

Vepco

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION

P. O. BOX 402

MINERAL, VIRGINIA 22117

10 CFR 50.73

March 16, 1992

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No. N-92-06
NAPS:WCH
Docket Nos. 50-338
License Nos. NPF-4


Dear Sirs:

The Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit 1.

Report No. 50-338/92-004-00

This Report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Corporate Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very Truly Yours,



G. E. Kane
Station Manager

Enclosure:

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. M. S. Lesser
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
North Anna Power Station

9203230053 920316
PDR ADOCK 05000338
S PDR

Handwritten initials: JE28

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

North Anna Power Station Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

050003381 OF 01

TITLE (3)

INADVERTENT REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL GENERATED DURING TESTING

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)															
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME(S)	DOCKET NUMBER(S)														
0	2	2	6	9	2	9	2	0	0	4	0	0	0	3	1	6	9	2	0	5	0	0	0	1
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
5			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b) <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)																					
POWER LEVEL (10)			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405.4(i)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(1) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v) <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)																					
0			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(b)(1)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Attachment and on NRC Form 308)																					
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(b)(1)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) <input type="checkbox"/>																					
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(b)(1)(iii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) <input type="checkbox"/>																					
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(b)(1)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(C) <input type="checkbox"/>																					
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(b)(1)(v) <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv) <input type="checkbox"/>																					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

G. E. Kane, Station Manager

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

7038942101

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				

ABSTRACT

(Limit to 1450 spaces, i.e., approximately three single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0050 hours on February 26, 1992, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 operating on the Residual Heat Removal System at 100°F when an unexpected Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip signal was generated during testing. The trip breakers had been closed as part of the Reactor Trip from Turbine Trip Response Time Test. The instructions in the test procedure that required the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) trips to be defeated were unclear resulting in the "B" Train trips remaining unblocked during the "A" Train test. When the Nuclear Instrumentation System test signal potentiometers were adjusted to 10% power, a "B" Train Loss of Flow Reactor Trip signal was generated. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv) as an automatic actuation of the RPS. A four hour report was made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii).

The cause of the event was personnel error resulting from an inadequate procedure. The steps for defeating the "B" Train SSPS trips during the "A" Train response time test were unclear. Another contributing factor was inadequate self checking by the Technician.

No significant safety consequences resulted from this event because the reactor was shutdown and the rod drive system was incapable of rod withdrawal. In addition, the SSPS fuses were removed. Since the unit was already shutdown when the inadvertent signal was generated, the health and safety of the public was not affected at any time during this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.5 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

North Anna Power Station Unit 1

YEAR

SEQUENTIAL
NUMBERREVISION
NUMBER

0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | OF | 0 | 3

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 360A's) (17)

1.0 Description of the Event

At 0050 hours on February 26, 1992, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 operating on the Residual Heat Removal System at 100°F when an unexpected Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip signal was generated during testing. The trip breakers had been close as part of the Reactor Trip from Turbine Trip Response Time Test (1-PT-36.7.2). The instructions in the test procedure that required the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) trips to be defeated were unclear resulting in the "B" Train trips remaining unblocked during the "A" Train test. When the Nuclear Instrumentation System test signal potentiometers were adjusted to 10% power, the P-7 SSPS block of the RCS low flow trip was removed causing a "B" Train Loss of Flow Reactor Trip signal to be generated. Since the unexpected signal caused the reactor trip breakers to cycle open, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv) as an automatic actuation of the RPS. A four hour report was made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii).

2.0 Significant Safety Consequences and Implications

No significant safety consequences resulted from this event because the reactor was shutdown and the rod drive system was incapable of rod withdrawal. In addition, the SSPS fuses were removed. Since the unit was already shutdown when the inadvertent signal was generated, the health and safety of the public was not affected at any time during this event.

3.0 Cause of the Event

The cause of the event was personnel error resulting from an inadequate procedure. The steps for defeating the "B" Train SSPS trips during the "A" Train response time test were unclear. Step 6.2.7.e. instructed the Technician to "place all of the SSPS Time Response Test Card switches in the "untripped" position. The technician interpreted this step as requiring all test card switches to be placed in the "down" position. When the Technician placed all switches in the "down" position, the SSPS UV meter indicated 3.0 VDC. The Technician realized that this indicated a "tripped" condition. (The tripped condition resulted from the MANUAL switch being in the down position alone.) The Technician then placed all the switches in the "up" position, and the SSPS UV meter was then observed to read 48.0 VDC. Thus, an untripped condition had been achieved and the Technician proceeded with the test.

The intent of the procedure was to block all SSPS trips. To accomplish this, all switches on the Test Card must be in the "down" position except for the "manual" switch which should be in the "up" position.

Since the Technician later admitted some confusion concerning the intent of the step, he should have stopped the procedure and reviewed the potential outcome of his actions. Since he did not, another contributing factor to the event was the Technician's failure to self check.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) North Anna Power Station Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500033892	LER NUMBER (5)				PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0	0	4	0	0	03 OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

4.0 Immediate Corrective Actions

When the inadvertent RPS actuation was encountered, the test was terminated and a Deviation Report was submitted.

5.0 Additional Corrective Actions

A Procedure Action Request was submitted which incorporated more precise instructions for blocking SSPS trips.

The test was successfully completed.

The Technician involved with performing the procedure was counseled by management on their expectations concerning the self checking process.

6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence

The event will be discussed in the Instrument Technician Training Program.

7.0 Similar Events

LER N1-91-014-00 documents an intermediate and source range high flux reactor trip signal generated while shutdown during maintenance on a process control cabinet on July 14, 1991.

LER N2-89-004-00 documents an unexpected reactor trip during Steam Generator "B" flow protection channel IV test due to procedure inadequacy on May 2, 1989.

LER N2-87-016-00 documents an unexpected reactor trip from Mode 4 during Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Time Response Testing on October 31, 1987.

8.0 Additional Information

North Anna Unit 2 was in mode 1 throughout this event and was not affected.