

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0					PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4	
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TITLE (4) SPURIOUS SAFETY INJECTION																
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EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)							
1	1	6	8	4	0 2 4	0 0	1	2	1	7	8	4					0 5 0 0 0			
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OPERATING MODE (9) N		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.402(b)				20.405(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
	20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)			
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME R. F. SAUNDERS, STATION MANAGER										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 0 4 3 5 7 - 3 1 8 4						

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO														

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

With the unit in a refueling shutdown condition, a spurious Safety Injection occurred when returning CLS-HI (Equivalent to Containment Depressurization Actuation System) to service. The controlling procedure was inadequate in that the procedure did not require the resetting of CLS-HI. The impact on the unit was minimal and the unit was returned to a normal condition.

Outstanding work procedures, that required the de-energizing of CLS-HI were held in abeyance until the procedures could be modified.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-C104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 4	— 0 2 4	— 0 0	0 2	OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

1. Description of the Event

On November 16, 1984, with the Unit 1 in a refueling shutdown condition, a spurious Safety Injection (SI) occurred. Train B of the Consequences Limiting Safeguards, High phase (CLS-HI), Surry's equivalent of the Containment Depressurization Actuation System, was being returned to service when the SI occurred. CLS-HI, train B, had been removed from service to replace a terminal board in the CLS-HI circuit. The SI did result in the actuation of the few SI components that were still operable in this plant mode. However, the SI did not result in the flowing of water to the reactor vessel.

2. Safety Implications

The impact of the SI was minimal since the unit was shutdown and the fuel had been removed from the reactor vessel.

A similar event at power is not possible because the replacement of a terminal board (de-energizing CLS) is not allowed at power. Therefore, this event did not result in an unreviewed safety question or was the health and safety of the public affected.

3. Cause

The spurious SI was due to an inadequate procedure. The inadequate procedure was due to an oversight during the procedure development, review and approval process.

For the remaining discussion, refer to the attached figure. To prevent an inadvertent SI, whenever CLS-HI is de-energized, the interface between CLS-HI and SI must be removed (lifting of leads). Due to the arrangement of the CLS-HI relays, the CLS-HI memory circuit (3-CLS-1BM) must be reset before the CLS-HI/SI interface is re-instated. The controlling procedure did not require the resetting of CLS-HI, hence a spurious SI occurred when the CLS-HI/SI interface was re-instated.

4. Immediate Corrective Actions

Operators performed the appropriate off-normal procedure and returned the unit to a normal condition.

5. Additional Corrective Actions

Outstanding work procedures that required the de-energizing of CLS-HI were held in abeyance until the procedures could be modified to require the resetting of CLS-HI.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT :	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	— 6 2 4	— 0 0	0 3	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Those involved in the development, review and approval of work related procedures will be made aware of this event to heighten their awareness to unusual situations.

7. Generic Implications

None.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)

SURREY POWER STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)


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YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION
NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER

0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 8 4 - 0 2 4 - 0 0 0 4 OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

CLS-HI TRAIN B



NOTES: ① CLS Relays Normally energized
② Shown: de-energized

- SIMPLIFIED DRAWING -



VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
Surry, Virginia 23883

DEC 17 1984

Serial No: 84-40

Docket No: 50-280

License No: DPR-32

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
016 Phillips Building
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER

84-024-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

R. F. Saunders

R. F. Saunders
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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11