



**CENTERIOR
ENERGY**

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

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Michael D. Lyster
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

July 2, 1992
PY-CEI/NRR-1519 L


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Des.
Washington, D.C. 20555

Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 70-440
LER 92-014

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 92-014 for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

Sincerely,



Michael D. Lyster

MDL:DWC:ss

Enclosure: LER 92-014

cc: NRC Project Manager
NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
NRC Region III

9207070280 920703
PDR ADOCK 05000440
S PDR

Operating Companies
Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Toledo Edison

TE22

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-300), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 4 0				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3		
TITLE (4) Procedure Deficiency Results in an Unexpected Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolation																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER (5)			
0 6	0 3	9 2	9 2	0 1 4	0 0 0	7 0	3 9	2					0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following):														
4		20.402(b)				20.407(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 0				50.38(a)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.25(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 355A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Henry L. Hegrat, Compliance Engineer, Extension 5185										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 2 1 6 2 5 9 - 3 7 3 7						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE				SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 3, 1992 at 2236, while performing surveillance instruction ISI-B21-T1300-1, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage Pressure Test," a Steam Supply Pressure Low isolation signal and the associated Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System isolation were initiated when RCIC isolation valves were opened as required by the instruction.

The cause of this event is procedure deficiency. Surveillance instruction ISI-B21-T1300-1 specified that reactor pressure should be stabilized above the isolation setpoint; however, it did not provide sufficient margin to account for minor pressure transients when the RCIC system isolation valves were opened. Had the ISI required the RPV to be stabilized at a higher pressure, the temporary pressure decrease would not have caused the isolation to occur.

To prevent recurrence, ISI-B21-T1300-1 is being revised to provide a sufficient reactor pressure margin to accommodate minor pressure transients in the RCIC system. Additionally, all licensed plant operators will receive training on this event as part of requalification training.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-5301), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 4 0 9 2	—	0 1 4	—	0 0 0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

I. Introduction

On June 3, 1992 at 2236, while performing surveillance instruction ISI-B21-T1300-1, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage Pressure Test," a Steam Supply Pressure Low isolation signal was initiated which resulted in an unexpected Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) [BN] System isolation. At the time of the event, the plant was in Operation Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) with a reactor heatup in progress. The reactor vessel [RPV] pressure was approximately 65 psig with reactor coolant at approximately 161°F. The NRC Operations Center was informed of the event via the Emergency Notification System at 0124 on June 4, 1992, in accordance with notification requirements identified in 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii). This event is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

II. Event Description

On June 3, 1992, at 1823, plant personnel began performing surveillance instruction ISI-B21-T1300-1, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage Pressure Test." The SVI directed plant personnel to establish RPV pressure greater than 60 psig (RCIC isolation setpoint), and open 1E51-F076, "RHR & RCIC ST SUPP WARMUP ISOL VALVE" to equalize pressure across 1E51-F063, "RHR & RCIC ST SUPP INBD ISOL VALVE." Accordingly, RPV pressure was raised to approximately 65 psig and 1E51-F076 was opened. When the operator received positive indication that 1E51-F076 was full open and that there was no indicated pressure decrease, he proceeded to open 1E51-F063. During the opening of this valve at 2236, RPV pressure decreased to approximately 60 psig, and quickly returned to 65 psig. As a result, both a Steam Supply Pressure Low isolation signal and the associated alarm were received from Leak Detection system instrumentation. The isolation logic in the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff [JM] system was satisfied, resulting in the unexpected RCIC System isolation. In accordance with plant procedures, the RCIC isolation logic was reset, and this evolution was successfully re-performed at a higher reactor pressure.

III. Cause Analysis

The cause of this event is procedure deficiency. Surveillance instruction ISI-B21-T1300-1 did not provide sufficient initial reactor pressure margin to account for minor pressure transients when the RCIC system isolation valves were opened. Had the ISI required the RPV to be stabilized at a higher pressure, the temporary pressure decrease would not have caused the isolation to occur.

Investigation into this event determined that 1E51-F063, 1E51-F076, and 1E51-F064 (boundary valve) had been successfully exercised and leak rate tested during this refueling outage; therefore, the material condition of these valves is not regarded as a potential cause of this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 504 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	0 5 2 0 0 4 4 0	9 2	0 1 4	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

IV. Safety Analysis

The RCIC system is designed to maintain sufficient reactor water inventory should the vessel lose feedwater supply during a reactor vessel isolation condition. Should the RCIC system isolate when it is required to be in service, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) [BG] system performs the redundant function of maintaining reactor water inventory and adequate core cooling at high reactor pressure. During the time the RCIC system was isolated for this event, the HPCS system was operable. Additionally, the isolation actuation instrumentation used to mitigate the consequences of accidents by isolating the reactor systems functioned as designed. This event is not considered to be safety significant. This instruction has been previously performed four times, with no problems being noted.

V. Corrective Action

To prevent recurrence, ISI-B21-T1300-1 is being revised to provide a sufficient reactor pressure margin to accommodate minor pressure transients in the RCIC system. Additionally, all licensed plant operators will receive training on this event as part of requalification training.

Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as [XX].