

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 1				PAGE (3) OF 0 3										
TITLE (4) INADVERTENT RX TRIP																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
1	2	3	1	8	4	8	4	0	2	6	0	0	0	1	2	8	8	5					0 5 0 0 0	
OPERATING MODE (9) N			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 4 7			20.402(b)			20.405(c)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)												
			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)												
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)												
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)															
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)															
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)																		
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME R. F. SAUNDERS, STATION MANAGER										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 0 4 3 5 7 - 3 1 8 4														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC															
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR										
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO														

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On 12-31-84, unit 1 was stable at 47% power following a startup from a refueling outage. The "A" main and bypass reactor trip breakers (RTB) were closed while Instrument Technicians were performing monthly Test (PT-8.1), Reactor Protection Logic.

The exact cause of the "B" RTB opening could not be determined. Several possible causes that were ruled out after an initial investigation are:

1. Automatic Reactor Protection Signal
2. Manual Trip from the Control Room
3. Failure of a BFD Relay in the Reactor Protection System.

The "B" RTB was inspected, the shunt trip devices were successfully tested, and no discrepancies were found.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (7)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	0 2 1 6	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

1. Description of the Event

On 12-31-84, unit 1 was stable at 47% power following a startup from a refueling outage. The "A" main and bypass reactor trip breakers (RTB) were closed while Instrument Technicians were performing monthly Test (PT-8.1), Reactor Protection Logic.

At 1147 hours, a reactor trip occurred when "B" RTB opened. This occurred when the newly installed shunt trip test pushbutton for "A" RTB was actuated as part of PT-8.1. The open "B" RTB led to a turbine trip which initiated a reactor trip signal that opened "A" RTB and "A" bypass breaker.

2. Probable Consequences

The reactor trip breakers are designed to open to provide automatic and manual actuation of the reactor protection system. The "A" main and bypass breakers responded properly to the signals they received and all trip breakers were demonstrated to function properly during subsequent testing. Also, more conservative trips from full power are analyzed in the UFSAR without violation of any safety barrier, therefore, an unreviewed safety question was not created and the health and safety of the public were unaffected.

3. Cause

The exact cause of the "B" RTB opening could not be determined. Several possible causes that were ruled out after an initial investigation are:

1. Automatic Reactor Protection Signal
2. Manual Trip from the Control Room
3. Failure of a BFD Relay in the Reactor Protection System.

The shunt trip test panels for both RTB's were labeled "A" as an error in implementing Design Change 84-06. Although pushing the wrong test panel pushbutton could result in a duplicate event, the technician performing the test demonstrated proper knowledge of the test panels and indicated that the correct button was actuated. The Human Performance Evaluation System program was used to investigate possible Human Factors deficiencies. No apparent deficiencies were found.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The Operators performed all appropriate emergency and function restoration procedures to ensure that the plant was returned to stable conditions.

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SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 D	8 4	— 0 2 6	— 0 0	0 3	OF 0	3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The Instrument Technicians performing PT-8.1 terminated the procedure. The STA performed the status tree reviews to ensure that specific parameters were noted and the appropriate procedures were used to maintain these parameters within safe bounds.

5. Additional Corrective Actions

An inspection of the "B" RTB performed by station electricians yielded no discrepancies. The shunt trip devices were successfully tested with the unit shutdown. The event could not be duplicated. The labeling on the shunt trip panels was corrected.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Since no specific cause could be determined and all equipment was subsequently proven to function properly, no further actions were taken.

7. Generic Implications

None.



VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
Surry, Virginia 23883

January 28, 1985

Serial No: 84-046

Docket No: 50-280

License No: DPR-32

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
016 Phillips Building
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER

84-026-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

R. F. Saunders
R. F. Saunders
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
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101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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