NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
RPS Actuation (Engineered Safety Feature)

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1 1	2 9	8 4	8 4	— 0 3 6	— 0 0	1 2	2 1	8 4		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	[X]	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)	
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)	
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
T. L. Elton, Acting Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance	9 1 2 3 6 7 - 7 8 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
N/A											

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
[ ] YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	[X] NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 11/29/84, at approximately 0617 CST, with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2423 MWt (approximately 100% power), Unit 2 received a reactor scram on a reactor low water level trip signal. However, an investigation revealed that the signal was invalid.

No actual or potential safety consequences or implications resulted from this event. This event had no impact on any other Unit 2 system or on Unit 1. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. This is a non-repetitive event; however, the last reactor scram is referenced in LER 50-366/1984-021.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6	8 4	— 0 3 6	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This 30 day LER is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) because of the reactor scram and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation.

On 11/29/84, at approximately 0617 CST, with the reactor mode switch in the run position and reactor power at 2423 MWt (approximately 100% power), Unit 2 received a reactor scram on a reactor low water level trip signal. However, an investigation revealed that the signal was invalid.

The transient proceeded smoothly. The invalid reactor low water level signal was sensed via the "Water Level 3 RPS transmitters" (2B21-N080 C&D), which caused a group 2 isolation and a reactor scram. Reactor water level decreased to approximately-25" (reference instrument zero). Reactor feed pumps started and increased reactor water level to approximately +60" (reference instrument zero) and then tripped on high water level. Reactor pressure increased to approximately 1010 psig but was decreased to less than 920 psig via the EHC system with the turbine bypass valves. HPCI and RCIC remained in their normal standby configuration. No other ECCS system started nor was needed.

No actual or potential safety consequences or implications resulted from this event. This event had no impact on any other Unit 2 system or on Unit 1. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. This is a non-repetitive event; however, the last reactor scram is referenced in LER 50-366/1984-021.

This event was the result of contract personnel (non-licensed personnel) opening the equalizing valve of the SPDS water level transmitter (2B21-N038B) before closing its isolation valve. 2B21-N038 is on the same lines as low water level transmitters 2B21-N080 C&D, which actuate a low water level scram (A2 and B2 RPS channels). Thus, when the equalizing valve for 2B21-N038B was opened, a pressure spike occurred on the lines causing 2B21-N080 C&D to sense an invalid signal and initiate a reactor scram.

The involved personnel were counseled as to the importance of acquiring the proper clearance(s) before working on equipment that is associated with an operating Unit.

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Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

December 21, 1984
GM-84-1128

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1984-036. This report is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

for H. C. Nix
General Manager

HCN/TLE/vlz

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