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J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Vice President - Nuclear
Hatch Project



March 22, 1996

Docket No. 50-321

HL-5128


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1
Licensee Event Report
Missed Technical Specifications Surveillance on
Secondary Containment Doors and Hatches

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning a Missed Technical Specifications Surveillance on Secondary Containment Doors and Hatches.

Sincerely,



J. T. Beckham, Jr.

IFL/eb

Enclosure: LER 50-321/1996-002

cc: Georgia Power Company

Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
NORMS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II

Mr. S. D. Ebner, Regional Administrator

Mr. B. L. Holbrook, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

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EXPIRES: 5/31/96

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB87714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | OF | 4

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)

Missed Technical Specifications Surveillance on Secondary Containment Doors and Hatches

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER(S)					
0	2	2	9	6	9	6	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	2	1
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 7: (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
OPERATING MODE (9)			20.40 (b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)			
0			20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
1			20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
0			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
8			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)						
5															

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Steven B. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager, Hatch

TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

9 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 7 | - | 7 | 8 | 5 | 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION

MONTH DAY YEAR

DATE (15)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 2/23/96 at approximately 1930 EST, Unit 1 was in the Run mode at a power level of 2066 CMWT (84.8 percent of rated thermal power) and Unit 2 was in the Run mode at a power level of 2558 CMWT (100 percent of rated thermal power). At that time, a licensed Shift Support Supervisor discovered that surveillance 34SV-T22-002-0S, "Secondary Containment Integrity Demonstration," had been missed on 2/9/96. This surveillance is required every 31 days per Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications sections 3.6.4.1.1 and 3.6.4.1.2. The surveillance requires that doors and hatches which penetrate the secondary containment boundary be confirmed closed. The surveillance was completed by 2110 EST with no problems identified.

This event was caused by a personnel error.

Corrective actions include placing the individual on the GPC positive discipline program.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

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INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD
COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION
AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB7714), U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-
0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

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LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1

05000321

YEAR	SEQUENTIAL YEAR	REVISION NUMBER
96	-002	-00

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System codes appear in the text as (EIIS Code XX).

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 2/23/96 at approximately 1930 EST, Unit 1 was in the Run mode at a power level of 2066 CMWT (84.8 percent of rated thermal power) and Unit 2 was in the Run mode at a power level of 2558 CMWT (100 percent of rated thermal power). At that time, a licensed Shift Support Supervisor discovered that surveillance 34SV-T22-002-0S, "Secondary Containment Integrity Demonstration," had been missed on 2/9/96. This surveillance is required every 31 days per Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications sections 3.6.4.1.1 and 3.6.4.1.2. The surveillance requires that doors and hatches which penetrate the secondary containment (EIIS Code NH) boundary be confirmed closed. The last performance of the surveillance had occurred on 1/2/96; therefore, the next time the surveillance was due was 2/2/96, and the 25 percent grace period expired on 2/9/96. The surveillance was completed by 2110 EST on 2/23/96 with no problems identified. The total amount of time during which the surveillance had lapsed was 14 days.

CAUSE OF EVENT

This event was caused by personnel error. On 2/5/96, a licensed Shift Support Supervisor (SSS) was reviewing surveillances that were due that day. When he reviewed surveillance task sheets indicating which surveillances were to be done that day, he mistook the surveillance for one with a similar name and procedure number, 34SV-T22-001-0S, "Secondary Containment Test." The correct surveillance was 34SV-T22-002-0S, "Secondary Containment Integrity Demonstration," which requires secondary containment doors and equipment hatches to be verified closed every 31 days. The "Secondary Containment Test" procedure, which is the test the SSS thought he was supposed to perform, requires the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS, EIIS Code BH) to be operated to prove that the required vacuum can be established in the secondary containment. This test requires wind speeds to be less than 5 miles per hour. Therefore, the SSS checked wind speed, found it greater than 5 mph, and deferred the surveillance until a time when the wind speed was less than 5 mph. The SSS did not recognize the fact that the correct surveillance merely required checking all the doors and hatches to ensure they were intact and closed.

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Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1

05000321

YEAR

SEQUENTIAL

REVISION

YEAR

NUMBER

96

- 002

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

REPORTABILITY ANALYSIS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the plant entered a condition which is prohibited by the Technical Specifications. Namely, a surveillance to ensure all secondary containment doors and hatches are closed was performed approximately 14 days after the late date had expired.

The secondary containment is a structure that completely encloses both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 primary containments and those components that may be postulated to contain primary system fluid. The purpose of the secondary containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain dampers whose lines penetrate the secondary containment, the secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products released to the environment. The surveillance requirement which was missed serves as a check to ensure that the doors and hatches in the Secondary Containment boundary are closed.

In this event, the surveillance lapsed for a period of 14 days. However, when the surveillance was performed at the time the event was discovered, all the doors and equipment hatches were found to be properly positioned and operable. Should an accident have occurred during the time the surveillance was lapsed, the secondary containment would have functioned as designed to control the release of fission products to the environment.

Based on this analysis, it is concluded that this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety. This analysis applies to all operating conditions.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The surveillance was satisfactorily performed on 2/23/96. This action is complete.
2. The involved licensed individual is being placed on the positive discipline program.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL YEAR	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 6	-	0 0 2	-	0 0	4 OF 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Other Systems Affected: No systems other than those already mentioned in this report were affected by this event.
2. Failed Component Information: No failed components contributed to or resulted from this event.
3. Previous Similar Events: Five events have been reported in the past two years involving missed surveillances. These events are described in the following LERs:

50-321/1994-004, dated 05/09/94

50-321/1994-015, dated 12/19/94

50-321/1995-001, dated 02/06/95

50-366/1994-006, dated 05/24/94

50-366/1995-002, dated 05/04/95

Corrective actions for these events included performing lapsed surveillances, counseling personnel, changing the way surveillance schedules are communicated to personnel who perform them, and revising procedures. These actions would not have prevented this event because the personnel and circumstances surrounding this event are unique to the event.