

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 4	-	0 7 1 9	-	0 1 0 2	OF	0 1 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

Plant Condition

- a) Power Level - 15%
b) Plant Mode - 1

Event

While preparing to roll the turbine in a normal ramp up mode the control room operator started the third large circulating water pump. At this time, the Plant was being supplied by the startup transformer (TR-S) which was heavily loaded. The large starting current for this motor (~3300 Amps) coincident with the heavily loaded condition of the startup transformer, resulted in a voltage droop on the secondary of the transformer. This voltage dropped below the setpoint for the second level (degraded) undervoltage protection. The voltage had not exceeded the reset setpoint within the eight second time delay and the second level undervoltage circuitry initiated load shedding as designed on Div. I and Div. III. The temporary loss of power to the control circuitry resulted in tripping of the RFW pump. The loss of feedwater to the reactor resulted in a drop of reactor water level to level three (+12") and the reactor scrammed as designed.

Immediate Corrective Action

Operators initiated Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and restored reactor water level. The Plant electrical lineup was returned to a normal configuration.

Notification was given to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).

Further Corrective Action

The applicable startup procedures have been modified to identify limitations to the loading of the startup transformer.

Operability of the second level undervoltage circuit (Div. II) which did not initiate its divisions load shedding sequence was verified. This lack of operation was attributed to minor variations in time delay operation.

In addition, the circulating water pump overcurrent relays were functionally tested. The relay coordination curve for these relays was also evaluated to substantiate that it was likely for the second level undervoltage circuits to initiate load shedding prior to overcurrent relay actuation.

Safety Significance

There are no safety consequences associated with this event and all Plant systems performed as required during the event.

Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397

December 13, 1984

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-079-01

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-079-01 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This report clarifies information provided in Licensee Event Report 84-079.

Very truly yours,

CM Powers for

J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 84-079-01

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC - Site (901A)
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA

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