



GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

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December 7, 1984


RBG- 19654

File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.1

Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011


Dear Mr. Martin:

River Bend Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458
Final Report/DR-160



On November 7, 1984, GSU notified Region IV by telephone that it had determined DR-160 concerning Gould-supplied lugs connecting potential transformer leads to 5-KV emergency switchgear buses to be reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). The attachment to this letter is GSU's final 30-day written report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e)(3) with regard to this deficiency.

Sincerely,


for J. E. Booker
Manager-Engineering,
Nuclear Fuels & Licensing
River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB/^{PJD}PJD/lp

Attachment

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector-Site

INPO

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ATTACHMENT

December 7, 1984
RBG- 19654

DR-160/Gould-Supplied Lugs Connecting Potential Transformer Leads to 5-KV Emergency Switchgear Buses

Background and Description of the Problem

This deficiency concerns Gould-supplied lugs connecting potential transformer (PT) leads to 5-KV emergency switchgear buses. This deficiency resulted from a possible misapplication of Gould-supplied lugs, as the lugs were breaking when the leads were being handled during normal installation of field cables. The design of the switchgear is such that the only place the field cabling could be attached without modifying the equipment is at the same attachment points as the PT leads. It was found that the size of the hole at the attachment point on the switchgear for the PT leads and the field cabling was larger than the hole in the PT lugs. When the PT leads were initially bolted down in the vendor's factory, sufficient torque was applied to the holddown hardware to cause the lugs to be deformed and partially extended through the oversized hole in the switchgear. The lugs were deformed to the point that movement could cause the lugs to crack and break.

Safety Implication

If one or more of the deformed lugs broke and the high voltage PT leads shorted one to another or to the ground, the breakers protecting the emergency 4160V bus would trip. Thus, the bus would be deenergized along with any safety related equipment connected to that bus, which includes the emergency backup diesel generators.

Corrective Action

Engineering and Design Coordination Report No. C-23,101B has been issued to replace all high-voltage PT leads and lugs on 1ENS*SWG1A, 1B, 3A, and 3B with higher quality lugs.