

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500002751 OF 02

TITLE (4) INOPERABILITY OF BOTH RHR TRAINS

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
01	25	85	85	006	000	02	25	85			050000

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																														
5	<table border="1"><tr><td>20.402(b)</td><td>20.405(e)</td><td>X</td><td>80.73(a)(2)(iv)</td><td>73.71(b)</td></tr><tr><td>20.405(a)(1)(i)</td><td>80.38(a)(1)</td><td></td><td>80.73(a)(2)(v)</td><td>73.71(c)</td></tr><tr><td>20.405(a)(1)(ii)</td><td>80.38(a)(2)</td><td>X</td><td>80.73(a)(2)(vi)</td><td>OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)</td></tr><tr><td>20.405(a)(1)(iii)</td><td>80.73(a)(2)(i)</td><td></td><td>80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>20.405(a)(1)(iv)</td><td>80.73(a)(2)(ii)</td><td></td><td>80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>20.405(a)(1)(v)</td><td>80.73(a)(2)(iii)</td><td></td><td>80.73(a)(2)(ix)</td><td></td></tr></table>	20.402(b)	20.405(e)	X	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	80.38(a)(1)		80.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	80.38(a)(2)	X	80.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(i)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	80.73(a)(2)(ii)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)		20.405(a)(1)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(ix)	
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20.405(a)(1)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(ix)																												

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME DAVID P. SISK, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER
TELEPHONE NUMBER 805 595-7351
AREA CODE 805

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1750 PST, January 25, 1985, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), a loss of vital 4kV bus voltage resulted in the autostarts of Diesel Generator (DG) 1-2, containment fan cooler system 1-5, and auxiliary saltwater pump 1-2, and the transfer of the control room ventilation system to Mode 4. In addition, for approximately two minutes, the decay heat removal capability was lost when the closure of the loop 4 RHR suction valve (MOV-8702) resulted in both Residual Heat Removal (RHR) trains being isolated from the reactor coolant system.

The RHR suction valve was subsequently opened and RHR flow established within two minutes. All other affected equipment and systems were returned to their normal standby conditions.

Investigation has shown that the cause of this event was misadjustment of the auxiliary switches on the Bus G feeder breakers (HG 13 and HG 14). The auxiliary switches were adjusted to a new tolerance and the breakers were tested with satisfactory results. To prevent recurrence, Procedure E-51.2, "4.16kV Circuit Breaker PM (preventative maintenance)," is being revised to identify the specific auxiliary switch adjustment required for the bus feeder breakers.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 9/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	8 5	0 0 6	0 0 0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

At 1750 PST, January 25, 1985, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), a loss of vital 4kV bus voltage resulted in the autostarts of Diesel Generator 1-2 (DG) (EK), containment fan cooler system 1-5 (BK) (CLR), and auxiliary saltwater pump 1-2 (BI) (P), and the transfer of the control room ventilation system (VI) to Mode 4. In addition, for approximately two minutes, the decay heat removal capability was lost when the closure of the loop 4 RHR suction valve (MOV-8702) resulted in both Residual Heat Removal (RHR) trains being isolated from the reactor coolant system.

While performing a bus transfer test on vital 4kV Bus G (EB) (BU) following maintenance on auxiliary power supply breaker 52-HG-13 (EB) (BKR), the breaker failed to close causing the bus to momentarily de-energize and auto transfer back to startup power. The momentary de-energization of the bus triggered the autostart of DG 1-2. Since Instrument AC Inverter IY 11 (ED) (INVT) was out of service for preventive maintenance, and instrument AC bus 11 (ED) (BU) was powered from its backup source (Bus G), the momentary loss of power to Bus G resulted in the temporary loss of power to relays in the automatic closure circuitry for the Loop 4 RHR suction valve, MOV-8702 (PB) (ISV). Since the automatic closure circuitry is of a fail-safe nature, the loss of power resulted in the closure of the suction valve and caused both RHR pumps (PB) (P) to lose suction. In response to the RHR low flow alarm, the pumps were manually tripped.

The RHR Suction Valve was subsequently opened and RHR flow established within two minutes. All other affected equipment and systems were returned to their normal standby conditions.

Investigation has shown that the cause of this event was misadjustment of the auxiliary switches on the Bus G feeder breakers (HG 13 and HG 14). Although the switches were adjusted to manufacturer's and procedural tolerances, these tolerances were not satisfactory for optimum operation in the manual transfer mode. The auxiliary switches were adjusted to a new tolerance and the breakers were tested with satisfactory results. To prevent recurrence, Procedure E-51.2, "4.16kV Circuit Breaker PM," is being revised to identify the specific auxiliary switch adjustment required for the bus feeder breakers.

This event had no safety consequences and in no way affected the health and safety of the public.

PGandE is, and has been, actively pursuing administrative and/or hardware remedies to preclude the inadvertent closure of RHR pump suction valves. These remedies are presently being formulated and will be discussed with the NRC on a generic basis by the utility and NSSS vendor.

Similar occurrences were reported in LER 85-005 and informational LER 84-004.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

77 BEALE STREET • SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94106 • (415) 781-4211 • TWX 910-372-6587

JAMES D. SHIFFER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

February 25, 1985

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-85-081

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 85-006-00
Inoperability of Both RHR Trains


Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning the inoperability of both RHR trains due to an inadvertent closure of the RHR pump suction valve.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

IE22
1/1