

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6				PAGE (3) 1 OF 3										
TITLE (4) Failure to Fully Document Reactor Scrams																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
1	2	1	3	8	4	8	4	—	0	3	3	—	0	1	0	1	2	9	8	5	0 5 0 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
1		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)										
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 9 9				20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)										
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)										
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)														
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)														
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)														
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME T. L. Elton, Acting Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance										TELEPHONE NUMBER 9 1 2 3 6 7 1 7 8 5 1														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs														
X	B/H	R/L	Y H 0 8 0	Y																				
X	A/D	S/I	C G 0 8 0	Y																				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR								
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO												
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																								
<p>This 30 day LER is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) because these events show that the reactor protection system (RPS), which is an engineering safety feature (ESF), experienced unplanned actuations.</p> <p>On 09-30-84, a loss of condenser vacuum resulted in the closing of the turbine stop valves and a reactor scram.</p> <p>On 11-17-84, a reactor recirculation pump (2B31-C001B) overspeed condition caused a reactor scram.</p> <p>On 12-30-84, a MSR high level caused a reactor scram. Events 1 and 2 resulted from material failure. The cause of event 3 is unknown. In all 3 events deficiency reports were not initiated as required by the "DEFICIENCY CONTROL SYSTEM" procedure (HNP-444).</p>																								

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 9/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 8 4	—	0 3 3	—	0 1 0	2	OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

This 30 day LER is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) because these events show that the reactor protection system (RPS), which is an engineering safety feature (ESF), experienced unplanned actuations. Additionally, the first and second events were not reported (via an LER) within 30 days as required by 10CFR50.73(a)(1).

On 09-30-84, (i.e., the first event's date) at approximately 1145 CST, the reactor operating at 2431 Mwt (approximately 99% power), a loss in condenser vacuum resulted in the closing of the turbine stop valves and a reactor scram.

On 11-17-84 (i.e., the second event's date) at approximately 0013 CST, the reactor was in operation at a reduced power level of 1453 Mwt (approximately 59% power) for the performance of the "TURBINE CONTROL VALVE FAST CLOSURE INSTRUMENT F.T" procedure (HNP-2-3007). At approximately 0400 CST reactor recirculation pump 2B31-C001B went into an overspeed condition and caused the reactor to scram.

On 12-30-84, at approximately 1624 CST, with the reactor operating at 2436 Mwt (100% power) a reactor scram occurred due to the "C" moisture separator reheater's having a high level. For each of these events 1 hour notification was made to the NRC.

During investigation of this year's scrams, the senior STA discovered that neither the first or second event were reported in a deficiency report as required by the "DEFICIENCY CONTROL SYSTEM" procedure (HNP-444); consequently, LERs were not previously submitted. He wrote a deficiency on 12/13/84 to document his findings.

On 01-11-85, the plant's Senior Shift Technical Advisor notified Regulatory Compliance personnel that an unplanned reactor scram had occurred on 12-30-84 (i.e., the third event's date), and that a deficiency report had not been written as required by the "DEFICIENCY CONTROL SYSTEM" procedure (HNP-444). The required deficiency report was written on 01-11-85.

During an investigation of the first event plant personnel determined that the off gas condenser (2N62-B002) had accumulated sufficient water to restrict the steam jet air ejector's discharge flow which resulted in a low condenser vacuum; consequently, the turbine stop valves closed and caused a reactor scram. After further investigation, plant personnel determined that the off gas condenser's moisture drain valve 2N62-F019A was not opening to drain accumulated moisture because the drain valve's solenoid power relay (2N62-K3) had failed. The off gas condenser's drain valve solenoid relay (2N62-K3a) was replaced, and the drain valve (2N62-F019A) was then satisfactorily functionally tested. Normal reactor startup began, and control rod withdrawal commenced on 09-30-84 at approximately 1950 CDT. This event is the result of component (2N62-K3) failure.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 8 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
			- 0 3 3	- 0 1 0	3	OF	3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)


In the second event, the reactor recirculation pump's (2B21-C001B) motor generator scoop tube was locked in position for repair of the recirculation pump speed limit controller (2B31-K634B). After the speed limit controller was repaired, the recirculation pump's motor generator scoop tube was unlocked. At that time the reactor recirculation pump ran up to its high speed stop and caused the reactor to scram. After further investigation plant personnel determined that the percent speed demand indicator (2B31-R621-001B) was out of calibration and it was also giving a nonlinear indication. Operating personnel were relying on this indicator to accurately balance the motor generator's scoop tube position with the percent speed demand indicator's percent signal before unlocking the motor generator's scoop tube position. This resulted in the recirculation pump's overspeed which caused the reactor scram. The percent speed demand indicator was replaced and satisfactorily functionally tested per the "G.E. TYPE 180 INDICATOR" procedure (HNP-2-5233) on 11-17-84. This event is the result of component (2B31-R621-001B) failure.

In the third event, plant personnel observed that the purge flow for the MSR level instrumentation was at zero. Thus, plant personnel commenced to restore flow and the transient occurred. Without purge flow, MSR level indication would be artificially high. Thus, when purge flow was restored the actual level was increased to the indicated level. The "C" MSR high level dump valve (2N22-F252C) stuck closed which enabled the lowering of the MSR's level. The MSR high level caused the turbine to trip. The turbine trip was followed by a reactor scram on Turbine Stop Valve Fast Closure.

No actual or potential safety consequences or implications resulted from these events. These events had no impact on any other system in Unit 2, or Unit 1. The health and safety of the public were not affected by these non-repetitive events.

HNP-426, the "SCRAM/TRANSIENT RESPONSE" procedure will be revised to ensure that deficiencies are written when scrams occur.

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Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant


January 29, 1985

GM-85-94

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1984-033, Rev. 1. This report is required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).


H. C. Nix
General Manager

^{TKS}
HCN/TLE/djs

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