if neither the RCPs or shutdown cooling is in operation, the core exit thermocouples are the appropriate indicators of RCS temperature.

add INSERT E

3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inspection programs for the ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. To the extent applicable, the inspection program for these components is in compliance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

3/4.4.11 CORE BARREL MOVEMENT

This specification is provided to ensure early detection of excessive core barrel movement if it should occur. Core barrel movement will be detected by using four excore neutron detectors to obtain Amplitude Probability Distribution (APD) and Spectral Analysis (SA). Baseline core barrel movement Alert Levels and Action Levels will be confirmed during each reactor startup test program following a core reload.

Data from these detectors is to be reduced in two forms. Root mean square (RMS) values are computed from the APD of the signal amplitude. These RMS magnitudes include variations due both to various neutronic effects and internals motion. Consequently, these signals alone can only provide a gross measure of core barrel motion. A more accurate assessment of core barrel motion is obtained from the Auto and Cross Power Spectral Densities (PSD, XPSD), phase (ϕ) and coherence (COH) of these signals. These data result from the SA of the excore detector signals.

A modification to the required monitoring program may be justified by an analysis of the data obtained and by an examination of the affected parts during the plant shutdown at the end of any fuel cycle.

INSERT E (new paragraph for BASES 3/4.4.9)

The allowed out-of-service times for degraded low temperature overpressure protection system in Modes 5 and 6 are based on the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-06 and the time required to conduct a controlled, deliberate cooldown, and to depressurize and vent the reactor coolant system under the Action statement entry conditions.

ATTACHMENT 2

UNIT 2 REVISED

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

AND BASES PAGES

CHANGE NO. 1

3/4 4-7

B3/4 4-2

CHANGE NO. 2

3/4 4-32

3/4 4-33

3/4 4-34

B3/4 4-10

NOTE: In the INSERTs, wording which is a change from the current Technical Specifications is underlined.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3 Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be **OPERABLE**.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.*

ACTION:

Replace with INSERT A

~~a. With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.~~

~~b. With one or more block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour either restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or close the block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.~~

~~c.~~ ~~With one or more block valve(s) closed and power removed from the block valve(s) to satisfy a. or b. above,~~ the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated **OPERABLE**:

a. At least once per 31 days by performance of a **CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST**, in accordance with Table 4.3-1, Item 4.

b. At least once per 18 months by performance of a **CHANNEL CALIBRATION**.

4.4.3.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated **OPERABLE** at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the ~~This demonstration is not required if a PORV~~ block valve is closed ~~and power removed~~ to meet Specification 3.4.3.~~a or b.~~ the requirements of Actions a., b., or c. in

Add INSERT B

INSERT A (for Technical Specification 3.4.3 Actions)

a. If one or both PORV(s) has excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour close the associated block valve(s) and maintain power to the block valve(s).

b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive PORV seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 5 days or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 305°F within the following 24 hours.

c. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive PORV seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORVs to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore one PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 305°F within the following 24 hours.

d. With one or both block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV(s) in override closed. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next 72 hours if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within the following 5 days; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 305°F within the following 24 hours.

INSERT B (for Technical Specification 3/4.4.3)

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* Above 305°F. At or below 305°F, Specification 3/4.4.9.3 applies.

shutdown cooling loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be **OPERABLE** to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to limit the Reactor Coolant System pressure to within its Safety Limit of 2750 psia following a complete loss of turbine generator load while operating at **RATED THERMAL POWER** and assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint (Pressurizer Pressure-High) is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of turbine) and also assuming no operation of the pressurizer power-operated relief valve or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

3/4.4.3 RELIEF VALVES

The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) operate to relieve RCS pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves. These relief valves have remotely operated block valves to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable. The electrical power for both the relief valves and the block valves is capable of being supplied from an emergency power source to ensure the ability to seal this possible RCS leakage path.

Add INSERT C →

{However, the PORVs and associated circuitry do not perform a safety related function and, therefore, do not need emergency power as part of their operability requirements}

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

A steam bubble in the pressurizer with the level as programmed ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and is capable of accommodating pressure surges during operation. The operating band for pressurizer level bounds the programmed level and ensures that RCS pressure remains within the bounds of an analyzed condition during the excessive charging event as well as during the limiting depressurization event, Excess Load. The operating band also protects the pressurizer code safety valves and power-operated relief valve against water relief. The power- operated relief valves function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients. Operation of the power-operated relief valve in conjunction with a reactor trip on a Pressurizer-Pressure-High signal, minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves.

The requirement that 150 kw of pressurizer heaters and their associated controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency bus provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during

INSERT C (for BASES 3/4.4.3)

The block valves are exempt from the surveillance requirements to cycle the valves when they have been closed to comply with the ACTION requirements. This precludes the need to cycle the valves with full system differential pressure or when maintenance is being performed to restore an inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status.

Power is maintained to the block valve when it is closed to control excessive PORV seat leakage. This allows the PORV and block valve to remain operable should the PORV be needed to control reactor pressure and facilitate decay heat removal during certain accident conditions. The removal of power from a closed block valve for a PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive PORV seat leakage provides additional assurance that the block valve will not be inadvertently opened when the condition of the PORV is uncertain.

RCS temperature, as used in the applicability statement, is determined as follows: (1) with the RCPs running, the RCS cold leg temperature (Tc) is the appropriate indication, (2) with the Shutdown Cooling System in operation, the shutdown cooling temperature indication is appropriate, (3) if neither the RCPs or shutdown cooling is in operation, the core exit thermocouples are the appropriate indicators of RCS tem,erature.

The testing for transferring motive and control power for the PORVs and block valves from the normal to emergency power bus is done under Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.d.3.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

Overpressure Protection Systems

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 The following overpressure protection requirements shall be met:

a. One of the following three overpressure protection systems shall be in place:

1. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting of ≤ 430 psia, or (with their associated block valves open)

2. A single PORV with a lift setting of ≤ 430 psia (with its associated block valve open) and a Reactor Coolant System vent of ≥ 1.3 square inches, or

3. A Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vent ≥ 2.6 square inches.

b. Two high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps# shall be disabled by either removing (racking out) their motor circuit breakers from the electrical power supply circuit, or by locking shut their discharge valves.

c. The HPSI loop motor operated valves (MOVs)# shall be prevented from automatically aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS by placing their handswitches in pull-to-override.

d. No more than one **OPERABLE** high pressure safety injection pump with suction aligned to the Refueling Water Tank may be used to inject flow into the RCS and when used, it must be under manual control and one of the following restrictions shall apply:

1. The total high pressure safety injection flow shall be limited to ≤ 210 gpm OR

2. A Reactor Coolant System vent of ≥ 2.6 square inches shall exist.

APPLICABILITY: When the RCS temperature is ≤ 305°F and the RCS is vented to < 8 square inches.

Except when required for testing.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION: (IN MODE 3 with RCS temperature ≤ 305°F OR IN MODE 4)

a. With one PORV inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 5 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a ≥ 1.3 square inch vent(s) within the next 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.

(Add INSERT D)

(c b.) With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a ≥ 2.6 square inch vent(s) within 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until either one OPERABLE PORV and a vent of ≥ 1.3 square inches has been established or both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.

(d c.) In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

(e d.) With less than two HPSI pumps# disabled, place at least two HPSI pump handswitches in pull-to-lock within fifteen minutes and disable two HPSI pumps within the next four hours.

(f e.) With one or more HPSI loop MOVs# not prevented from automatically aligning a HPSI pump to the RCS, immediately place the MOV handswitch in pull-to-override, or shut and disable the affected MOV or isolate the affected HPSI header flowpath within four hours, and implement the action requirements of Specifications 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3, and 3.5.3, as applicable.

(g f.) With HPSI flow exceeding 210 gpm while suction is aligned to the RWT and an RCS vent of < 2.6 square inches exists,

1. Immediately take action to reduce flow to less than or equal to 210 gpm.

2. Verify the excessive flow condition did not raise pressure above the maximum allowable pressure for the given RCS temperature on Figure 3.4.9-1 or Figure 3.4.9-2.

Except when required for testing.

INSERT D (new Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 Action b)

b. With one PORV inoperable in Modes 5 or 6, either restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, or depressurize and vent the RCS through a $\geq$ 1.3 square inch vent(s) within the next 48 hours; and maintain the RCS in this vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

3. If a pressure limit was exceeded, take action in accordance with Specification 3.4.9.1.

h. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated **OPERABLE** by:

a. Performance of a **CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST** on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required **OPERABLE** and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required **OPERABLE**.

b. Performance of a **CHANNEL CALIBRATION** on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.

c. Verifying the PORV ~~isolation~~ block valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

d. Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent(s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours* when the vent(s) is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9.3.3 All high pressure safety injection pumps, except the above **OPERABLE** pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits or by verifying their discharge valves are locked shut. The automatic opening feature of the high pressure safety injection loop MOVs shall be verified disabled at least once per 12 hours.

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* Except when the vent pathway is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these vent pathways open at least once per 31 days.

Note that only the design bases events are discussed in detail since the less severe transients are bounded by the RCP start and inadvertent HPSI actuation analysis.

RCS temperature, as used in the applicability statement, is determined as follows: (1) with the RCPs running, the RCS cold leg temperature is the appropriate indication, (2) with the Shutdown Cooling System in operation, the shutdown cooling temperature indication is appropriate, (3) if neither the RCPs or shutdown cooling is in operation, the core exit thermocouples are the appropriate indicators of RCS temperature.

Add INSERT E

3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inspection programs for the ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. To the extent applicable, the inspection program for these components is in compliance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

3/4.4.11 CORE BARREL MOVEMENT

This specification is provided to ensure early detection of excessive core barrel movement if it should occur. Core barrel movement will be detected by using four excore neutron detectors to obtain Amplitude Probability Distribution (APD) and Spectral Analysis (SA). Baseline core barrel movement Alert Levels and Action Levels will be confirmed during each reactor STARTUP test program following a core reload.

Data from these detectors is to be reduced in two forms. Root mean square (RMS) values are computed from the APD of the signal amplitude. These RMS magnitudes include variations due both to various neutronic effects and internals motion. Consequently, these signals alone can only provide a gross measure of core barrel motion. A more accurate assessment of core barrel motion is contained from the Auto and Cross Power Spectral Densities (PSD, XPSD), phase (ϕ) and coherence (COH) of these signals. These data result from the SA of the excore detector signals.

A modification to the required monitoring program may be justified by an analysis of the data obtained and by an examination of the affected parts during the plant shutdown at the end of any fuel cycle.

INSERT E (new paragraph for BASES 3/4.4.9)

The allowed out-of-service times for degraded low temperature overpressure protection system in Modes 5 and 6 are based on the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-06 and the time required to conduct a controlled, deliberate cooldown, and to depressurize and vent the reactor coolant system under the Action statement entry conditions.