

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION

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KEN POWERS
PLANT MANAGER

May 27, 1992

Docket No. 50-277

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2

This LER revision concerns a violation of Technical Specification 3.2.B due to less than the required number of instrument channels operable due to weaknesses associated with in the planning and equipment maintenance process and guidance concerning the control of equipment status changes.

Reference: Docket No. 50-277
Report Number: 2-91-027
Revision Number: 01
Event Date: 07/29/91
Report Date: 05/27/92
Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
RD 1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Sincerely,

cc: J. J. Lyash, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector
T. T. Martin, USNRC, Region I

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 7 1										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 3				
TITLE (4) Violation of Tech Specs due to Weakness in the Planning and Equipment Maintenance Process and Control of Equipment Status Changes																								
EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)				OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	7	2	9	9	1	0	2	7	0	1	0	5	2	7	9	2	0 5 0 0 0							
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OPERATING MODE (9)				THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following) (11)																				
N				20.402(b)				20.405(i)				60.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)								
POWER LEVEL (10)				20.406(a)(1)(i)				60.36(i)(1)				60.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)								
110.0				20.406(a)(1)(ii)				60.36(i)(2)				60.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text NRC Form 366A)								
				20.406(a)(1)(iii)				X 60.73(a)(2)(iii)				60.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)												
				20.406(a)(1)(iv)								60.73(a)(2)(iii)				60.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)								
				20.406(a)(1)(v)								60.73(a)(2)(iv)				60.73(a)(2)(ix)								
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME												TELEPHONE - NUMBER												
Albert A. Fulvio, Regulatory Engineer												AREA CODE												
												7 1 7 4 5 6 7 0 1 4												
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)															EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)					MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)															X NO									

ABSTRACT (2 lines or 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On 7/30/91, at 0600 hours, it was discovered during a panel walkdown that a half Group IV High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system isolation signal had not been manually inserted as required by Technical Specification (Tech Spec) 3.2.8. Tech Spec 3.2.8 was violated when temperature switches TS-4943C and TS-4944C were removed from service for maintenance at 1200 hours on 7/29/91 until 0000 hours on 7/30/91 when HPCI was taken out of service for unrelated reasons. The cause of the event has been determined to be the lack of guidance for operations personnel concerning the control of equipment status changes required to satisfy Tech Spec operability statements. Guidance will be developed. No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event. No previous similar events were identified.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-330), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 7	LER NUMBER (6) YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 9 1 — 0 2 7 — 0 1	PAGE (3) 0 2 OF 0 3
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A (6-89) (17))

Requirements for the Report

This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) to report a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).

Unit Conditions at time of the Event

Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)(EIIS:BJ) steam line area high temperature switch (EIIS:TS) TS-4944C had previously been determined to be defective requiring a half Group IV HPCI isolation signal be manually inserted to comply with Technical Specification (Tech Spec) 3.2.B.

Description of the Event

On 7/30/91, at 0600 hours, Instrument and Controls personnel discovered during a panel walkdown that a half Group IV HPCI isolation signal had not been maintained inserted as required by Tech Spec 3.2.B following the removal of TS-4944C for repairs on 7/29/91 at approximately 1200 hours. TS-4943C had also been removed because it is on the same circuit card as TS-4944C. Previous to this event on 7/27/91, TS-4944C was discovered to be defective during the performance of a surveillance test. Per direction of shift management, a half Group IV HPCI isolation signal was inserted by lowering the trip setpoint on TS-4944C until a constant trip signal was received. This action satisfied the Tech Spec 3.2.B requirement which states that if any one of the four required instrument channels for the HPCI steam line area high temperature is inoperable, then its associated trip channel shall be placed in the tripped condition.

On 7/29/91 an Instruments and Controls technician (Utility, non-licensed) was dispatched to remove the circuit card containing TS-4943C and TS-4944C for repair. When the TS-4943C/4944C card was removed at 1200 hours, the trip signal which was inserted on TS-4944C was removed from the logic allowing the half group IV isolation signal to clear. Therefore from approximately 1200 hours on 7/29/91, when TS-4943C/4944C was removed, until 0000 hours on 7/30/91 when HPCI was removed from service for maintenance, Tech Spec 3.2.B was not satisfied.

Cause of the Event

The cause of the event has been determined to be the following:

There was no programmatic controls or processes for Operations personnel to place equipment in a tripped condition.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PB30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (D160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 7 9 1	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0 2 7	0 1	0 3	OF	0 3	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

The Shift Supervisor (SSV)(Utility:Licensed) who authorized the work order failed to ensure that the required Tech Spec requirements would continue to be met prior to work.

In addition, the new computer software which controls the work order process allowed Tech Spec equipment to be released without two Shift Management approvals.

Analysis of the Event

No actual safety consequences occurred as result of this event.

TS-4944C, in conjunction with TS-4944A,B and D, monitors an area of the HPCI steam supply line to detect a break in that area. Similarly, TS-4943A-D monitor a different area of the HPCI system supply line to detect a break in that area. Had a break occurred in either of the areas monitored by TS-4943C or TS-4944C, the remaining three switches in each area would have been available to provide the isolation signal. The four switches in each area are arranged in a one-out-of-two twice logic to provide a full isolation signal.

Corrective Actions

On 7/31/91, the TS-4943C/4944C card was replaced and TS-4944C was verified to be operable.

Guidance will be developed so that the Operations personnel have a preferred method of installing and maintaining trip conditions as required by the Tech Specs.

The event has been discussed with the involved individuals. The pertinent information from this event has been provided to the appropriate Operations and I&C personnel.

Guidance has also been provided to Operations personnel regarding the proper method to perform a completed review of work orders prior to authorizing the activity.

In addition, the computer software has been modified to required that the appropriate approval process is complete prior to the release of the Tech Spec equipment.

Previous Similar Events

There were no previous similar events identified in which Technical Specification were not met as a result of improper release of equipment.