ATTACHMENT B

Proposed changes to Appendix A, Technical Specifications
Facility Operating Licenses NPF-11 and NPF-18

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3/4 8-23*	3/4 8-23*
3/4 8-24 (delete)	3/4 8-24 (delete)
3/4 8-25 (delete)	3/4 8-25 (delete)
3/4 8-25a (delete)	3/4 8-25a (delete)
B 3/4 8-3	B 3/4 8-3

* For information only, no changes.

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.2 All primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3. Replace with Insert A

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8.3.2-1 inoperable, restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable circuit breaker within 72 hours, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out, or removed, at least once per 7 days thereafter. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their circuit breakers tripped, racked out, or removed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.2 Each of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8.3.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. By verifying that the 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers and performing:

a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, and

b) An integrated system functional test of the breakers overcurrent protective trip circuit which includes simulated automatic actuation of the trip system to demonstrate that the overall penetration protection design remains within operable limits.

c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

No Changes
For Information Only

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each type of 480-volt circuit breakers. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. Testing of these circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current in excess of 120% of the breakers nominal setpoint and measuring the response time. The measured response time will be compared to the manufacturer's data to insure that it is less than or equal to 120% of a value specified for test current by the manufacturer. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

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TABLE 3.8.3.2-1

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR
OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	SYSTEM/COMPONENT POWERED
a. 6.9 kV Circuit Breakers	
1. Swgr. 151 (Bkr. 3A)	RR Pump 1A Primary - fast speed
2. Swgr. 152 (Bkr. 3B)	RR Pump 1B Primary - fast speed
3. Swgr. 151-1 (Brk. 2A)	RR Pump 1A, Primary - low speed
4. Swgr. 152-1 (Brk. 2B)	RR Pump 1B, Primary - low speed
5. Swgr. 151-1 (Brk. 4A)	RR Pump 1A, Backup - fast speed
6. Swgr. 152-1 (Brk. 4B)	RR Pump 1B Backup - fast speed
b. 4.16 kV Circuit Breakers	
1. Swgr. 141Y (Brk. 1A)	RR Pump 1A Backup - low speed
2. Swgr. 142Y (Brk. 1B)	RR Pump 1B Backup - low speed
c. 480 VAC Circuit Breakers	
1. Swgr. 136Y (Compt. 403C)	VP/Pri. Cont. Vent Supply Fan 1B
2. Swgr. 135Y (Compt. 203A)	VP/Pri. Cont. Vent Supply Fan 1A
d. 480 VAC (Molded Case) Circuit Breakers	
1. Type K-M Cat # NZ MH6-160/SM6C[(a)]	
a) MCC 136Y-2 (Compt. C4)	RR/MOV 1B33-F067B
b) MCC 136Y-2 (Compt. A3)	RR/MOV 1B33-F023B
c) MCC 134X-1 (Compt. B3)	NB/MOV1 1B21-F001

(a) Backup breakers are located in the back of the respective MCC.

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TABLE 3.8.3.2-1 (Continued)

DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	SYSTEM/COMPONENT POWERED
d) MCC 134X-1 (Compt. B4)	NB/MOV 1B21-F002
e) MCC 136Y-1 (Compt. B-2) (Normal)	RH/MOV 1E12-F009
f) MCC 136Y-2 (Compt. E4)	RI/MOV 1E51-F063
g) MCC 135Y-1 (Compt. A1)	RR/MOV 1B33-F023A
h) MCC 135Y-1 (Compt. A4)	RR/MOV 1B33-F067A
i) MCC 133-1 (Compt. C2)	RT/MOV 1G33-F102
j) MCC-133-1 (Compt. E1)	NB/MOV 1B21-F005
k) MCC-136Y-2 (Compt. B1)	NB/MOV 1B21-F016
l) MCC 136Y-2 (Compt. E1)	RH/MOV 1E12-F099A
m) MCC 136Y-1 (Compt. E4)	RT/MOV 1G33-F001
n) MCC 136Y-2 (Compt A5)	WR/MOV 1WR180
o) MCC 136Y-2 (Compt. D6)	RH/MOV 1E12-F099B
p) MCC 136Y-1 (Compt. H5)	VP/MOV 1VP113B
q) MCC 136Y-1 (Compt. H4)	VP/MOV 1VP114A
r) MCC 136Y-1 (Compt. H3)	VP/MOV 1VP113A
s) MCC 136Y-1 (Compt. H6)	VP/MOV 1VP114B
t) MCC 136Y-2 (Compt. A4)	WR/MOV 1WR179
u) MCC 135Y-1 (Compt. D3)	RT/MOV 1G33-F101
v) MCC 135Y-1 (Compt. D4)	RT/MOV 1G33-F100
w) MCC 133-1 (Compt. C3)	RT/MOV 1G33-F106
x) MCC 136Y-2 (Compt. D5)	RI/MOV 1E51-F076
y) MCC 135X-1 (Compt. C2/C3) (Emerg)	RH/MOV 1E12-F009
z) MCC 133-2 (Compt. AC1)	VP/Drywell Cooler 1VP15SA
aa) MCC 133-2 (Compt. AB1)	VP/Drywell Cooler 1VP15SE

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TABLE 3.8.3.2-1 (continued)

DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	SYSTEM/COMPONENT POWERED
ab) MCC 133-2 (Compt. AB2)	VP/Drywell Cooler 1VP15SD
ac) MCC 134X-2 (Compt. H1)	VP/Drywell Cooler 1VP15SB
ad) MCC 134X-2 (Compt. H2)	VP/Drywell Cooler 1VP15SC
ae) MCC 134X-2 (Compt. J1)	VP/Drywell Cooler 1VP15SF
2. Type K-M Cat # NZ M12V-630/ZM12AV	
a) MCC 135X-2 (Compt. E4)	VP/Pri. Cont. Vent Supply Fan 1A Backup
h) MCC 136X-2 (Compt. G4)	VP/Pri. Cont. Vent Supply Fan 1B Backup

A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

The battery load profile and battery charger specifications will be maintained and are located in Chapter 8, "Electrical Power", section of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, UFSAR.

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Primary containment medium and high voltage (6.9 kV, 4.16 kV and 480 volt) electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers by periodic surveillance. Add Insert B

The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers and fuses provides assurance of breaker and fuse reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturers brand of circuit breaker and/or fuse. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers and/or fuses are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers and/or fuses are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of molded case circuit breakers and/or fuses, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers and/or fuses into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker or fuses for surveillance purposes.

The bypassing of the motor operated valves thermal overload protection continuously or during accident conditions by integral bypass devices ensures that the thermal overload protection will not prevent safety related valves from performing their function. The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the bypassing of the thermal overload protection continuously and during accident conditions are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves", Revision 1, March 1977.

A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

The battery load profile and battery charger specifications will be maintained and are located in Chapter 8, "Electrical Power", section of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, UFSAR.

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Primary containment medium and high voltage (6.9 kV, 4.16 kV and 480 volt) electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either de-energizing circuits not required during reactor operation or demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers by periodic surveillance. (Add Insert B)

The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers and fuses provides assurance of breaker and fuse reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturers brand of circuit breaker and/or fuse. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers and/or fuses are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers and/or fuses are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of molded case circuit breakers and/or fuses, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers and/or fuses into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker or fuses for surveillance purposes.

The bypassing of the motor operated valves thermal overload protection continuously or during accident conditions by integral bypass devices ensures that the thermal overload protection will not prevent safety related valves from performing their function. The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the bypassing of the thermal overload protection continuously and during accident conditions are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves", Revision 1, March 1977.

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.2 All primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3. Replace With Insert A

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8.3.2-1 inoperable, restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable circuit breaker within 72 hours, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out, or removed, at least once per 7 days thereafter. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their circuit breakers tripped, racked out, or removed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.2 Each of the primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8.3.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. By verifying that the 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers and performing:

a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, and

b) An integrated system functional test of the breakers overcurrent protective trip circuit which includes simulated automatic actuation of the trip system to demonstrate that the overall penetration protection design remains within operable limits.

c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

No Changes
For Information Only

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each type of 480-volt circuit breakers. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. Testing of these circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current in excess of 120% of the breakers nominal setpoint and measuring the response time. The measured response time will be compared to the manufacturer's data to insure that it is less than or equal to 120% of a value specified for test current by the manufacturer. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

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TABLE 3.8.3.2-1

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR
OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	SYSTEM/COMPONENT POWERED
a. 6.9 kV Circuit Breakers	
1. Swgr. 251 (Bkr. 3A)	RR Pump 2A Primary - fast speed
2. Swgr. 252 (Bkr. 3B)	RR Pump 2B Primary - fast speed
3. Swgr. 251-1 (Brk. 2A)	RR Pump 2A, Primary - low speed
4. Swgr. 252-1 (Brk. 2B)	RR Pump 2B, Primary - low speed
5. Swgr. 251-1 (Brk. 4A)	RR Pump 2A, Backup - fast speed
6. Swgr. 252-1 (Brk. 4B)	RR Pump 2B Backup - fast speed
b. 4.16 kV Circuit Breakers	
1. Swgr. 241Y (Brk. 1A)	RR Pump 2A Backup - low speed
2. Swgr. 242Y (Brk. 1B)	RR Pump 2B Backup - low speed
c. 480 VAC Circuit Breakers	
1. Swgr. 236Y (Compt. 400A)	VP/Pri. Cont. Vent Supply Fan 2B
2. Swgr. 235Y (Compt. 202C)	VP/Pri. Cont. Vent Supply Fan 2A
d. 480 VAC (Molded Case) Circuit Breakers	
1. Backup breakers are located in the back of the respective MCC.	
a) MCC 236Y-2 (Compt. C4)	RR/MOV 2B33-F067B
b) MCC 236Y-2 (Compt. A3)	RR/MOV 2B33-F023B
c) MCC 234X-1 (Compt. B3)	NB/MOV1 2B21-F001

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TABLE 3.8.3.2-1 (Continued)

DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	SYSTEM/COMPONENT POWERED
d) MCC 234X-1 (Compt. B4)	NB/MOV 2B21-F002
e) MCC 236Y-1 (Compt. B2 (Normal)	RH/MOV 2E12-F009
f) MCC 23[illegible]-2 (Compt. E4)	RI/MOV 2E51-F063
g) MCC 235Y-1 (Compt. A1)	RR/MOV 2B33-F023A
h) MCC 235Y-1 (Compt. A4)	RR/MOV 2B33-F067A
i) MCC 233-1 (Compt. C2)	RT/MOV 2G33-F102
j) MCC-233-1 (Compt. E1)	NB/MOV 2B21-F005
k) MCC-236Y-2 (Compt. B1)	NB/MOV 2B21-F016
l) MCC 236Y-2 (Compt. E1)	RH/MOV 2E12-F099A
m) MCC 236Y-1 (Compt. E4)	RT/MOV 2G33-F001
n) MCC 236Y-2 (Compt. A5)	WR/MOV 2WR180
o) MCC 236Y-2 (Compt. D6)	RH/MOV 2E12-F099B
p) MCC 236Y-1 (Compt. H5)	VP/MOV 2VP113B
q) MCC 236Y-1 (Compt. H4)	VP/MOV 2VP114A
r) MCC 236Y-1 (Compt. H3)	VP/MOV 2VP113A
s) MCC 236Y-1 (Compt. H6)	VP/MOV 2VP114B
t) MCC 236Y-2 (Compt. A4)	WR/MOV 2WR179
u) MCC 235Y-1 (Compt. D3)	RT/MOV 2G33-F101
v) MCC 235Y-1 (Compt. D4)	RT/MOV 2G33-F100
w) MCC 233-1 (Compt. C3)	RT/MOV 2G33-F106
x) MCC 236Y-2 (Compt. D5)	RI/MOV 2E51-F076
y) MCC 235X-1 (Compt. C2/C3) (Emerg)	RH/MOV 2E12-F009
z) MCC 233-2 (Compt. AC1)	VP/Drywell Cooler 2VP15SA
aa) MCC 233-2 (Compt. AB1)	VP/Drywell Cooler 2VP15SE

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TABLE 3.8.3.2-1 (continued)

DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	SYSTEM/COMPONENT POWERED
ab) MCC 233-2 (Compt. AB2)	VP/Drywell Cooler 2VP15SD
ac) MCC 234X-2 (Compt. H1)	VP/Drywell Cooler 2VP15SB
ad) MCC 234X-2 (Compt. H2)	VP/Drywell Cooler 2VP15SC
ae) MCC 234X-2 (Compt. J1)	VP/Drywell Cooler 2VP15SF
2. Backup breakers are located in the front of the respective MCC.	
a) MCC 235X-2 (Compt. AA4)	VP/Pri. Cont. Vent Supply Fan 2A Backup
b) MCC 236X-2 (Compt. AA4)	VP/Pri. Cont. Vent Supply Fan 2B Backup

BASES

A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)

specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

The battery load profile and battery charger specifications will be maintained and are located in Chapter 8, "Electrical Power", section of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, UFSAR.

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Primary containment medium and high voltage (6.9 kV, 4.16 kV and 480 volt) electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either de-energizing circuits not required during reactor operation or demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers by periodic surveillance. (Add Insert B.)

The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers and fuses provides assurance of breaker and fuse reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturers brand of circuit breaker and/or fuse. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers and/or fuses are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers and/or fuses are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of molded case circuit breakers and/or fuses, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers and/or fuses into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker or fuses for surveillance purposes.

The bypassing of the motor operated valves thermal overload protection continuously or during accident conditions by integral bypass devices ensures that the thermal overload protection will not prevent safety related valves from performing their function. The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the bypassing of the thermal overload protection continuously and during accident conditions are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves", Revision 1, March 1977.

INSERT A

3.8.3.2 Primary and backup primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices associated with each primary containment medium and high voltage (6.9 kV, 4.16 kV and 480 volt) electrical penetration circuit shall be OPERABLE. The scope of these protective devices excludes those circuits for which credible fault currents would not exceed the electrical penetration design rating.

INSERT B

A controlled list of the components applicable to Specification 3.8.3.2 is maintained as an Administrative Technical Requirement.

ATTACHMENT C

Evaluation of Significant Hazards Consideration

Commonwealth Edison has determined that the proposed Technical Specification Amendment does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration based on the criteria established in 10CFR50.92. In support of this determination, a discussion of each of the criteria is presented below.

1) Would operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

   This is an administrative change to remove the component list of Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices, Table 3.8.3.2-1 from the Technical Specifications. The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), 3.8.3.2, is being revised to define components to which the LCO applies. The wording of the revised LCO encompasses all of the components listed in the current Table 3.8.3.2-1, and all of the components which fit the wording of the revised LCO are currently listed in Table 3.8.3.2-1. Removal of this component list does not change the probability of any accident initiators or change any other relevant accident initial assumptions. Also, there is no change to the consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because removing this list from the Technical Specifications does not change either the onsite or offsite dose consequences resulting from an event. The component list will be controlled by an Administrative Procedure and can only be changed by the 10 CFR 50.59 change process with review and approval per the Onsite Review and Investigative Function as specified by Technical Specification Section 6.0, Administrative Controls. Therefore, there is no increase in either the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2) Would operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

   This is an administrative change to control the list of Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices outside the LaSalle Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications. The administrative controls provided to control this component list assure that the design and operation of the plant will continue to be in accordance with the UFSAR, Facility License and the associated Technical Specifications. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated is not created.

3) Would operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?

The Limiting Condition for Operation for Technical Specification 3.8.3.2, Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices, is revised by this Technical Specification change to specifically define the components to which the LCO applies. Therefore, removal of Technical Specification Table 3.8.3.2-1, which lists the specific components to which the LCO applies, does not change the scope or applicability of the specification. The component list will be controlled administratively, with any changes to the list made in accordance with the 10CFR50.59 change process. Therefore, this is an administrative change only and there is no reduction in the margin of safety.

Guidance has been provided in "Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazards Considerations," Final Rule, 51 FR 7744, for the application of standards to license change requests for determination of the existence of significant hazards considerations. This document provides examples of amendments which are and are not considered likely to involve significant hazards considerations. These proposed amendments most closely fit the example of an administrative change to the Technical Specifications. The Limiting Condition for Operation for the effected specification is being revised to clearly define the components to which the specification applies, so the Technical Specification Table which lists the components is redundant to the revised LCO and can be removed without changing the application or interpretation of the LCO. Any changes to the component list after removal from Technical Specifications will be performed under Administrative control, which will assure compliance with the Technical Specification.

This proposed amendment does not involve a significant relaxation of the criteria used to establish safety limits, a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting safety system settings or a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting conditions for operations. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

ATTACHMENT D

Environmental Assessment Statement Applicability Review

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed amendment against the criteria for the identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10CFR51.21. It has been determined that the proposed changes meet the criteria for categorical exclusion as provided for under 10CFR51.22(c)(9). This determination is based on the fact that these changes are being proposed as amendments to licenses issued pursuant to 10CFR50. These proposed changes involve no significant hazards consideration, and neither a significant change in the types nor a significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite. In addition, this amendment request does not involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.