

Duquesne Light Company

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March 11, 1996

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001


**Subject: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
Proposed Operating License Change Request No. 229;
Conference Call Documentation**

This letter documents our response to radiological analyses concerns the NRC staff identified during a conference call on March 8, 1996. This information is provided to support the Alternate Steam Generator Tube Plugging Technical Specification change.

Enclosure 1 provides the NRC concerns followed by our response as discussed during the conference call.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. S. F. LaVie at (412) 393-5856.

Sincerely,



Sushil C. Jain

c: Mr. L. W. Rossbach, Sr. Resident Inspector
Mr. T. T. Martin, NRC Region I Administrator
Mr. D. S. Brinkman, Sr. Project Manager

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ENCLOSURE 1

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1
PROPOSED OPERATING LICENSE CHANGE REQUEST 229;
MARCH 8, 1996, CONFERENCE CALL DOCUMENTATION

QUESTION

Regarding application of an iodine partitioning factor of 100 for the intact steam generators, documentation should be provided for re-establishing level control in 0.5 hours.

RESPONSE

The Duquesne Light Company (DLC) control room habitability analysis delayed assuming partitioning credit for one hour. In the event of a main steamline break, a main steamline isolation will occur. This rapidly closes the main steam stop valves and isolates main feedwater. The auxiliary feedwater pumps start on steam generator low-level and safety injection (other automatic actuations may occur). Even if one assumes one main steam isolation valve fails, two steam generators will be isolated from the steamline rupture. As noted on Page 7 of the DLC analysis, the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) direct the operator to isolate feed to the faulted generator, and to feed intact steam generators to maintain a level between 5-50%. An EOP critical safety function red path would be entered if the level was less than 5% and feed flow less than 350 gpm. Page 15.1.5-13 of the Standard Review Plan only requires that the tubes be submerged.

DLC believes, based on engineering judgment, that it is reasonable to assume that level can be restored in 30 minutes, and that the added 30 minute delay assumed in the DLC analysis provides additional margin.