



Nuclear Group  
P.O. Box 4  
Shippingport, PA 15077-0004

Telephone (412) 393-6000

June 25, 1992  
ND3MNO:3323

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73  
LER 92-008-00

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical Specifications, the following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER 92-008-00, 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.i.B, "Inoperable Quench Spray Pump due to Breaker Failure".

Very truly yours,

T. P. Noonan  
General Manager  
Nuclear Operations

DSC/sl

Attachment

9206300175 920625  
PDR ADOCK 05000412  
S PDR

IF22  
11

June 25, 1992

ND3MNO:3323

Page two

cc: Mr. T. T. Martin, Regional Administrator  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region 1  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

C. A. Roteck, Ohio Edison  
76 S. Main Street  
Akron, OH 44308

Mr. A. DeAgazio, BVPS Licensing Project Manager  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

Larry Roszbach, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  
BVPS Senior Resident Inspector

Larry Beck  
Centerior Energy  
6200 Oak Tree Blvd.  
Independence, Ohio 44101-4661

INPO Records Center  
Suite 1500  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway  
Atlanta, GA 30339

G. E. Muckle,  
Factory Mutual Engineering  
680 Anderson Drive #BLD10  
Pittsburgh, PA 15220-2773

Mr. Richard Janati  
Department of Environmental Resources  
P. O. Box 2063  
16th Floor, Fulton Building  
Harrisburg, PA 17120

Director, Safety Evaluation & Control  
Virginia Electric & Power Co.  
P.O. Box 26666  
One James River Plaza  
Richmond, VA 23261

W. Hartley  
Virginia Power Company  
5000 Dominion Blvd.  
2SW Glenn Allen, VA 23060

J. M. Riddle  
Halliburton NUS  
Foster Plaza 7  
661 Anderson Drive  
Pittsburgh, PA 15220

June 25, 1992

ND3MNO:3323

Page three

Bill Wegner, Consultant  
23 Woodlawn Terrace  
Fredricksburg, VA 22404

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

0	5	0	0	0	4	:	2	1	CF	0	3
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	---	---

**SECRET NUMBER(S)**

0 5 0 0 0

0 5 0 3 0 1 1

IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 6. (Check one or more of the following) (1)

Before and in Text, NRC Form 751-2-82

LISEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

4	1	2	6	4	3	-	1	2	5	8
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (12)

[illegible]

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 114

EXPECTED  
SUBMISSION  
DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
-------	-----	------

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

☒ NO

**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 characters; approximately fifteen single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 5/26/92, operators removed the A Quench Spray Pump breaker (Gould Inc., Model 5HK-350) from its bus for periodic testing. As the breaker was being removed, its closing springs were found to be discharged. Investigation determined that normally closed contact pair in the breaker's control device were open. With these contacts open, the charging motor would not operate to charge the closing springs after the breaker was opened. Review of station documents showed that the breaker was last operated on 4/23/92, during a pump test. Based on the above, the breaker's closing springs were apparently not charged from 4/23/92 until 5/26/92, resulting in the pump being unable to be started and inoperable during this period. The breaker's control device was replaced and verified to operate correctly. There were no safety implications due to this event. The other train of quench spray was fully operable throughout this event and capable of depressurizing the containment in the event of an accident. Additionally, both trains of the recirculation spray containment de-pressurization system were available and would have auto-started approximately 10 minutes after quench spray initiation.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.5 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20585, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

0 5 0 0 0 4 1 2 9 2 - 0 0 8 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 385A's) (17)

Description

On 5/26/90, operators removed the A Quench Spray Pump breaker from its bus for normal periodic testing. As the breaker was being removed, the operators noted that its closing springs were discharged. Operators then racked the breaker back onto the bus and reenergized its control power, but the closing springs did not charge. Without these springs charged, the breaker could not close and could not start the quench spray pump. The breaker was then replaced with a spare. The closing springs of the spare breaker did charge after it was racked onto the bus and its control power energized. Operators verified proper breaker function by starting the A quench spray pump.

Cause of Event

Investigation by Maintenance personnel discovered that a normally closed contact pair in the failed breaker's control device were open. Without these contacts closed, the breaker's charging motor could not operate and would not charge the closing springs. This control device is a sealed unit and not adjustable on site. The control device was replaced and the breaker was verified to function properly. The involved breaker was manufactured by Gould, Inc., operated on a 4KV bus and was model number 5HK-350.

Previous Similar Events

Review of station records showed no previous similar events.

Corrective Actions

The station has completed or initiated the following corrective actions:

- 1) The faulted breaker was replaced with a spare. The spare breaker was verified to operate properly. The original breaker was repaired.
- 2) A sample of 4KV breakers will be inspected to verify that this type of control device contact failure is not generic in nature.
- 3) Maintenance procedures are being revised to periodically inspect 4KV breaker control device contacts and ensure they are properly aligned.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)	PAGE (3)
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER	
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 1 2 9 2	- 0 0 8 - 0 0 0 3	OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

Reportability

Review of station records showed that the breaker had last been opened on 4/23/92. It is believed that at that time the closing springs failed to charge, causing the breaker and its associated quench spray pump to be inoperable. This resulted in one train of Quench Spray being inoperable longer than allowed by Technical Specifications. Also, during this time, the station changed modes (from Operational Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, to Operational Mode 1, Power Operations) with only one train of Quench Spray operable. Mode changes with an inoperable train of Quench Spray is prohibited by Technical Specification 3.0.4. This event is therefore being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.B as a condition of operation prohibited by Technical Specifications.

Safety Analysis

There were no safety implications due to this event. The B train of Quench Spray was fully operable throughout this event and capable of de-pressurizing the Containment Building in the event of an accident (reference: Unit 2 UFSAR Section 6.2.2.2.1, "Quench Spray System"). Additionally, both trains of the recirculation spray containment de-pressurization system were also operable throughout this event and capable of supplying long term, post-accident containment cooling and pressure control.