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ComEd

March 8, 1996

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #96-001-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i.)

Respectfully,

Lyz Luthin

for D. J. Ray
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

Enclosure

cc: H. J. Miller, NRC Region III Administrator
P. G. Brochman, NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle
C. Matthews, IDNS Resident Inspector - LaSalle
F. Niziolek, IDNS Senior Reactor Analyst
INPO - Records Center
D. L. Farrar, Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager

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NRC FORM 366 (5-92) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
LaSalle County Station Unit One	05000373	1 of 4

TITLE (4)
Missed Technical Specification Required Fire Protection Valve Position Verification

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									NONE	
02	13	96	96	001	00	03	08	96	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)						
			20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	100		20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	OTHER
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
James Arnould, Operations Department	(815) 357-6761 x 2771

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines 16)

On February 13,1996, Fire Protection personnel identified that four fire protection valves on Unit 1 had not been verified to be in the correct position as required by Technical Specification 4.7.5.1.1.a. Three of the valves, 1FP063, 1FP124 and 1FP125 are locked open fire water suppression header stop valves for the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The fourth valve, 1FP050, is a normally closed drain valve for an inline strainer. This condition is contrary to Technical Specification 4.7.5.1.1.a which states that the fire suppression water system shall be demonstrated operable at least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve in the flow path is in its correct position. When the missed surveillance was identified, the four valves were immediately declared inoperable and a fire protection impairment permit was issued.

The root cause of the missed surveillance was human performance. Several opportunities to identify that the surveillance interval was exceeded were missed.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 1 Event Date: 02/13/96 Event Time: 1500 Hours

Reactor Mode(s): 5 Modes(s) Name: Refuel Power Level(s): 08

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On February 13,1996, Fire Protection personnel identified that four fire protection valves on Unit 1 had not been verified to be in the correct position as required by Technical Specification 4.7.5.1.1.a. Three of the valves, 1FP063, 1FP124 and 1FP125 are locked open fire water suppression header stop valves for the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The fourth valve, 1FP050, is a normally closed drain valve for an inline strainer. The surveillance on these valves was required to be complete on February 12, 1996.

Position verification of Unit 1 fire suppression system valves is performed once per month in surveillance procedure LOS-FP-M3, "Fire Protection Flow Path Valve Position Check" Attachment 1A. This surveillance was started February 4, 1996. During the performance of the surveillance, the operator found that access to four valves at Reactor Building Elevation 710' was prevented by a high radiation barrier created by a demineralizer in use for the chemical decontamination of Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal(RHR)[BO] piping. The operator reported the problem in accessing the four valves to the Work Control Center Senior Reactor Operator(WCC SRO) and returned the surveillance to the WCC. The WCC SRO discussed the need to access the valves with the supervisor in charge of the chemical decontamination. Dose rates at the valves were 2 to 3 R/hr but were expected to decrease in several days and based on this information, the WCC SRO held the surveillance open at the WCC.

On February 9, 1996, a WCC SRO followed up on accessing the four valves and was

informed that dose rates at the valves were still 2 to 3 R/hr. The surveillance was was returned to the WCC and then re-assigned on February 12, 1996 and high dose rates again prevented the completion of the surveillance. This was not recognized as exceeding the allowed Technical Specification surveillance interval when the surveillance was returned to the WCC. The following day, when the Fire Marshall reviewed the surveillance, he noticed the incomplete surveillance items and that the affected portion of the fire suppression system was not declared inoperable and the required compensatory measures initiated. This condition is contrary to Technical Specification 4.7.5.1.1.a which states that the fire suppression water system shall be demonstrated operable at least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve in the flow path is in its correct position.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of the missed surveillance was human performance. The individuals responsible for the timely completion of a Technical Specification surveillance did not recognize the surveillance interval was exceeded and did not initiate the required compensatory actions.

D. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The 1FP063, 1FP124 and 1FP125 valves are locked open stop valves that supply water to a fire protection water suppression loop header. Other valves that supply the header were on the same surveillance procedure, LOS-FP-M3, and had been verified to be positioned correctly on February 4, 1996. If these three valves had been inadvertently closed, adequate flow and pressure would still have been available to the header through these other valves to fulfil all water suppression requirements.

Valve 1FP050 is a closed drain valve, which is only opened to clean out an in line strainer on the fire protection loop header. If this valve is mispositioned open, the flow would be quickly detected from the input into the floor drains system. The Reactor Building fire suppression water supply remained available throughout this period and the safety consequences of this event are minimal.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. When the missed surveillance was identified, the four valves were immediately declared inoperable and a fire protection impairment permit was issued.

2. Operating Department senior management has reinforced expectations with the WCC SROs, shift supervisors, and Operating schedulers on the performance of a Technical Specification surveillance to ensure that:

   a. The performance of a surveillance will be followed by the Field Supervisor and reviewed by the Unit Supervisor each shift prior to returning the surveillance to the WCC SRO for further scheduling.

   b. The Unit Supervisor will be responsible for problems identified during the surveillance and will initiate actions to ensure any problems which could prevent completion of the surveillance are resolved.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

LER NUMBER	TITLE
373/95-012-00	Missed Fire Protection Valve Position Verifications Due to Management Deficiencies
373/95-015-00	Missed Technical Specification Fire Protection Valve Surveillance

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Since no component failure occurred, this section is not applicable